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Structural Interference

U.S. Ultimatums and the Threat to the ICC

16.11.2026

In addition to attacking the International Criminal Court (ICC) directly – verbally and by imposing sanctions on several court members as well as announcing to sanction the whole court – the United States of America pressures other states to withdraw from the ICC. As the U.S. calls upon ICC member states that enjoy U.S. security assistance to reject the ICC’s authority to prosecute U.S. citizens, aid-dependent nations must choose between retaining relations with the U.S. and their commitment to international criminal justice. However, Washington’s strategy is not mere geopolitical maneuvering but must be addressed by the current legal framework: international actors should expand the duty of non-recognition under Article 41(2) ARSIWA, enact third-state blocking measures, and pursue domestic litigation in U.S. courts.

U.S. pressure on the ICC and its member states is not new. In 2002, the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA), known as the “Hague Invasion Act”, authorized the use of military force to free personnel detained by the Court (Sec. 2008), while restricting U.S. cooperation with the ICC (Sec. 2004). It also provided for withdrawal of military assistance to ICC member states (Sec. 2007). The U.S. president could waive such withdrawal due to national interest (Sec. 2007 b.) or if the country and the U.S. sign a bilateral immunity agreement shielding U.S. personnel (Sec. 2007 c.).

With Executive Order 14203, U.S. president Donald Trump blocked the property and U.S. entry of then-Prosecutor Karim Khan, before expanding the sanctions to target other ICC personnel. Most recently, in October 2026, the U.S. extended the sanctions to the whole Court, suspending them for 180 days. In parallel, the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a strategy to “dismantle” the Court, applying “higher scrutiny” to Rome Statute parties reliant on U.S. foreign assistance. At the same time, the misconduct allegations against former Prosecutor Karim Khan and his subsequent dismissal severely damaged the Court’s already fragile external credibility and global legitimacy.

The Limits of the Principle of Non-Intervention

According to the principle of non-intervention, states may not coercively influence the internal affairs of a state. Grounded in the principle of sovereign equality of states under Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, this rule bars interference in internal matters, such as the choice of its foreign policy and entering into international engagements (p. 3). However, imposing economic costs on certain acts to influence decision-making remains lawful foreign policy leverage (pp. 603, 605). In the Nicaragua case (para. 244-245), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the cessation of economic aid does not breach the principle of non-intervention. Similarly, the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (Friendly Relations Declaration) requires economic measures to force the “subordination” of sovereign will to constitute a violation, maintaining an exceptionally high threshold for unlawful intervention.

The line is crossed only in extreme cases of dictatorial coercion. This refers to a state using threats to extort results or materially depriving a target state of its ability to control its sovereign choices. This is the case if it is unable to operate without specific funding or when the state’s capacity to govern itself is affected. The threshold is not reached when a donor state withdraws bilateral economic aid, which is generally discretionary by nature.

This high threshold creates a significant legal loophole for aid-dependent States. The 2025 dismantling of USAID led to severe cuts in humanitarian protection, as funding for countries such as El Salvador, Senegal, and the Philippines was cut by 95% or more and U.S. official development assistance fell by 57%. The 2026 Ebola outbreak illustrates how USAID cuts negatively affect surveillance and prevention programs. Globally, the Center for Global Development estimates that there are between half a million and one million additional deaths in 2025 alone due to the agency’s closure.

Withholding aid falls short of total sovereign subordination, as targeted states can formally still choose to stay a party to the treaty and lose the funds, or to withdraw from the treaty. Even as the U.S. actions have a certain economic weight, they do not intervene in the state’s internal affairs. Yet, leveraging structural economic dependency to de facto force states to withdraw from the Rome Statute establishes a precedent that could similarly compromise other multilateral institutions. It signals that any state with economic power could use this to influence other states to reconsider their commitment to international (criminal) justice.

Five Withdrawals So Far

Recent events illustrate this dynamic. In summer 2026, five States notified the UN of their withdrawal from the ICC. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger exited first as a united Sahel bloc in June, followed in July by Chad and Venezuela. Venezuela withdrew as it realigned politically with Washington’s anti-ICC campaign, while Chad acted after a direct U.S. request to review its membership.

In August 2026, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth pushed for further Global South withdrawals during the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition conference. He urged member states to leave the ICC, while simultaneously announcing joint military operations and hence layering pressure to abandon the Court directly onto Washington’s regional security cooperation agenda. Venezuela’s Interim President Delcy Rodríguez justified Venezuela’s exit using this same sovereignty-based rhetoric.

Yet this framing contradicts the ICC’s actual record in the region, as the Rome Statute’s complementarity mechanism already protects state sovereignty whenever domestic courts function. For example, the ICC closed its preliminary examination in Colombia because national judges actively prosecuted crimes. Conversely, the ICC maintained its investigation into Venezuela because domestic institutions failed to prosecute offenses committed by high-level officials. Because complementarity safeguards states’ first right to prosecute international crimes (para. 1), withdrawing from the Statute is unnecessary to protect sovereignty. Instead, by promoting this anti-ICC campaign under the guise of sovereignty, the U.S. induces governments under active investigation to weaponize withdrawal, winning political and economic favor with Washington while shielding ongoing core crimes from international scrutiny.

Non-Recognition of Withdrawals

To address these pressured withdrawals, the international community needs to respond accordingly. They can do so by refusing to accept withdrawal notices resulting from U.S. pressure, by installing sanction-blocking statutes and by pursuing national litigation before U.S. courts.

Under Article 41(2) of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), states must not recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. A state’s formal withdrawal engineered to shield ongoing crimes that violate peremptory norms, such as genocide or crimes against humanity, from ICC jurisdiction could constitute such a situation. Though cutting discretionary economic aid is not a breach of a peremptory norm in itself, states should expand the scope of application of non-recognition.

Traditionally, the obligation of non-recognition was thought to apply to serious breaches of law such as unlawful territorial acquisitions or the denial of the right of self-determination of peoples (p. 114, paras. 6-8). Yet the ICJ in the Wall (para. 159) and Occupied Palestinian Territory (paras. 274–279) Advisory Opinions and legal scholars (pp. 53–59; pp. 12–16) argue for expanding the obligation of non-recognition beyond strict breaches of peremptory norms to cover breaches of erga omnes obligations. Part 9 of the Rome Statute imposes binding obligations of international cooperation with the Court and other Member States, reflecting duties owed to all other States Parties (erga omnes partes) (para. 33). In Belgium v. Senegal (paras. 68–69), the ICJ established that treaties prosecuting core crimes create a shared legal interest among all States Parties in demanding compliance. Though Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute does not discharge a departing state from obligations arising while it was a party, including cooperating with ongoing investigations such as Venezuela’s, an exit taking effect after the one-year waiting period still undermines the erga omnes partes interest of the remaining states parties by barring the Court’s jurisdiction over future crimes committed on that state’s territory.

Hence, rather than merely issuing diplomatic statements supporting the Court, ICC member states should refuse to recognize the legal validity of a withdrawal where it stems directly from targeted economic dependency. While a withdrawal is a unilateral decision under Article 127 of the Rome Statute, withdrawals resulting from external pressure must be analyzed and contested by the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties. Established under Article 112 of the Rome Statute as the Court’s management oversight and legislative body composed of all member states, the Assembly is the primary forum mandated to address state non-cooperation and safeguard the integrity of the Statute. The international community would thus consider the affected state as retaining its obligations under the Rome Statute.

Blocking Statutes and National Litigation

Besides, economically independent states should use their own complete sovereign capacity to enact protective measures to counter the pressure imposed by U.S. sanctions. Diplomatic opposition is already visible. For example, Japan formally opposed the indiscriminate sanctioning of ICC officials such as President Tomoko Akane. Germany repeatedly assured its support to the ICC.

To elevate this from diplomatic objection to legal consequence, states can deploy frameworks akin to the EU Blocking Statute, which has historically neutralized extraterritorial economic pressure. Because the Court relies heavily on U.S.-linked banking, software, and cloud providers, the Blocking Statute works by prohibiting European operators from complying with extraterritorial U.S. sanctions and allowing them to recover damages caused by those measures. Following repeated calls from the European Parliament, the European Commission is assessing whether to add the U.S. ICC sanctions to the Blocking Statute’s annex. Operationalizing these frameworks can effectively counter the pressure the U.S. is forcing on the ICC.

Beyond international law, domestic legal mechanisms have also been activated with regard to the U.S. measures’ impact on victims’ rights. For instance, Human Rights Watch and other organizations have filed a lawsuit against the U.S. administration before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. These legal challenges argue that coercive measures targeting the ICC violate the organizations’ constitutional protections and obstruct humanitarian efforts to secure international justice. As the basis for the lawsuit, they invoke their First and Fifth Amendments to protect free speech, association, and due process, arguing that the sanctions threaten human rights defenders with penalties simply for communicating evidence, legal filings, and advocacy to the ICC on behalf of the victims. They also argue that Executive Order 14203 exceeds presidential statutory authority by declaring a baseless national emergency over the ICC’s judicial work.

Domestic litigation thus serves as a crucial parallel avenue to protect victims’ access to international justice. Ultimately, combining non-recognition, blocking frameworks, and domestic litigation provides a concrete legal shield to ensure that multilateral justice commitments survive the unilateral economic pressure of non-party states.

Author
Agustín Vásquez Cobo

Agustín Vásquez Cobo is a law student and Academic Assistant in Public International Law at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador (PUCE). His research focuses on international criminal law, the history of law, and structural critiques of international law from a Global South perspective.

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