On 5 June 2026, Law No. 149-FZ entered into force. Signed by Vladimir Putin, the law amended two foundational statutes, the Citizenship Law and the Defence Law. The amendment of the former means that the Citizenship Law now obliges Russian authorities “to take necessary measures to protect Russian citizens who have been arrested (detained) or are subject to criminal or other proceedings abroad by judicial authorities whose jurisdiction is not based on a Russian international treaty or a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII.” The amendment of the latter now explicitly authorises the President to “deploy the Armed Forces with weapons and outside their standard operational purpose” to protect such Russian citizens. In this blog post, I argue that Law No. 149-FZ should not be thought of as a citizen protection statute but rather seen as what it really is: a legislative deterrent against international criminal accountability, purporting to authorise extraterritorial armed force in violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
The Protection of Nationals and its Limits under International Law
The protection of nationals abroad is a contested doctrine in international law. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006) codified a state’s right to espouse claims on behalf of nationals harmed by internationally wrongful acts of another state. As several scholars, including Yoram Dinstein and Tom Ruys, point out, however, this right is conditional and requires: (i) an imminent threat of injury to nationals and (ii) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them. Furthermore, (iii) the action of the intervening state must be strictly confined to the objective of protecting its nationals – armed forces cannot, for example, be used to overthrow the foreign government or occupy its territory.
Even on the most expansive reading of the protection of nationals doctrine – which does not constitute a recognised exception to the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – the situations the doctrine covers are fundamentally different from what Russian Law No. 149-FZ purports to authorise. To recall, armed rescue operations are considered legitimate when nationals face imminent physical danger from non-state actors or state failure. An example of a situation covered by the protection of nationals doctrine is the Israeli Entebbe mission in Uganda in 1976, during which Israeli special forces rescued hostages, including around 80 Israelis, held by armed plane hijackers in Entebbe, while the Ugandan authorities were unwilling to intervene. By contrast, the doctrine does not extend to extracting persons from regular criminal proceedings lawfully conducted by a foreign state or by an international judicial body. A state exercising criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national pursuant to its domestic law or a treaty obligation is not committing an internationally wrongful act against that individual’s state of nationality. Rather, the foreign state is exercising a sovereign prerogative that international law recognises and, in the case of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in some circumstances, even expressly obliges (e.g., Geneva Convention IV, Art. 146).
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations require protective action to be conducted through legal and diplomatic means precisely because armed extraction from foreign criminal proceedings would violate the foreign state’s territorial sovereignty under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The prohibition of the use of force does not allow for any unilateral exceptions based on disagreement with the legal grounds for prosecution.
Law No. 149-FZ in Context
The Explanatory Note accompanying Law No. 149-FZ framed it as a natural extension of existing protective obligations indicated in Article 8 of the Russian Law on Security (amended in April 2023), which states that the President shall take measures to protect the state’s citizens from decisions of foreign and international bodies that run counter to Russia’s interests.
Interestingly, the note did not refer to Article 69(3) of the Russian Constitution which, following amendments made in 2020, provides for “supporting compatriots living abroad in the exercise of their rights, ensuring the protection of their interests and preserving their shared Russian cultural identity.” It seems that this provision was primarily prompted by the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict then ongoing in Ukraine, where, according to the Russian authorities, Russian armed forces were supporting compatriots who spoke the Russian language and adhered to Russian culture. New Law No. 149-FZ peruses different objectives; it concerns “citizens” rather than “compatriots”, between which a difference appears to be made.
I propose that the language of the new law is crafted with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine in mind. Following Russia’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016, the state no longer has a treaty relationship with the ICC. In theory, a Security Council referral of the situation in Ukraine to the ICC would still be possible, however, in light of UN Charter Chapter VII. But any such attempt will be vetoed since Russia is one of the five veto power holding permanent members of the Security Council. The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, currently under discussion, would similarly fall within the wording of Law No. 149-FZ: the Tribunal was established by multilateral treaty with neither Russian participation nor Security Council authorisation. Both the ICC and the Tribunal (would) target high-ranking Russian officials. In 2023 and 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for eight individuals falling in this category, including Vladimir Putin. As for the Tribunal, once it begins its work, it will investigate the crime of aggression for which high-ranking officials may be held accountable.
As indicated above, Law No. 149-FZ permits the deployment of armed forces into the territory of a state that has arrested a Russian citizen, including where this was done in fulfilment of an obligation under the Rome Statute such as when a state party arrests a suspect against whom the ICC has issued a warrant. Thus, the new law can be interpreted as a warning to states that decide to enforce decisions by the ICC or the Tribunal to arrest Russian citizens.
Law No. 149-FZ, moreover, addresses foreign states in an even more direct manner. As was explained by Andrei Kartapolov, Chair of the State Duma Defence Committee, “the introduction of such provisions [Law No. 149-FZ] will help prevent situations such as the arrest in Poland of the Russian archaeologist Aleksandr Butyagin.” Butyagin was arrested in Poland at Ukraine’s request in December 2025 for allegedly conducting illegal excavations in Crimea after 2014. On 28 April 2026, Butyagin returned to Russia as part of an exchange of detained nationals between Russia and Belarus, on the one hand, and Poland and Moldova, on the other. According to one independent Russian media outlet, there are currently around 15 Russian citizens, who are arrested (detained) in European countries on suspicion of committing crimes on behalf of the Kremlin. The new law’s wording (“judgments of foreign courts granted jurisdiction by other states without Russia’s participation”) indicates that Russia deems it legitimate to challenge any foreign criminal prosecution of a Russian national. Consequently, the objective of the new law may be not only to prevent the enforcement of judgments rendered by international judicial bodies, but also those of national courts at the request of another state or of their own accord (which is, for example, what Finland did when its court sentenced Russian soldier Yan Petrovskii to life imprisonment for committing war crimes in Ukraine in 2014).
Additionally, for ordinary Russians and probably some allied states, the law could provide domestic legal ‘cover’ for military operations in Ukraine that are in reality dictated by the ongoing armed conflict. Through the new Law No. 149-FZ, these operations could formally be characterised by the Russian authorities as a reaction to “Russian citizens who have been arrested (detained)” in Ukraine. Such a cover is important for the authorities, as Russia is, formally speaking, still a state governed by the rule of law (see its Constitution, art. 1).
And, lastly, the law communicates to Russian officials, including military commanders and political leadership, that the state will potentially militarily protect them from international prosecution. This helps to maintain the cohesion of the “elite” in the face of weariness following four years of armed conflict, constant external pressure, and ongoing discussions about the criminal accountability of Russian officials.
One might compare Law No. 149-FZ to the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (“Hague Invasion Act”), pointing out that powerful states have long sought legislative protection from international criminal jurisdiction, and this comparison would not be without merit. However, despite all similarities, the American law was strictly directed against the ICC and it was adopted in the absence of any arrest warrants from the ICC or national jurisdictions. The law also does not explicitly provide for the deployment of armed forces onto the territory of another state though section 8(a) that authorises the US President “to use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of” persons then defined, including US citizens, could be read to encompass this power with regards to the Netherlands, where the ICC is located.
Conclusion
Law No. 149-FZ was enacted in full compliance with Russian constitutional procedure. It was submitted by the Government, passed by the Parliament, and signed by the President in accordance with established legislative practice. Its formal validity under Russian law is not in question; its conformity with international law and its true purpose, however, are an entirely different matter.
The law purports to authorise extraterritorial armed operations in an effort to “rescue” nationals subject to ongoing foreign criminal proceedings for which no recognised exception to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter exists. Even on the most expansive reading of the protection of nationals doctrine, as indicated above, the permissible use of force is confined to situations of imminent physical danger where the foreign state has failed to protect the individuals concerned. To be clear: A national or international foreign court conducting lawful criminal proceedings satisfies none of those conditions.
In this blog post, I have argued that the real objective of this law lies not in the operational measures, but in intimidation. The law is primarily aimed at deterring states from executing ICC arrest warrants against Russian officials and those that will be issued by the future Special Tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine. By transforming its political stance of non-recognition into a formal legislative threat of an armed response, Russia has moved from declarative non-compliance with international criminal law to codified, militarised opposition. Whether this escalation is an end point or a step towards actual implementation of this threatened use of force is a question that the new law deliberately leaves open.
States and international organisations including judicial bodies that still believe that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured” must not remain silent when such laws are enacted. To ensure that faith in international justice is not eroded by Russia’s agenda of disregarding international law and the ongoing commission of international crimes, it is important to reiterate the importance of punishment for such crimes, particularly when laws that directly contradict this principle are enacted.