Revolution of Rights, Rethinking of Freedom

The debate on inherent rights of nature (RoN) is no longer uncharted domain. What initially emerged as a theoretical concept in the 1970s through the work of Christopher Stone, who pioneered the concept of RoN, has since evolved into a legal reality in various jurisdictions. The recognition of nature as a legal entity has prompted a significant reassessment of balancing processes within legal frameworks. Where nature was previously regarded as a mere resource, the attribution of rights has granted it a new status within the legal system. This global trend towards acknowledging nature as a legal subject may also call for a redefinition of the concept of freedom. The following discussion will demonstrate that, in the Anthropocene, freedom can no longer be confined to the broadest possible scope of individual choice or the mere absence of external constraints. Instead, in times of crisis, the principle of collective self-restraint may emerge as a foundational element of what it means to be free.

About Freedom

Freedom, in the legal context, is traditionally conceptualized along the distinction between negative and positive freedom, as defined by Isaiah Berlin. Negative freedom refers to freedom from something, signifying the absence of external constraints. Positive freedom, by contrast, encompasses freedom to do something, representing the capacity to actively make decisions and realize one’s own options for action. This understanding of negative freedom, rooted in classical liberalism, profoundly shapes the public law of many states. A clear example of this influence is the conception of fundamental rights in these states, which primarily interpret fundamental rights as safeguards against state intervention. At the core of these frameworks lies the autonomous individual, striving to maximize their sphere of freedom.

This liberal conception of freedom has had far-reaching societal and technological consequences, contributing significantly to numerous social advancements. At the same time, however, the emphasis on individual autonomy and the associated individualism have led to an unprecedented global impact of human activity. Geologically, biologically, and physically, humans have become the decisive factor influencing Earth’s processes, thereby shaping the geological epoch of the Anthropocene. It may be tempting to interpret this development as a deliberative process through which humanity has liberated itself from natural and social constraints, thereby progressively realizing freedom. Yet, the darker side of this freedom paradigm is now evident in an exaggerated individualism, which has substantially contributed to the three major ecological crises: climate change, biodiversity loss, and global pollution.

New Rights

A potential way out of these Anthropocene constraints lies in the recognition of RoN. This concept has been under discussion since the 1970s, with Christopher D. Stone emerging as an intellectual pioneer through his influential essay “Should Trees Have Standing?”. The recognition of RoN represents a legal revaluation of nature. Historically, nature has often been undervalued in balancing processes, as it was primarily regarded as an object. However, with the acknowledgment of inherent rights, nature’s interests must now be directly incorporated into balancing considerations. Examples of this legal paradigm shift can be found worldwide: Ecuador, Colombia, New Zealand, and Canada, among others, have recognized nature’s inherent rights in various legal frameworks. Most recently, two landmark rulings in Germany (here and here) have reawakened discussions around nature’s inherent rights. The recognition of such rights contributes to decentering humanity in the legal order and freedom concepts. It underscores that humans cannot realize their freedoms in isolation from nature but are instead inherently embedded within and dependent upon it. On a legal-technical level, the recognition of RoN requires an irrevocable consideration of natural interests in balancing processes. These interests can no longer be accounted for merely indirectly or through state structural principles; rather, they acquire independent legal weight through the attribution of rights. Thus, the recognition of nature’s inherent rights constitutes a pivotal step toward affirming the importance of natural life-support systems for humanity, both factually and legally.

New Freedom

This obligation to consider natural interests in balancing processes impacts not only public law procedures but also the concept of freedom underpinning liberal constitutions and the fundamental rights they guarantee. To date, normative regulations aimed at mitigating ecological crises and achieving sustainability are often dismissed in political debates as restrictions on individual freedom, or polemically, as elements of an alleged “eco-dictatorship.” In this framing, freedom and sustainability are positioned as adversaries.

The recognition of nature as a legal person significantly challenges this argument: through its legal subjectivity, nature becomes part of the legal community. It no longer stands outside the law but forms, together with human individuals, a legal community oriented toward an expanded concept of the common good. This concept integrates the interests of both humans and nature, fostering a societal order where both perspectives are granted legal recognition. In acknowledging this legal community, freedom and sustainability emerge as much closer allies than the traditional, two-dimensional understanding of freedom suggests. Sustainability becomes a societal duty: in times of ecological crises, the preservation of the natural environment forms the very basis for the exercise of freedom. When individual spheres of freedom are curtailed by regulations to enhance ecological sustainability, this does not constitute a mere reduction of freedom in the sense of positive and negative liberty. Rather, it represents a form of collective self-limitation, understood as socially-oriented freedom. This republican notion of freedom underscores that the individual is always embedded—within a society and an environment upon which their autonomy ultimately depends. Individual autonomy, therefore, can never be conceived as entirely independent. Instead, it is a “dependent autonomy”, defined and constrained by the natural environment. In this sense, collective self-limitation becomes a prerequisite for individual freedom. In this concept sustainability and freedom are thus no longer adversaries. Instead, sustainability becomes a condition for the realization of freedom.

This broader conception of freedom is not a novel idea; it has already gained traction in political science and philosophy. Scholars such as Heidenreich and Riechmann have demonstrated that the classical notion of freedom reaches its limits in the Anthropocene. The challenge now lies in translating this understanding of freedom into legal principles, as recently exemplified by Sacksofsky. An excessive focus on individual freedom without collective responsibility not only endangers the ecological foundations of life but also undermines the very conditions for freedom itself.

Conclusion

Freedom, when solely focused on maximizing short-term individual interests, becomes inherently contradictory in the Anthropocene: it destroys the natural foundation of life on which it depends. Integrating an additional dimension of freedom—one that embeds individual autonomy within a framework of responsibility towards both the community and the environment—may be essential for sustainably realizing freedom for present and future generations.