When Power Asymmetries Become Evident

International law, as a set of rules, is presumed to constitute an order in which power asymmetries are constrained. Yet, the perceived “crisis” of international law reveals its foundation in an international landscape characterized by power asymmetries, oscillating between the exercise of “soft power” and, at times, a shift toward “hard power” depending on the actors involved and the geopolitical context. Today, we are witnessing the increasing visibility of these asymmetries, marked by a growing reliance on hard power and the attempts of dominant states, such as the United States (U.S.), to coerce others through threats and inducements. I analyze the shift in U.S. policies from soft power to hard power during Donald Trump’s second administration, focusing in particular on the application of hard power in Latin America, as a way of illustrating how international law remains embedded within imperial logics that have historically operated alongside colonial legacies. This shift makes it evident that, although international law has often been framed as functioning within a sphere of equality, it has in practice always operated within a context of power asymmetry, which is only perceived as a crisis when revealed through the systematic exercise of hard power by a dominant state like the U.S.

The Crisis of International Law as a Symptom of Deeper Flaws

Donald Trump’s second inauguration took place in a context of significant destabilization at the international level, driven by geopolitical tensions and unresolved military conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of and ongoing war against Ukraine, the war and genocide in Gaza, and the armed conflict in Sudan.

In this fragile context, the return of the Trump administration further exacerbated instability in the international sphere. New conflicts emerged, including Israeli and U.S. military intervention in Iran, which prompted retaliatory strikes by Iran against regional targets, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. threats to end the “whole civilization” of Iran and a fragile ceasefire. The U.S.’s broader withdrawal from multilateralism, as well as its proclaimed expansionist ambitions—including U.S. interest in the annexation of Greenland—also reflects this instability. At the same time, the U.S. has revived military interventionist policies in Latin America that contravene international law, particularly through military operations against boats in the Caribbean suspected of being “narco-terrorists”, and by its military attack on Venezuela, which culminated in the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his transfer to U.S. territory, as well as Trump’s declaration of a possible “friendly takeover” of Cuba.

These developments sparked renewed debates on the “crisis of international law”, frequently articulated through questions as to its “death,” calls for its “reconstruction,” and depictions of the present moment as a “time of monsters” and “dystopia.” Yet, the perceived crisis within the international legal order merits deeper inquiry. From a critical perspective, B.S. Chimni observes that while mainstream international legal scholarship views “crisis” as episodic gaps and inadequacies, Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) identifies it as a structural, enduring condition deeply rooted in colonialism and imperialism. Among the types of crisis identified by Chimni is an “originary crisis” relating to conditions that are foundational to modern international law and the inextricable link between modern international law and imperialism and colonialism. From a TWAIL understanding, a “crisis” is rooted in deep history and deep structures which will endure until the imperialism of international law is meaningfully addressed.

Building on this understanding of the current “crisis” in international law, I focus on Trump’s policies in Latin America during his second mandate, analyzing how they reflect imperial continuities within the international legal order. In the case of Latin America, the current perceived “crisis” of international law in fact reflects a continuation, albeit one that has shifted from the exercise of soft power towards the use of hard power. This calls into question the perception of the crisis as a periodic phenomenon, suggesting that it should instead be understood as a continuation of imperial and colonial legacies that have merely become more evident.

The Transition from Soft Power to Hard Power in U.S. Policy

From a liberal perspective on international relations, power can take two distinct forms. Hard power refers to the ability of a state to coerce others into changing their behaviour or acting in ways they would not otherwise choose, typically through threats or inducements. Soft power, by contrast, operates more subtly and indirectly, shaping the preferences of other states by encouraging them to emulate or align with one’s values and objectives, not through force but through attraction. The second Trump administration has oscillated between soft and hard power in its policies, marked in particular by a recent turn to hard power. I focus on the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as an instrument of soft power, inseparable from the colonial and imperial logics underlying it, while its shutdown represents a shift toward a more explicit U.S. reliance on hard power. I then turn to the hard power practices adopted by the Trump administration in Latin America, with particular attention to how the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (2025 U.S. NSS) reflects and consolidates this transition.

The shutdown of USAID

On his first day in office, Trump adopted the “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid” policy, which resulted in the shutdown of USAID. As Marco Rubio stated, this “reevaluation” was based on the premise that every U.S.-funded program must be justified on three fronts: “Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Does it make America more prosperous?” The shutdown had far-reaching consequences for humanitarian aid worldwide and was subsequently mirrored by other countries. The shutdown of USAID had a significant impact across Latin America, particularly on the marginalized communities that relied on its assistance, and the full consequences of the shutdown are yet to be seen.

Despite the real impact of the shutdown of USAID, it should be noted that USAID has been viewed with suspicion by actors in the region, often perceived as a political instrument created during the Cold War to advance U.S. strategic interests and contain the expansion of communism. While USAID’s policies have evolved over time, the agency was initially designed to promote development in countries of the Global South, though the pursuit of this objective through neoliberal policy frameworks has been criticized. From this perspective, USAID can be understood as part of a broader “development project” within the international sphere, which scholars such as Anthony Anghie, Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja argue has perpetuated colonial practices of ordering, administration, and the production of scientific knowledge. Christian Ruth has highlighted USAID’s role in implementing small-scale privatization efforts through granular projects tailored to local conditions.

While the shutdown of USAID has had real consequences for beneficiaries of aid programs, both regionally and globally, it also represents the end of a soft power tool that has consistently served U.S. interests, despite what Rubio’s framing may suggest. In this sense, the shutdown of USAID can be understood as part of a broader shift from soft to hard power in U.S. foreign relations, including with Latin America. This broader turn toward the exercise of hard power is further reflected in the 2025 U.S. NSS.

The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy

The 2025 U.S. NSS is unabashed in its imperial aspirations, opening with the statement: “To ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come…” From the start, the 2025 U.S. NSS outlines what it defines as its “core vital interests,” identifying what the U.S. seeks in and from the world. Among these are the need to keep the Western hemisphere free from hostile foreign incursion and control key assets that support critical supply chains, as well as to ensure continued U.S. access to strategic locations. To this end, the strategy explicitly asserts that the U.S. will enforce what it terms a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine.

The explicit invocation of the Monroe Doctrine echoes interventionist policies of the U.S. in the 19^th and 20^th centuries. The Roosevelt Corollary (1905) to the Monroe Doctrine allowed the U.S. to intervene in Latin American states that infringed upon the rights of European nationals, assuming what the U.S. deemed an “anticolonial” approach toward European nations by adopting the role of regional policeman. However, these interventionist policies proved that, although the new nations in Latin America achieved their independence in the 19^th century, in practice, sovereignty conferred much less autonomy and equality than anticipated.

The 2025 U.S. NSS represents a continuity in this sense, not only in its explicit reference to the Monroe doctrine, but also in its approach to the principle of non-intervention. Although the Strategy expresses a preference for non-interventionism, it also states that “for a country whose interests are as numerous and diverse as ours, rigid adherence to non-interventionism is not possible.” This position directly conflicts with the principle of non-intervention established in Article 8 of the Montevideo Convention, which, as Arnulf Becker Lorca highlights, represents one of the efforts undertaken by semi-peripheral and peripheral diplomats to reconfigure the international order in response to the interventionism that the Latin American region consistently experienced. These dynamics have deeper historical roots. From a critical historical perspective, moments such as the Peace of Westphalia, commonly portrayed as marking a transition from a world of empires to a world of states, appear less as a rupture with empire than as its transformation and continuation. The modern international system, centred on the nation-state and sovereignty, recalibrated earlier conceptions of empire, as the idea of a universal monarchy to a new vision of empire increasingly pursued through economic competition and commercial rivalry.

The 2025 U.S. NSS is a continuation of the pursuit of empire by economic means. The U.S. has broadly imposed tariffs on nearly every country in the world—a practice which has been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court—despite the absence of any clear indication that their imposition achieved the benefits promised for the U.S. economy. The 2025 U.S. NSS also emphasizes the United States’ economic and commercial ambitions, stating its aim to maintain the world’s “strongest, most dynamic, innovative, and advanced economy”, alongside a robust industrial base. Among the principal competitors identified in the NSS is China, which the U.S. perceives as having grown increasingly powerful. In this context, the U.S. states that it will deny non-hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or control assets in the region. In practice, this can be understood as an effort to limit China’s access and influence in Latin America, as reflected in Trump’s declared positions on the Panama Canal and the Peruvian port of Chancay. The so-called “Trump Corollary” has also translated into concrete military operations in the region, framed as efforts to combat “narco-traffickers” and “narco-terrorists.” Under this justification, the U.S. has carried out military attacks in the Caribbean and Venezuela. This approach has been further reinforced through initiatives such as the Shield of the Americas Summit, aimed at coordinating military and security efforts across the hemisphere.

In conclusion, as the exercise of hard power becomes more systematic and extends to other actors, for example, through expansionist ambitions regarding Greenland, the imposition of tariffs worldwide, and challenging multilateralism, these dynamics become increasingly evident. In this sense, this crisis has made it clear that international law is deeply embedded in structures of power asymmetry rooted in colonial and imperial legacies that continue to shape the field. Addressing these asymmetries requires fostering a sense of community that does not seek homogenization but instead respects the diverse and conflictual character of its actors, while pursuing gradual efforts to reduce the asymmetries within which international law operates. To this end, meaningfully challenging these power asymmetries depends on recognizing and making visible the colonial and imperial legacies that have shaped the field’s fundamental concepts.