Solving the Wrong Problem?

On January 1, 2025, the Basel Convention’s amendments on e-waste took effect, extending the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure to non-hazardous e-waste for the first time. Yet, they regulate e-waste only after it has become waste and leave untouched the design and production decisions that determine how much of it is generated. This post argues that, unless repairability obligations are built into producer responsibility frameworks and international compliance regimes, the Basel regime will keep managing the aftermath of the e-waste crisis rather than its source.

The amendments to the Basel Convention were a meaningful step, closing a long-standing loophole that led exporters to move non-hazardous Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) across borders without receiving states’ consent. Under PIC, a shipment may proceed only with the written consent of the importing and transit states. The flows at stake are considerable, with an estimated 5.1 billion kilograms of e-waste, equivalent to 8.2 percent of all e-waste generated, crossed borders in 2022 (p. 15). Yet the reform’s structural inadequacy is already apparent. The Global E-waste Monitor 2024 (GEM) projects that annual e-waste generation will reach 82 million tonnes by 2030  (p. 57). In 2022 alone, an estimated 3.3 billion kilograms were shipped from high-income to middle- and low-income countries, much of it moving uncontrolled and undocumented (p. 15).

The 2025 amendments address e-waste movements once it has entered the waste stream. They do not address upstream design and production decisions that determine how quickly Electrical and Electronic Equipment (EEE) becomes WEEE. This post argues that without embedding repairability obligations into producer responsibility frameworks and international compliance regimes, the Basel reforms continue to manage the aftermath of a waste crisis while leaving its source of generation largely unaddressed. This post calls this phenomenon the Basel Convention’s “repairability gap”.

What the Basel Amendments Do and Do Not Fix

Definitional ambiguity has long undermined the Basel Convention application to e-waste. Since WEEE’s inclusion in Annexes VIII and IX in 1998, exporters have exploited the gap between ‘waste destined for disposal’ and ‘used equipment destined for reuse,’ misclassifying non-functional devices as second-hand goods to bypass PIC requirements (p. 31).

The 2025 extension of PIC coverage to non-hazardous e-waste represent genuine progress in the Basel Convention’s scope. However, three structural issues remain unresolved. The first concern is classification arbitrage. There is a high possibility of misclassification of hazardous waste as “donation” and “reuse” categories, which still enable exporters to escape routes, especially if receiving states lack tools, technologies and inspection capacity (p. 2). Second, the Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation (1999) has not entered into force, meaning that financial accountability for illegal transboundary harm has been largely non-existent (p. 6). Third, the most important problem is that neither the 2025 amendments nor any other Basel agreement cover the upstream sector, namely, deliberate product design and planned obsolescence strategies.

Extending PIC is not sufficient. Even in countries with established e-waste systems, the proportion of waste recycled remained limited compared to the amount generated (p. 34). Prevention requires intervention at the point where environmental damage originates. The polluter-pays principle makes producers responsible for decisions that result in product obsolescence. Hence, repairability obligations are a logical extension of these principles, already embedded in international environmental law.

Right to Repair as an Upstream Intervention

The Basel amendment governs what happens once EEE becomes WEEE or is shipped as Used EEE (UEEE). Right-to-Repair (RtR) legislation addresses an earlier question on how long a device stays usable.

RtR legislation requires manufacturers to make available diagnostic tools, repair manuals, spare parts, and software updates to consumers and independent repairers (p. 1). It intervenes upstream at the design stage, where decisions regarding repairability, modularity, and product longevity are made. By extending product lifecycles, RtR can reduce the number of new EEEs and devices that reach end-of-life prematurely. Consequently, the volume of WEEE potentially available for illegal export or informal disposal will be minimized (p. 168).

Repair, however, may postpone, but does not necessarily prevent a device from becoming waste. RtR may therefore reduce replacement frequency, but it cannot, on its own, reduce e-waste volumes or prevent transboundary e-waste movements. Jin, Yang, and Zhu’s economic modelling even indicates that repair requirements potentially cause higher device generation for low-cost products, as it may encourage manufacturers to reduce the prices of new products and increase output. For intermediate-cost products whose environmental impact arises mainly during use, repair may even prolong the use of older and less efficient devices (p. 1017-1018).

In this context, planned obsolescence, that is deliberately shortening product lifespans through design choices, software restrictions, and withholding repair information, is relevant. It remains largely unregulated at both the domestic and international levels (p. 25). International e-waste governance has largely focused on controlling waste flows while leaving the economic incentives that generate those flows intact. Due to the absence of binding repairability obligations manufacturers are not required to internalize the downstream environmental costs associated with their design decisions. RtR provides a legal mechanism for transitioning from a linear -make-use-discard” structure toward circular-economy principles (p. 2) ).

 D.C. or Brussels as a Role Model for Basel?

In the Basel regime, repairability is currently underdeveloped. On a (supra)national level, the EU and US represent different governance approaches. While the recent EU legislative changes offer a positive example of how repairability can be written into binding law  the US framework remains fragmented and largely state-based.

The EU’s 2024 Right to Repair Directive (2024/1799) is the most advanced example of embedding repair and product longevity within a regional legal framework. It requires sellers to offer repair services beyond the legal guarantee period. Manufacturers, on the other hand, must provide spare parts and repair information. The Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR), adopted in 2024, extends product-design obligations across a broader range of goods (p. 2). Consequently, the EU treats repairability not merely as a matter of consumer convenience, but as a structural environmental strategy connected to the European Green Deal and Circular Economy objectives (p. 2, 26). Nevertheless, the Directive’s limited product scope and its criticized repairability-scoring methodology remain significant weaknesses (p. 16-18).

By contrast, in the US, RtR legislation remains predominantly state-based rather than federal. This leads to substantial variation in both the products covered and the obligations imposed. It also remains largely disconnected from environmental governance.  For example, several state laws restrict their obligations to business-to-consumer transactions (p. 263). This fragmented approach produces regulatory inconsistency that manufacturers can easily navigate.

Hence, in the context of the international governance, the EU model is more useful. It shows that repairability can be made legally enforceable and that producer responsibility can be extended upstream through binding rules.

The North–South Dimension

Any attempt to integrate RtR into international e-waste governance must address existing North–South power asymmetries. The transboundary flows governed by the Basel Convention reflect broader patterns of environmental externalization (p. 25), in which high-income countries transfer obsolete electronics to lower-income states under the guise of “donation” or “reuse” (p. 336).

A legitimate concern is that stronger RtR obligations in developed countries could create new export channels for non-repairable devices, particularly where recipient countries lack access to spare parts, technical expertise, and relevant documentation (p. 12). Unless RtR standards are connected to export-classification systems, reform may become another layer of formal compliance that exporters can circumvent. Yet, RtR’s relationship with the Global South is not necessarily one-sided. Informal repair sectors already constitute significant economic activity across many developing countries (p. 399). Inclusive frameworks that recognize these sectors could generate employment and strengthen technical capacity (p. 38). This outcome, however, depends on the development of global RtR standards through meaningful participation by developing countries rather than through another phase of Northern-led norm-setting.

Three Ways the Basel Framework Could Address the Repairability Gap

The 2025 amendments create a political opportunity to connect e-waste governance with upstream product regulation. Repair so far has entered the Basel framework onlydownstream. The Technical Guidelines on EEE and UEEE, adopted in 2023, recognize reuse after repair or refurbishment, but they address the movement and classification of UEEE rather than product design. The next Conference of the Parties, which will meet in April 2027, should prioritize the following measures.

First, the Basel COP should develop technical guidelines for assessing whether a device’s parts, documentation, and software remain available and, therefore, whether the device is genuinely repairable. This information could be treated as relevant evidence when determining whether UEEE is destined for direct reuse and is therefore not treated as e-waste, a distinction already addressed in the Technical Guidelines on WEEE and UEEE. Such guidance would help address the classification gap left open by the 2025 amendments without making repairability an independent classification trigger.

This is a deliberately modest legal claim. The COP’s mandate under Article 15 includes adopting amendments to the Basel Convention’s Annexes and undertaking further action necessary to achieve the Convention’s purposes. However, the COP’s practice, including the amendments adopted at COP-15 in 2022, has generally classified waste by reference to its characteristics and disposal operations rather than to product-design features. Treating repairability as an independent classification could therefore considerably extend the COP’s mandate. By contrast, using repairability as a guide for applying the existing distinction between WEEE and UEEE destined for direct reuse would place the proposal more clearly within COP’s established competence. how

Second, the Basel COP, the OECD guidelines, or a dedicated international instrument should develop baseline repairability standards to prevent the regulatory arbitrage that a patchwork of domestic laws inevitably produces. Without greater cross-jurisdictional coherence, manufacturers will continue to design products according to the least demanding applicable standard. As a result, exporters will continue to route devices through jurisdictions with weaker controls.

A caveat applies here too. Once baseline repairability standards operate as binding technical requirements for traded EEE, they may fall within the scope of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). The Agreement permits technical regulations pursuing legitimate objectives such as environmental protection, provided they are no more trade-restrictive than necessary. Article 2.4 requires Members to base them on relevant international standards where these exist or their completion is imminent, unless such standards would be ineffective or inappropriate for those objectives. A Basel-specified repairability criterion would therefore face fewer trade-law concerns if it were aligned with relevant international environmental standards, applied equally to domestic and imported EEE, and operated primarily as an aid to classification rather than an outright prohibition on importing non-repairable products. OECD analysis of upstream circular economy policies, which include repairability requirements, shows that such measures are notified under the TBT Agreement and have already given rise to specific trade concerns (p. 17).

Third, the digital dimension of repairability, which concerns software-enabled products such as smartphones, laptops and connected tractors, needs explicit attention. Software locks, cybersecurity restrictions, the Internet of things (everyday objects that connect to the internet), interdependencies between hardware and embedded software, and intellectual property barriers remain significant obstacles to effective RtR enforcement (p. 2; 11). International guidelines addressing these barriers, including provisions on compulsory licensing for repair-related software, are necessary to prevent repair rights from being  blocked in practice even when they  are formally recognized.

Necessary, but Not Sufficient: A Milestone to Build On

Enforcing the Basel e-waste amendments on 1 January 2025 was a milestone worth marking. It should be seen as a necessary downstream reform that leaves the upstream drivers of the e-waste crisis, planned obsolescence, design-driven repair restrictions, and manufacturer control over the repair market mostly unaddressed. The EU’s 2024 Right to Repair Directive demonstrates that repairability can be embedded in binding environmental law rather than left to voluntary industry practice.

E-waste challenges are not confined to transboundary movement alone. Equally essential are the design choices and commercial incentives that determine how fast EEE becomes e-waste. Unless the international e-waste governance also addresses repairability and product longevity, the Basel regime will continue to confront a growing waste stream while leaving its underlying causes intact. The repairability gap is therefore not a reason to criticize the 2025 amendments, but a reason to build on them.