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The Shadow of the Rule

How Private Intermediaries Expand Sanctions Beyond Their Formal Scope

19.11.2026

Sanctions rules rarely reach their subjects in the form they were written. They pass through banks, platforms, compliance officers, and algorithms—intermediaries that almost always enforce them more strictly than the text requires. The formal rule becomes a shadow of itself: wider, darker, and harder to contest. This pattern has a name in modern policy literature: overcompliance. Folk literature and classic novels had already mapped the same mechanism. One proverb captures it aptly: what the king granted, his steward withheld. Kafka returns to the idea repeatedly—the man who spends a lifetime before a gate made only for him, the officer who treats guilt as beyond doubt. Kafka is not an accidental reference here. He studied law and received his doctorate in 1906, before spending his working life inside the bureaucracy of insurance and administration. His fiction shaped by a world in which rules exist, yet the person subject to them can never quite reach the person, office, or logic that gives those rules effect.

This essay follows the shadow rather than the formal text. It uses the economic logic of asymmetric incentives, the historical attempts to build channels that bypass gatekeepers, and the opacity of algorithmic decisions. But it begins from the older insight, recorded in both European and Persian literature: once the steward or the gatekeeper takes control of the rule, the rule changes shape.

Living Under the Shadow

When Kabul fell to the Taliban in 2021, my Facebook account had already been permanently locked for documenting the meeting that made it possible, an experience that revealed a broader pattern I had lived with for years. My account was locked for posting official U.S. State Department photographs accompanied by commentary clearly critical of the Taliban. The stated reason was “promotion of terrorist organizations.” I appealed immediately. After several weeks the response was unchanged. No one explained how criticism of U.S.–Taliban relations could be read as promotion of terrorism. I felt what Josef K. felt in Kafka’s The Trial: accused of something no one would name.

A suspended account is not a tragedy. I mention it because the same mechanism has excluded millions in sanctioned jurisdictions from financial services and web content available elsewhere, although no statute prohibits these restrictions. I am not on a sanctions list, yet the outcome is much the same.

What the Steward Withheld

The most devastating part of the sanctions story never happens in Washington or Brussels. It happens in a compliance office, or inside a moderation model. It happens in a decision no legislature voted on and rarely reaches a court. Persian literature worked out the shape of this problem long before anyone gave it the academic name overcompliance. Like Kafka’s Before the Law, Persian idioms locate the mechanism in the stern gatekeeper rather than the rulemaker.

Centuries ago, a king in Persia would hand out lavish payment orders to musicians and dancers — sums to be collected the next morning from his treasurer. The treasurer, who understood better than the Shah what these nightly generosities were doing to the state’s coffers, simply refused them, pleading an empty treasury. Shah bakhshid, Shah-Qoli nabakhshid — what the king granted, his steward withheld — the saying that followed him into folklore.

Pierre-Hugues Verdier examines sanctions through the lens of law and economics. U.S. sanctions are often complex, and their implementation relies extensively on private parties such as banks and multinational corporations. The excessive caution these intermediaries display can be a rational response to uncertainty. But that uncertainty need not be an unfortunate accident. Policymakers may have reasons to leave boundaries unclear. Specifying every edge case is costly and may require regulators to assume political responsibility for decisions they would rather leave to others. Ambiguity can therefore serve a political function. The intermediary bears the immediate risk of getting the decision wrong, while the regulator can benefit from the resulting caution without issuing an explicit prohibition in every case.

The U.S. Treasury has, in effect, admitted to its own regulatory shadow. In a 2023 review of de-risking mandated by Congress, banks reported that their avoidance of some services reflected an “unspoken belief” that regulators did not want them engaging in such business. The situation resembles another Kafka story. Bank representatives behave like the villagers of The Castle: no one has received a clear order from the Castle, but everyone tries to anticipate what it wants. Persian has a saying for this: kaaseh dagh-tar az aash—the bowl hotter than the soup. English speakers say “more Catholic than the Pope” or “more royalist than the king.”

Guilt Is Always Beyond a Doubt

Caution is a rational response to unknown dangers. If you are crossing a road, looking twice is not a mistake. But when a website closes its services to all Iranian users, the institution protects itself against an uncertain risk while an entire nationality pays the price.

The UN’s own guidance on the subject names this exact pattern “over-compliance”: banks and other financial service providers over-comply “to reduce legal, regulatory or business risks associated with inadvertent violations. Yet over-compliance with such sanctions has harmful effects on the entire range of human rights.”

Kafka’s officer in In the Penal Colony takes this instinct to its grotesque extreme. Every prisoner brought before him is sentenced by his sophisticated execution machine. His principle is simple: “guilt is always beyond doubt. Once guilt is never to be doubted, there is little reason to distinguish between a genuinely dangerous case and one that is not.

Perhaps the deepest layer is emotional, and therefore cannot be fixed by statutes alone. Mar-gazideh az rismaan-e siyaah-o-sefid mitarsad: a person once bitten by a snake fears even a striped rope. English has its own version: “a burnt child dreads the fire”. Mark Twain described the same adaptive failure in Following the Equator, with the cat that avoids a hot stove-lid but never sits on a cold one again.

What ties these together is that none of them require anyone to have done anything wrong, which is what makes the harm so easy to underestimate. The UN Special Rapporteur after visiting Iran in 2022, put it bluntly: “overcompliance has become so widespread globally that it should be recognized as a distinct threat to international law and human rights”.

A Chain for Justice

The eleventh-century vizier Nezam al-Mulk, in his syiasatname records a legend about the Sasanian king Anushirvan, who noticed that petitioners could never get past his own officials to reach him directly. So he had a chain hung outside the palace, fitted with bells. Anyone could pull it, bypass every intermediary, and be heard by the king himself. No one touched it for seven years. Then, one quiet afternoon, the bells rang. The guards found an old donkey, scratching its back against the chain. Its owner had worked the animal for twenty years and then turned it loose to fend for itself. Anushirvan ruled in the donkey’s favor: whoever benefited from a creature’s labor in its youth was bound to its upkeep in old age.

A direct channel to the sovereign existed, and for seven years not a single human being trusted it enough to use it. Courts offer a similar channel: private decisions can sometimes be challenged there. In LH v OTP banka d.d. )Case C-81/24, 2026), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that being listed by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) does not, by itself, justify a bank’s refusal to open a basic payment account. The bank must assess the individual case. In Bank Melli Iran v Telekom Deutschland GmbH the Court interpreted the EU Blocking Regulation where a telecommunications company ended its contracts with an Iranian bank in circumstances linked to U.S. sanctions.

In practice, however, pursuing such a challenge is often beyond the reach of ordinary people. A person must gather evidence, identify a legal basis for challenging the decision, and pay the costs of pursuing the case. Even if the challenge succeeds, it may affect only that institution’s decision, leaving similar refusals by other institutions untouched.

When Permission Wasn’t Enough

In December 2022, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2664, establishing a humanitarian exemption from asset-freeze measures imposed under UN sanctions regimes. Its reach is limited: it concerns UN asset freezes, not unilateral sanctions imposed by individual states. The U.S. Treasury subsequently issued or amended general licences to align its programmes with the humanitarian carve-out.

The resolution did move something. A survey by the Charity & Security Network found that three-quarters of the financial institutions it reviewed felt more comfortable processing transactions tied to sanctioned jurisdictions than before. But roughly half described only a moderate shift in their actual risk appetite and due-diligence procedures.

The Stimson Center’s review of the resolution’s first years was blunter still: “The chilling caused by de-risking and overcompliance impede the flow of humanitarian aid, even when allowed under Resolution 2664.” A report commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council described the practical cost: one European bank reportedly needed 40–50 staff members to facilitate a single financial transaction to Afghanistan.

Permission had been granted. The fear it was meant to override had not gone anywhere. Banks, like the subjects who left Anushirvan’s chain silent for seven years, had a direct channel within reach and, for the most part, still hesitated to pull it.

The EU Blocking Regulation, 2271/96 as extended to certain U.S. measures on Iran, shows the limits of law. It forbids compliance with listed foreign rules and allows recovery of damages, yet European firms kept leaving Iran. Many of those exits are ordinary business decisions about exposure to the United States, not overcompliance: law can forbid compliance with a foreign rule, but it cannot oblige anyone to do business.

Expose the Decision

There is another kind of counterweight: making it possible to protest a decision. Since 2024, the European Union’s Digital Services Act has required digital platforms to explain why they have removed content or suspended an account. According to the European Commission’s own transparency data, users have filed more than 165 million such appeals, and roughly 30% of reviewed decisions have been reversed. The DSA makes the intermediary expose the decision to the person who bears the cost of getting it wrong. It is a mechanism people actually reach for, and that returns a different answer in three cases out of ten.

My own Facebook account, suspended in 2021, existed in a world in which I received no meaningful explanation beyond a form notice and no appeal that changed the result. The gap between that experience and a system requiring reasons and accessible review is the gap this essay has been describing throughout.

Building the Counterweight

There is no single cure for overcompliance. What the examples show is simpler: permission is rarely enough when the person implementing the rule bears the cost of getting it wrong. A counterweight has to reach the intermediary itself — by changing the cost of refusal, or by giving the person affected a way to challenge the decision.

Nothing built at that scale yet exists for the systems now deciding what an entire nationality may do, say, or own. Anushirvan’s officials, at least, had faces — someone could learn their names, and someone did, once, in the case of an old donkey. The algorithm has none. It is Shah-Qoli without the Shah: the refusal, with nowhere for appeal.

It leaves us in a position eerily like the one at the end of Kafka’s Before the Law: “barred from entry for his entire life, the man from the country asks the gatekeeper on his deathbed why no one else has sought admission, only to be told: “No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut it.”

Today, there may be no gatekeeper left to give even that answer. There is only the closed door and the code that sealed it.

Author
Mohsen Kazempour

Mohsen Kazempour is an attorney licensed with the Iranian Central Bar Association. He holds a master’s degree in International Commercial and Economic Law from the University of Tehran.

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