Let Those Without Sin Cast the First Stone

It has been said that “satellites don’t have mothers”. However, a nuclear-material-laden satellite detonating in space could have consequences that produce ripple effects on global peace and security. This threat became a focal point in mid-February 2024 when the United States (U.S.) Congressman Mike Turner, a member of the House Intelligence Committee, highlighted a grave national security threat: the possibility of a Russian nuclear weapon in space. This claim quickly garnered attention and led to a series of official statements and reports that painted a concerning picture of exacerbating an already intense space militarization scenario.

According to reports, the threat involved two possible scenarios. One scenario was that Russia had deployed a nuclear-powered device designed for electronic warfare, capable of jamming satellite communications and disrupting critical infrastructure on Earth. The other, more alarming scenario suggested that Russia has been developing a space-based nuclear weapon, which could be detonated, causing an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that would cripple satellites and other space assets vital for global communications, navigation, and security.

In response to these concerns, the U.S. and Japan sponsored a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2024 – the first-ever space security-related resolution in the Council – purportedly aiming to reaffirm commitments under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST). This treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space. The draft resolution significantly “affirms the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” This paragraph mirrors the language of Article IV of the OST, reinforcing the treaty’s prohibitions and commitments. However, Russia vetoed it, while China abstained.

Russia’s Response

Russia dismissed the U.S. allegations as politically motivated, arguing that the resolution was redundant, and even potentially harmful to ongoing disarmament efforts. However, before the Russian veto, the UNSC rejected an amendment to the draft resolution proposed by Russia and China, which included a ban on deploying all kinds of weapons – not just nuclear weapons and WMDs – in outer space. They contended that their broader proposal would more effectively address the comprehensive prevention of an arms race in outer space. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) deliberated on the veto, revealing deep-seated divisions among major space-faring nations. More recently, on 20 May 2024, Russia’s counter-move at the UNSC – a draft resolution seeking to affirm States’ obligation not to place any weapon in outer space, including those causing mass destruction – met a similar fate. By a vote of seven in favor to seven against, with one abstention, the UNSC failed to adopt the draft resolution.

The following sections critically situate these state-led developments within the broader context of twenty-first-century space demilitarization negotiations. By briefly examining the history and politics of these developments, this post endeavors to cast some light on the complex dynamics shaping the immediate future of space security.

Strategic Move

The U.S.–Japan draft resolution clearly represented a strategic move to address perceived threats from Russia. The intent behind the resolution was evident from the US statement before the vote, which highlighted the severe consequences of a nuclear explosion in space without explicitly naming any country. By repeating a well-recognized stipulation in the operative part of the OST, which already applies to all State Parties, including Russia, the resolution was also intended to open another front against Russia. The latter happened in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, thus placing more emphasis on international scrutiny of Russia’s aggressive posturing.

In its retort during the same meeting, Russia stated that what the U.S. and Japan are doing “is like trying to install a roof on a house before the walls are built and the overall design is approved.” This metaphor underlines the fundamental differences in opinion between Western states, including the U.S., on the one side, and Russia and China on the other. These differences are about the form and content of norms regulating space militarization. This disarmament debate is also intertwined with Realpolitik, with each camp trying to preserve its strengths and strategic advantages in space.

Disagreements

The disagreements on the form and nature of the norms began in 2008 when Russia and China jointly submitted the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This proposal and its revised version aimed at establishing a legally binding treaty.

In contrast, Western States, particularly the European Union (EU), have advocated for ‘soft law’ instruments through the Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) – voluntary guidelines rather than enforceable rules – for arms control in outer space. Officially released in 2008 against the backdrop of the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test in 2007, the European Union’s (EU) Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (CoC) and its amended draft in 2014 were envisioned as TCBMs to strengthen existing regulations. However, the key spacefaring states, including Russia and China, viewed it as an insufficient move to address their concerns about the militarization of space. Interestingly, the U.S., while participating in discussions related to TCBMs, stringently opposed any arrangement that would restrict its freedom of action in outer space.

Despite not having an acknowledged program to develop co-orbital capabilities – maneuverable satellites that can approach and potentially attack other satellites or space objects – it is well documented that the U.S. possesses the technological superiority and ability to develop and deploy them in a short period if it chooses to do so. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the country has consistently opposed any binding obligation against placing “any weapon” in outer space.

Russia and China, on the other hand, have robust direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles in their arsenal. Consequently, their proposals in the PPWT (both versions) and, more recently, their amendment to the 2024 US-Japan draft resolution at the UNSC avoid any language covering these ground-based weapons. This omission is also evident in the Russian draft of 20 May 2024. None of these proposals also include a verification mechanism to ensure compliance, which the U.S. had pointed out. In contrast, in April 2022, the U.S. unilaterally pledged to stop testing direct-ascent ASAT weapons.

Breaking the Deadlock

The UNGA has attempted to break the deadlock by establishing two Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs) in 2011 and 2017. However, these efforts have been hindered by the lack of consensus among the major players, thus leaving significant gaps in progress. The narrative shifted when the United Kingdom introduced a fresh approach to space security legislation by sponsoring UNGA Resolution 75/36 in 2020, which focused on “reducing space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviours.” This resolution strategically avoided advocating for a binding treaty or ‘soft law,’ thereby paving the way for new forms of international engagement. Instead, the emphasis was placed on identifying behaviors in space that are considered threatening or destabilizing rather than concentrating on the types of space weapons. This initiative was further advanced by a subsequent UK co-sponsored resolution in 2021, which led to the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and garnered broad support within the UNGA. Again, the abovementioned divergences persisted, and the members could not agree on a report in 2023.

The same story is playing out in the UNSC this year, with both sides reemploying their long-held positions to undermine each other. At the core of this issue are differing philosophies on space arms control and the contrasting strategic realities of the U.S. and Russia. Given the adversarial climate exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, substantial progress in space arms control is improbable unless China works toward reaching an agreement with the US. Historical precedents demonstrate that even though the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the existential threat of Mutually Assured Destruction were crucial in driving disarmament efforts, major agreements – from the Partial Test Ban Treaty to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) – were achieved when both superpowers found common ground during U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the Cold War era.

The path to meaningful progress in space arms control likely hinges on the willingness of the major space-faring States to engage in constructive negotiations, much like the historical examples of US-Soviet arms control agreements. Until then, the strategic posturing and rhetorical battles at the UNSC will continue to reflect the deep-seated geopolitical tensions and divergent priorities. In a world shaped by strategic ambitions and past challenges, efforts to foster genuine cooperation and mutual restraint in space could be one of the important stones yet to be cast.