Climate Governance and the Energy Transition: Lessons from COP29

Dear Christoph, welcome to Völkerrechtsblog! We are delighted to have you join us for this interview. To begin, let’s delve into the realm of international climate governance.

In terms of international climate governance, how effective are the legal mechanisms under the framework agreement of the UNFCCC and particularly the Paris Agreement in enforcing compliance with emissions reductions targets? Are states taking enough binding commitments, or do you think the reliance on voluntary contributions undermines the UN climate process’s overall impact?

The legal mechanisms of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are reflective of the broader international order, which sets strong limits on how binding these types of agreements between sovereign countries can be. Given that we do not have a higher-level authority above these sovereign countries, it is understandable that more binding approaches like the earlier Kyoto Protocol were not successful. Therefore, the mechanisms  behind the Paris Agreement are essential – initiating a process by which countries define their own targets, share them on a transparent global platform for inclusive assessments, implement and deliver these targets, and, over time, continue racheting ambition over the repeated cycles. We have seen that this process has galvanized a lot of action and planning around the net-zero emissions concept, at country-level, state-level, but also by companies and cities.

Of course, the success of this process is not a given, and there is a risk that greenwashing and the promotion of ineffective solutions might dominate the process, but the Paris Agreement is our best chance to secure a coordinated approach to address  the intertwined challenge of stopping climate change and managing the resulting consequences, many of which are  already unavoidably baked into the system.

Bringing climate change down to a manageable level requires comprehensive transitions in  energy generation and use and in land-use practices. This is a complicated transformational process that requires constant learning and adaptation.  The main objective remains to significantly bend the curve of greenhouse gas emissions to achieve fast reductions in the years ahead, and towards net-zero emissions in the second half of this century. This is achievable by taking bold climate action at the national and sub-national levels, and by the international community sharing information and learning important lessons from each other, while also providing a higher level of accountability.

Given the commitments made at COP29, do you think the current climate action plans are ambitious enough to meet the targets set by the Paris Agreement, particularly in terms of limiting global warming to 1.5°C? What additional measures are needed to accelerate progress?

Our research both from a global top-down and a country-by-country bottom-up perspective clearly shows that we will definitely surpass 1.5°C, and likely even with a highest ambition peak temperature at 1.6-1.7°C. The lack of ambition in the past 10 years, which led to emissions further increasing on a global level rather than decreasing has considerably increased the unavoidable climate change we will have to cope with. On the other hand, we have been relatively successful in bringing many new mitigation technologies to market and scale, and thus it is now a crucial question whether we can build the right ambition to scale these solutions up as fast as possible and have an orderly phasing down of fossil fuels.
We are still facing the obscene situation that there are widespread financial incentives to using fossil fuels, ranging from direct subsidies to the lack of regulation or pricing that inadequately (or not at all) considers the negative side-effects like air pollution, energy insecurity, traffic congestions, and of course climate change.

At the same time, there are substantial financial barriers – foremost among them is the lack of low-cost financing solutions – to the adoption of low-carbon technologies like solar energy, utility-scale batteries, and electric mobility in many countries in the world. Correcting these biases, which requires a collaborative effort of national policymakers with international processes like the COP financing provisions, would go a long way in accelerating the needed energy transition.

The energy transition is a key component of climate strategies. How do you evaluate the progress in shifting from fossil fuels to renewable energy at COP29, and do you think the current energy policies are sufficient to address the scale of the climate crisis?

That the COP29 parties could not agree on how to embed the Global Stocktake outcomes from the UAE dialogue into this year’s decision text is a disappointment. In our interpretation, this illustrates that some countries (mostly fossil fuel exporters) have a clear interest in slowing down the global energy transition. On the other hand, there are many countries that have a clear ambition to speed up the energy transition, be it because they are fossil fuel importers and thus worry about energy and financial security or due to air pollution concerns or because they are looking to foster their local green industries, or because of already felt climate impacts – or any combination of those several factors. These countries, in our view, need to see the COP process as one avenue for building productive international coordination on the energy transition, but it is by no means the only avenue to do so.

And of course the most important tool remains country-level and even state-level legislation and regulation to support clean energy and to make sure that fossil energy is priced according to its full costs, including the various elements of damages caused by fossil fuels. While policies already exist to support the development and implementation of clean energy technologies, this is a constant area of work for governments given that the technology landscape is changing rapidly. For example, electric vehicles are now truly ramping up globally, including in various lower-income countries like Thailand and Ethiopia, or grid-scale battery storage becoming an important complement to solar and wind energy.

Looking at the analysis of national climate protection strategies, including the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), do you believe that the countries’ long-term decarbonization pathways align with the latest scientific recommendations, and are they incorporating enough urgency in addressing the most immediate threats posed by climate change?

One of the less visible advancements at COP29 was that last year’s and next year’s hosts of COP, the United Arab Emirates and Brazil, presented their new 2035 nationally determined contribution (NDC). Originally the plan was that the hosts of COP28-30, (those two countries and this year’s host Azerbaijan) would publish their NDCs ahead of this year’s COP to send a strong signal that the March 2025  submission deadline should be adhered  to by all parties. Doing so would allow for a clear understanding of the combined effect of these 2035 targets, well ahead of COP30 in Brazil next November.
So while the fact that this did not fully work (UAE submitted before COP, Brazil at COP, Azerbaijan is yet to present their NDC), the UAE and Brazil NDCs both contain encouraging elements:

• The UAE’s target of 47% emission reduction from 2019 levels for 2035 is an ambitious target, and recent progress in reducing emissions from electricity generation which is the largest contributor responsible for nearly 50% of emissions makes it plausible that it can be reached, although the ambition for renewables expansion still needs to be scaled up.
• Brazil’s target of 59%-67% compared to 2005 is less impressive, given that the country has already pledged to achieve 53% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, so 59% would be considerably less than what a linear trajectory from their existing 2030 and 2050 targets would require. The higher end of their 2035 target range is more in line with our assessment of High Ambition, but, unfortunately, Brazil will use potential higher mitigation as outcome of trading of internationally traded mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which basically means that its own contribution is, in any case. limited to the low ambition 59% reduction outcome.
  Both these countries are of course oil exporters, so the lack of explicit ambition with regard to that role is a lost opportunity.
• Lastly, there was an announcement by a diverse group of countries, including the EU, Canada, Georgia and Chile, and representing around 30% of global GDP and 15% of greenhouse gas emissions that they would submit NDCs in line with IPCC scenarios and the outcomes of the global stock take (GST). While this is a clear signal regarding the importance of scientific grounding, it remains to be seen what these countries deliver in the coming year.