Fast-Tracking and Fundamental Rights

In recent years, the European Union has placed unprecedented emphasis on accelerating its green and industrial transitions. Two flagship instruments, the revised Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) and the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), now require Member States to fast-track the authorisation of projects considered essential for decarbonisation and digitalisation. This represents a significant reorganisation of environmental decision-making in Europe: approvals must be issued more quickly, consultation windows are narrower, and the space traditionally allocated to public participation and environmental scrutiny is shrinking. This post argues that these acceleration mechanisms, while politically understandable, sit in growing tension with the minimum procedural human rights guarantees required for environmentally significant decisions.

The rationale for speed is clear. Meeting the EU’s climate and energy-security goals demands the swift construction of renewable energy and raw-materials-infrastructure on a scale never seen before. Yet compressing procedures risks eroding the democratic safeguards that ensure affected communities can meaningfully understand and influence decisions with lasting environmental consequences. This tension has become sharper in light of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)’s judgment in Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway, which confirmed that authorising large-scale energy projects engages States’ positive obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Such projects must therefore be preceded by an environmental impact assessment (EIA) that is adequate, timely, comprehensive, and supported by meaningful public participation and effective access to justice. The unavoidable question is whether the EU’s fast-tracking model, with its streamlined assessments and compressed timelines, can coexist with the procedural safeguards required by the ECHR.

The Greenpeace Judgment

The dispute in Greenpeace Nordic arose from Norway’s decision to grant ten petroleum licenses in the Barents Sea without assessing the climate impact of downstream emissions (paras. 21-23). Environmental NGOs and affected individuals argued that this omission violated Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, since the authorities had failed to evaluate the climate risks associated with combusting the extracted hydrocarbons. After losing before the Norwegian Supreme Court, the applicants turned to Strasbourg, where the case became a test of how Article 8 applies to large-scale, climate-relevant projects (paras. 51-87).

In its judgment, the ECtHR clarified that authorizing activities with significant climate implications engages States’ positive obligations under Article 8. These obligations require an EIA that is adequate, timely, and comprehensive, grounded in the best available science, and accompanied by meaningful public participation and effective judicial review (para. 319). Adequacy entails a genuine examination of environmental and climate risks, including cumulative and downstream effects (para. 330). Timeliness requires that assessments occur early enough in the decision-making process to influence outcomes, at a stage before essential choices are locked in (para. 331). Comprehensiveness demands a holistic analysis of long-term, indirect, and transboundary impacts (para. 335). Participation must be informed, substantive and open to the public at a moment when decision-makers can still be persuaded. Judicial review must provide a real opportunity to challenge authorizations based on incomplete or inadequate assessments (para. 336). Taken together, these requirements translate the precautionary principle into a concrete procedural architecture.

Although Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway concerned petroleum licences, the Court placed its reasoning within a broader international trend. Global courts and tribunals, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Inter American Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice, now treat EIA as a universal safeguard that links environmental protection and human rights (paras. 321-324). Applying its own principles, the ECtHR found shortcomings in Norway’s framework, particularly the absence of downstream-emissions assessments, and warned that waivers of EIAs could “completely undermine” their purpose (para. 332). Nonetheless, the Court ultimately found no violation because subsequent domestic developments, including judicial clarification of constitutional duties and administrative reforms, had strengthened the overall system (para. 334). In this sense, the judgment provides a functional benchmark against which emerging regulatory models concerning the authorisation of new projects, especially fast-track systems, must now be assessed.

Fast-Tracking Provisions under EU Law

Seen through the lens of Greenpeace, the EU’s new fast track permitting architecture reveals clear tensions. RED III and the CRMA were designed to overcome what policymakers describe as Europe’s “permitting bottleneck”, namely lengthy authorisation processes blamed for slowing renewable energy deployment and delaying access to strategic materials. The result is a governance model in which administrative speed becomes the central organising principle, and environmental assessment, public participation and review must be adapted to fit within compressed timelines.

Under RED III, Member States must map the areas needed to meet their 2030 energy targets and designate “renewables go-to areas”—zones pre-assessed through a Strategic Environmental Assessment and prioritized for rapid development (Art. 15c). Within these areas, project authorizations must be issued within twelve months (Art. 16a(1), and within twenty-four months outside of renewables acceleration areas (Art. 16b(1)). The directive also mandates one-stop shops to centralize permitting authority (Art. 16(3)). Although intended to simplify administration, this consolidation reduces opportunities for cross-agency oversight, environmental expertise and independent scrutiny. Perhaps more consequentially, RED III establishes a presumption that renewable-energy projects are in the overriding public interest (Art. 16f). In substance, the burden of justification shifts from developer to administration and from precaution to permission. Member States are already implementing these reforms, with several countries describing plans to map out renewables acceleration areas.

Yet not all renewable projects can be assumed to serve the public interest. For instance, courts in Finland annulled approvals for a wind farm on Sámi reindeer herding lands, finding that constitutional rights to a healthy environment and traditional livelihoods outweighed the presumption of overriding public interest. Similarly, residents in Portugal challenged a large solar project over inadequate environmental assessment and biodiversity risks. These examples show how renewable energy projects may sideline human rights and ecological safeguards.

The CRMA extends this acceleration logic to the Union’s industrial and geopolitical priorities. Its core innovation is the creation of “strategic projects” intended to secure a stable supply of critical raw materials (Art. 6). Once designated, these projects benefit from tight statutory deadlines: twenty-four months for extraction permits, twelve for processing and recycling, and ninety days for issuing the EIA’s “reasoned conclusion”, extendable by only twenty days (Annex III). Article 10(2) of the Act further provides that strategic projects in the Union shall be considered to be of public interest or serving public health and safety and may be considered to have an overriding public interest provided that they comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of EU environmental law, such as those under the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive. Although strategic projects are not formally exempt from EIAs, the binding deadlines compress scientific analysis and public participation into rigid, truncated windows. The Commission’s first list of strategic projects, ranging from lithium extraction in Portugal to rare-earth processing in Estonia, has already provoked significant public opposition and demonstrates how difficult it is to reconcile accelerated procedures with the plural ecological, social, and cultural values affected by such projects.

Is Fast-tracking Compatible with the ECHR?

The case for acceleration is compelling. Europe cannot meet its climate targets or secure essential materials if key infrastructure is trapped in bureaucratic delay. Yet the fast-track frameworks introduced by RED III and the CRMA place growing pressure on the procedural guarantees articulated in Greenpeace Nordic.

Adequacy requires a substantive identification and evaluation of environmental and climate risks, including cumulative, downstream, and transboundary impacts. When authorities must deliver permit decisions within twelve or twenty-four months and, under the CRMA, provide the EIA’s reasoned conclusion within ninety days, the scope for extensive baseline studies, cross-agency analysis, and iterative scientific inquiry narrows considerably. The presumption that renewable and strategic projects serve an overriding public interest further diminishes incentives for in-depth scrutiny, subtly shifting the burden of justification from developers to public authorities.

Timeliness exposes the most pronounced divergence. For the ECtHR, an assessment is timely only if it is produced early enough for the public to influence the substance of the decision. Under RED III and the CRMA, “timeliness” is defined in terms of administrative speed. Environmental information may therefore be disclosed only after the essential direction of the project is predetermined, preserving transparency in form but not in substance. Consultation can occur, yet too late to change the outcome.

Comprehensiveness also comes under pressure. Simplified or streamlined assessments frequently rely on standardized templates and partial datasets. Neither RED III nor the CRMA explicitly requires examination of downstream emissions or wider system-level effects, despite their recognized significance for climate impact. In the Greenpeace framework, omissions of this scale weaken an assessment’s capacity to safeguard Convention rights.

Finally, public participation, an essential component of Article 8 protection, is particularly vulnerable under acceleration regimes. Shorter consultation periods and centralized decision-making reduce opportunities for iterative engagement. Judicial review may be constrained by urgency procedures or by overarching presumptions of public interest. The Covas do Barroso lithium mine, designated a strategic project under the CRMA, illustrates these risks vividly. The Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee found that Portugal breached its obligations on access to information, participation, and review, underscoring how rapidly procedural guarantees can erode when administrative speed becomes the overriding imperative.

Conclusion

Acceleration is not inherently incompatible with human rights. The ECHR does not prohibit expedited procedures, but it requires that they remain effective in practice. As RED III and the CRMA reshape national permitting systems, there is a real risk that administrative speed will overshadow the need for robust, science-based, and participatory decision making. When assessments become formalistic, consultation symbolic, and review compressed, procedural rights risk becoming what the Court calls “theoretical and illusory” (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, paras. 544-545).

Urgency is essential for effective climate action. Legitimacy is essential too. The challenge is not to choose between speed and rights but to design institutions capable of delivering both. In this sense, the decision in Greenpeace Nordic v. Norway offers not an obstacle to the green transition but a blueprint for a transition that is fast, fair, and anchored in procedural justice. A transition that honours these guarantees is more likely to succeed and more likely to endure.