DSI – What?!
Why Those Three Letters Are Not Only at the Heart of CBD COP 16, but Also Matter to Minority Rights and Systemic Change
The use of DSI (Digital Sequence Information) is one of the hot topics discussed at the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 16), taking place over the last two weeks in Cali, Colombia. As DSI is a rather technical subject – familiar to biologists, but rather not to international law experts – it did not catch much attention from international law scholars so far. In particular, the topic did not seem to have the interest of those scholars who research minority rights and social justice. Yet, looking at it more closely reveals that legal questions relating to DSI being currently discussed at COP 16 are closely linked to the rights of marginalized communities and social and ecological justice.
What Is DSI and What Is It Used For?
Digital Sequence Information is one of the terms used for genomic digital data, which means data of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and ribonucleic acid (RNA) and related data. DNA and RNA store and transmit genetic information and therefore the characteristics of an organism, whether it is a virus or a tree. The DNA and RNA information is acquired by breaking down the structure, the sequence of the nucleotides – the elements forming the DNA and RNA – by using actual biological material. DSI refers to the digitized DNA and RNA data. The term is not widely used by science but is a policy term referring to the subject. Although “there are divergent views on digital sequence information on genetic resources with regard to its scope under the Convention on Biological Diversity”, the concept of DSI will be used for the purpose of this contribution, as it is the concept referred to under the CBD (e.g. in the language of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework).
The DSI data has been stored in large public repositories among databases run by private companies. Three large public databases form the International Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (NSDC) which is widely used by researchers. So far, public databases can be accessed freely by researchers from all over the world.
Scientists access those databases for either academic or commercial interests. They combine large DSI datasets in order to learn about proteins and metabolites that form the DNA or RNA and detect new organisms and species, their specificities, and interactions. Scientific findings – the new data – are being uploaded to those databases again, a process which has been leading to an exponential growth of the datasets in the databases in the past years. Why does this matter for COP 16? DSI is important for biodiversity monitoring and conservation. It is also essential for commercial use in biotechnology, to detect and develop new fabrics, pharmaceuticals, cosmetic products, vaccines, and so on.
Why Is It Discussed at CBD COP 16?
DSI regulation has no normative basis within the CBD itself, adopted as one of the three Rio Conventions in 1992, although databases already existed at that time. Neither is the concept of DSI featured in the Nagoya Protocol (NP), the prevalent legal instrument that was designed ten years ago to halt biopiracy and regulate access to and the sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources.
DSI is part of Goal C (to be achieved by 2050) and Target 13 (to be implemented by 2030) of the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) which was adopted at COP 15 in 2022. That framework sets long-term goals and “action-oriented global targets“ for the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the sharing of its benefits. According to the KMGBF, benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and digital sequence information on genetic resources have to be shared in a fair and equitable manner. In particular, target 13 of the KMGBF requires state parties to “ensure the fair and equitable sharing of benefits that arise from the utilization of […] digital sequence information on genetic resources[.]”
Decision 15/9, adopted at COP 15 in 2022, established a multilateral mechanism on DSI (para. 16) as part of the KMGBF. Decision 15/9 does not provide a definition of digital sequence information but recognizes “divergent views” on the concept in its preamble. The decision aims at a global instrument that would be applicable across jurisdictions and regulate the use of DSI, including a global fund serving the restoration and conservation of nature. The mandate to discuss the multilateral mechanism on DSI at COP 16 arises from that decision. In that regard, the topic is related to the ongoing negotiations on agenda item 11 on resource mobilization and a financial mechanism for the KMGBF.
What Does Benefit Sharing Mean? How Does This Relate to the Rights of Indigenous People and Local Communities?
Within the rationale of the NP benefits resulting from the use of genetic resources are to be shared fairly and equitably with the countries that provide the genetic resources. Furthermore, the benefits have to be shared with the indigenous and local communities who hold these genetic resources and the rights thereon (see in particular Article 5 NP). This process includes not only monetary benefits which would be shared by payment, but also non-monetary aspects. Sharing of non-monetary benefits could therefore include the transfer of knowledge and technology, access to scientific information, as well as capacity building within local communities. As DSI is stored in databases and, to a certain extent, detached from actual genetic resources and specific locations of origin, benefits arising from their use are often shared unequally or not shared at all. For that reason, benefit sharing needs to be governed by a multilateral mechanism. The rights of indigenous people and local communities holding traditional knowledge relating to genetic resources – also referred to as “biocultural meta-data” – are especially emphasized throughout the KMGBF. The latter aims at strengthening indigenous people and local communities – as well as people of African descent if so decided at COP 16 or later – as guardians of the ecosystems around them. These groups often live in places of extraordinary biological diversity and therefore play a crucial role in the conservation of nature and its sustainable use. Therefore, their well-being is at the heart of questions relating to the KMGBF implementation. Here, when considerations about monetary allocation arise. What is at stake?
To put it briefly, the following matters will be decisive: how the use of DSI will be regulated by the multilateral mechanism, how monetary resources will be mobilized, especially by defining who will be made to pay for the use of DSI and how much, and how those fundings will be allocated.
Referring to the establishment of a global MLM, Preambular paragraph 12 of decision 15/9 states: “Recognizing also that a solution for benefit-sharing from the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources is also a wide-ranging solution for the mobilization of resources to support the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”. This statement does not only make reference to Article 20 of the CBD but also gives a hint about the possible scope of the DSI regulation.
Firstly, the MLM could be a tool to generate financial resources for a global fund for the protection and restoration of biodiversity. Secondly, payment obligations for companies – as foreseen in current drafts – could mark a paradigm shift with regards to big companies – “big pharma” corporations in particular, as they have not so far paid for digitized data originating from genetic resources. A decision that would oblige companies to pay for the data they use would acknowledge that natural resources, data gained from it, and the associated traditional knowledge do not come for free. Their use has a price we will all pay if biodiversity is not conserved and aligned on par with human and biocultural rights.
Conclusions
I consider the negotiations as an opportunity for a paradigm shift in social and ecological justice. A global mechanism of benefit sharing marks a possible means of redistribution of wealth between those who have been exploiting natural resources and indigenous people and local communities in particular who have been serving as guardians of nature.
Yet, it remains disputed, what would be within the scope of the “use of DSI”. There is no agreement on the exclusion of non-commercial, conservation-oriented research from mandatory payment – something that scientists are advocating for. It remains highly disputed which companies – small, medium, large – would have to pay, how much, and based on which criteria. Contributions could also be voluntary. All of those questions remain “bracketed text” in the language of the negotiators.
What is still left unclear is, how the income to the global fund will be allocated, through capacity-building programs or, for example, by direct funding to indigenous people and local communities. Currently, it seems that a final decision on DSI will not be adopted during this COP 16. DSI and the related matters will rather be reconsidered in the intersessional period ahead of COP 17. Despite this, negotiators have the opportunity to set a tone regarding a seemingly technical matter with meaningful implications for biodiversity conservation and biocultural rights.
Catharina Caspari is attending the ongoing COP 16 negotiations as part of the German Research Foundation (DFG) delegation and works as a research assistant to Prof. Dr. Sabine Schlacke on the DFG SKBV working group on access and benefit sharing. This text reflects only her academic perspective and not the views of the DFG.
Catharina Caspari is a research assistant at the Institute for Energy, Environmental and Maritime Law (IfEUS) at the University of Greifswald. She holds a M.A. in philosophy and is a trained and qualified German lawyer.
Before the first sentence ends, the errors begin: “The use of DSI (Digital Sequence Information)…”.
DSI is the acronym for “Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Resources” and not “Digital Sequence Information”. The suppression of “on genetic resources” is egregious. Without “on genetic resources”, “digital sequence information” would also describe the sound emanating from my YAMAHA keyboard. With “on genetic resources”, delegates and stakeholders become befuddled. What does “on genetic resources” mean? In UN translations from the official English text into French and Spanish, the “on” was translated as if the preposition were “from”. Parties and stakeholders are also interpreting the “on” as “from”; digital sequence information from genetic resources means de-materialized genetic resources. In submission of views on Decision 15/9, savvy User Parties remind the Secretariat that DSI is not de-materialized genetic resources. The seemingly erroneous “on” is to convey that digital sequence information is NOT from genetic resources. The curious use of “on” is artful.
This article does not mention that DSI is a placeholder term and deemed not appropriate by the consensus of the 2018 Ad Hoc Technical Group on DSI [1]. Nor does the author allude to how contentious is the term as evidenced by copious submission of views. Rather “[t]he term is not widely used by science but is a policy term referring to the subject”. Origins illuminate. The “policy term” emerged in a 2015 CBD workshop in synthetic biology for which no one ever claimed authorship [2]. Nine years and three COPs later, no definition has been officially accepted for this inappropriate term.
Without acceptance of the appropriateness of DSI or an official definition, the author nonetheless asserts: “DSI regulation has no normative basis within the CBD itself, adopted as one of the three Rio Conventions in 1992”. To make sense of this sentence, the reader must assign a definition to DSI. The reasonable interpretation of DSI as de-materialized genetic resources means a normative basis does exist within the CBD itself. Similarly, Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol would be the basis for a Global Multilateral Benefit Sharing Mechanism for genetic resources, no matter whether the medium is biological matter, print, film or digital. A Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism for DSI is redundant of Article 10. But why the redundancy?
No one dares ask an even more undiplomatic question, so I will. If DSI is not de-materialized genetic resources, why do profit-driven Users embrace a new obligation in Decision 15/9 when none exists in the CBD and NP? Don’t corporate lawyers relish loopholes? The answer: there is no loophole and they know it. The current utilization of dematerialized genetic resources is non-compliant with the CBD and NP, and can cloud the intellectual property rights of hundreds of billions of dollars in biotechnology. Hence one explains the User obsession with legal certainty. Decision 15/9 has allowed Users to create a mechanism as if they were never under any CBD and NP obligation. Provider Parties took the bait but have not yet fully swallowed. The brackets in the Draft Recommendation Version 3.0 at COP16 number in the hundreds.
The author writes “Firstly, the MLM could be a tool to generate financial resources for a global fund for the protection and restoration of biodiversity.” But without reference to economic rents for genetic resources used in patented biotechnologies, financial resources will be infinitesimal [3]. Note well that the German-government-financed 2020 “Finding Compromise” Report, foundational for Decision 15/9, contemplates royalties as low as 0.01% (one hundredth of one percent) [4]
The “glaring absence” of including intellectual property in Decision 15/9 seems deliberate [5], especially when advocates hail from User Parties and huge biotechnology interests. The option of a 1% retail tax on biological products in the Draft Recommendation would effectively spread the benefit-sharing obligation from patented biotechnologies to entities that enjoy no monopoly intellectual property protection. [6] This is as inequitable as it is inefficient.
Funds should originate in rent-rich royalties on the limited-in-time monopolies of intellectual property. [7] Allocation should align incentives between Users and Parties for conservation and sustainable use [8].
The concluding sentence of the author is that “negotiators have the opportunity to set a tone regarding a seemingly technical matter with meaningful implications for biodiversity conservation and biocultural rights.” There is no evidence that the movers and shakers of Decision 15/9 are availing themselves to economic reasoning and a large supporting literature [9]. As long as the philanthropist who foots the bill does not do due diligence, they won’t [10].
[1] “REPORT OF THE AD HOC TECHNICAL EXPERT GROUP ON DIGITAL SEQUENCE INFORMATION ON GENETIC RESOURCES”, 20 February 2018, https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/4493/56b5/4ec917358b3cb37c7f7061f5/dsi-ahteg-2018-01-04-en.pdf
[2] Report from the 2015 AHTEG meeting refers to “digital genetic information” and “digital genetic resource information” but not to “digital sequence information”, https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/synbio/synbioahteg-2015-01/official/synbioahteg-2015-01-03-en.pdf. The term “digital sequence information” may have been heard but not recorded. See, Edward Hammond, 2019 (1 June), “Comments of Third World Network on Digital Sequence Information”, SCBD/NPU/DC/VN/KG/RKi/87804, p. 3, https://www.cbd.int/abs/DSI-views/2019/TWN-DSI.pdf.
[3] Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental, “Fairness, Equity and Efficiency for the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol: Analysis of a Rodent, a Snail, a Sponge and a Virus”. Report. 2021. Eschborn, Germany: The ABS Capacity Development Initiative. 127 pp. https://www.abs-biotrade.info/fileadmin/Downloads/Resources/Fairness-Equity-Efficiency-for-the-CBD-and-the-NP/Study-Fairness-Equity-Efficiency-for-the-CBD-and-the-NP-2021.pdf
[4] A. H. Scholz, Hillebrand, U., Freitag, J., Devanshi, S., Seitz, C., Thiele, T., & Van Zimmeren, E.(2020). Finding Compromise on ABS and DSI in the CBD: Requirements & Policy Ideas from a Scientific Perspective. WiLDSI Project. https://www.dsmz.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Collection_allg/Final_WiLDSI_White_Paper_Oct7_2020.pdf
[5] Viviana Munoz Tellez, “A Fair Solution for Access and Sharing of Benefits
of Digital Sequence Information? Decision for the CBD COP in November2024”,
SouthViews No. 275, The South Centre, 4 October 2024,
https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/SV275_241004.pdf
[6] Joseph Henry Vogel. (commentary), 24 August 2024, MONGABAY. “Biodiversity’s Tower of Babel: The confusion & disorientation of Convention on Biological Diversity Decision 15/9”, https://news.mongabay.com/2024/08/biodiversitys-tower-of-babel-the-confusion-compromise-of-convention-on-biological-diversity-decision-15-9-commentary/#:~:text=Decision%2015%2F9%20of%20the,on%20genetic%20resources%20(DSI).
[7] Manuel Ruiz Muller, Joseph Henry Vogel, Klaus Angerer and Nicolas Pauchard, “‘Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing’ in the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework”, Op-Ed, Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF), 11 December 2019, https://trade4devnews.enhancedif.org/en/op-ed/access-genetic-resources-benefit-sharing
[8] Joseph Henry Vogel, Natasha C. Jiménez-Revelles,Xavier A. Maldonado-Ramírez de Arellano, “Decision 15/9 and the Nagoya Protocol: Who should get what in the Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism?” The South Centre, 30 September 2024, https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/RP210_Decision-15-9-and-the-Nagoya-Protocol_EN.pdf
[9] Joseph Henry Vogel, Manuel Ruiz Muller, Klaus Angerer, Dino Delgado-Guitiérrez, Alfredo Gálvez Ballón, “Bounded openness: A robust modality of access to genetic resources and the sharing of benefits”, PLANTS PEOPLE PLANET, Vol 4 Issue 1 (2022) https://doi.org/10.1002/ppp3.10239
[10] Joseph Henry Vogel, “Will billionaires bankroll biodiversity? Decision 15/9 as potential goldmine” (commentary), MONGABAY, 14 May 2024, https://news.mongabay.com/2024/05/will-a-billionaire-bankroll-biodiversity-cbd-decision-15-9-as-potential-goldmine-commentary/
Dear Joseph Henry Vogel, a late reply to your comment:
Thanks for your insights and elaborations. However, I’m afraid you missed my point. My aim has been to briefly sketch out the concept of DSI for readers who might not be as familiar with it and to elaborate, why the concept is not a technical issue, but matters for social equality, marginalised communities and the funding necessary to protect and restore ecosystems. This intention precludes to go into the details of the debate evolving around the term itself – yet, I am grateful for some of the points raised by your comment.
Although I would not agree with the contemptuous tone of your comment, I agree that the omission of “on genetic resources” is indeed inaccurate. The discussion about the respective translation into other language sheds light on conceptual details which are of significance regarding possible definitions of DSI “on” or “from” genetic resources.
I am also aware that DSI is a heavily debated placeholder term, isn’t considered adequate by some of the stakeholders and therefore, also, lacks legal clarity. I tried to make this clear by pointing to the fact that it is used as a policy term. However, as mentioned above, the point of my blog contribution has not been to go into details of terminology and conceptual considerations regarding the emergence of DSI as an acronym under the CBD, but to shed light on the implications the latest COP decision – negotiations respectively – and the operationalised multilateral mechanism might have with regards to social and ecological justice. A look into the terminology of DSI as the concept used might be instructive, especially from a legal perspective, but that has not been my point here.
My assertion that “DSI regulation has no normative basis within the CBD itself” may also have been misunderstood. It was meant to say, that digital sequence information on genetic resources cannot be found in the terminology of the Convention. However, it is considered to fall within the scope of the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources as one of the CBD’s objectives. Your considerations whether DSI is de-materialized genetic resources or not and how this might have fundamental implications for the question whether the use of DSI actually creates obligations under the CBD and the NP are insightful. I consider those questions legitimate to discuss and highly interesting, especially from a legal point of view – but that would be a different blog contribution. With regards to Article 10 NP: following its wording, Article 10 aims to cover “the utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge [..] that occur in transboundary situations”. We would therefore first need to discuss whether the use of DSI would always be considered transboundary in order to apply Article 10 NP.
Thank you for your insights on the economic aspects, including intellectual property considerations which might be complementary and instructive for the readers as well, especially since I cannot cover those aspects as a legal scholar.
Overall, your comment seems to be driven by inherent criticism regarding Decision 15/9. I’m afraid my blog contribution has just not been the right place to address all the questions that arise from it.
Thank you for your response to my comment. The architects of the COP16 Decision to “operationalize” Decision 15/9 have not addressed the relevant economics but ignored them, just as you have done in your response. Please do not mistake my earnestness as contempt. Any discussion regarding operationalizing Decision 15/9 requires engagement with the relevant economics. The “contemptuous tone” you perceive in my comment appears to be an argument ad hominem.
The officially undefined placeholder DSI (digital sequence information on genetic resources) is not simply a “technical issue”, as you assert. It is the core issue because of “social equality, marginalized communities and the funding necessary to protect and restore ecosystems”. Through the misnomer DSI, genetic resources de-materialized and digitalized are escaping the scope of the CBD and NP through Decision 15/9, which is not legally binding.[1] From a position of weak bargaining power, Provider parties are negotiating an inefficient and inequitable benefit under the Decision to operationalize Decision 15/9. The Decision contemplates extension to genetic resources.
This opt-in is bait and switch: Bait Providers Parties with compensation for something out-of-scope under the false premise that DSI is not a genetic resource. Many Provider Parties will reason that a trifling something is worth more than nothing. Then User Parties hope to switch DSI for genetic resources in all media (biological matter, print and film). Through the many intersessional meetings, everyone is worn down. Should Provider Parties acquiesce at COP17 or COP18, “marginalized communities and the funding necessary to protect and restore ecosystems” will receive a pittance.
[1] Kathryn Garforth, “Legal considerations DSI-WG-1, report, annex: Possible elements of a multilateral mechanism”, https://s3.amazonaws.com/cbddocumentspublic-imagebucket-15w2zyxk3prl8/0591b1afd6568dc4f28b67f254c00755