New ECtHR Climate Cases

On 7 May 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rendered the inadmissibility decisions De Conto v Italy and 32 Others and Uricchio v Italy and 31 Others. They are the first climate cases to be decided by a three-judge Committee of the Court (see Art 28 European Convention of Human Rights [ECHR]) rather than by the Grand Chamber. For this reason, the decisions are of high practical and legal relevance. They indicate how the principles on climate litigation established by the Grand Chamber (notably in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland and Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Others) will be applied and how unresolved legal issues might be dealt with by smaller ECtHR panels.

Facts

The applicants alleged violations of Art 2 (right to life) and Art 8 ECHR (right to private and family life) due to the negative effects of climate change and related State inaction. Elena De Conto referred to the ‘Vaia Storm’, which had affected several Italian regions in 2018 (De Conto, para 2). Daniela Uricchio stated that Southern Italy had experienced extreme heat in summer and severe flooding. She also claimed that high temperatures had worsened her allergies (Uricchio, paras 2–5). Furthermore, both applicants claimed that climate change had impacted their mental health, causing nightmares and preventing them from going outside on hot days (Uricchio and De Conto, para 3). Born in 2000 and 2002 respectively, they also alleged a breach of Art 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination), arguing that the harmful effects of climate change would disproportionately affect younger generations (Uricchio and De Conto, para 6).

Summary of the decisions

The Committee rejected both applications as inadmissible (Art 35 para 4 ECHR). It largely adhered to the climate cases decided by the Grand Chamber, for example regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction. As in Duarte Agostinho, the applications were directed not only against the applicants’ country of residence, but also against other Member States. In this respect, the Committee referred to Duarte Agostinho and dismissed the complaints.

Regarding the applicants’ victim status (Art 34 ECHR), the Committee relied on KlimaSeniorinnen. It confirmed the high threshold for victim status for complaints under Art 8 ECHR (KlimaSeniorinnen, paras 487 f). The applicants could not demonstrate that they were subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change or that there was a pressing need to ensure their protection (Uricchio and De Conto, para 14). In climate cases, victim status requires concrete medical evidence suggesting a correlation between an applicant’s condition and the complaint (KlimaSeniorinnen, para 534). Furthermore, the applicants were unable to substantiate their complaints under Art 2 ECHR (Uricchio and De Conto, para 16).

Areas severely affected by climate change

In other aspects, the decisions went beyond the Grand Chamber’s climate cases. The applicants argued that they lived in cities and regions which were severely affected by climate change. Elena De Conto’s city of residence was severely hit by a storm allegedly caused by climate change. Daniela Uricchio lived in Southern Italy, which was experiencing rising temperatures and flooding. However, although local conditions must be taken into account when assessing victim status (KlimaSeniorinnen, para 488), these arguments were not addressed by the ECtHR.

This was likely due to lack of concrete evidence submitted. The Committee could not rely on national rulings either, because the applicants had apparently not brought their cases to Italian courts beforehand but had gone straight to the ECtHR instead. By contrast, in the climate case Carême v France, the Grand Chamber could build on the findings of the Conseil d’État that the coastal municipality in question was at high risk of flooding and severe drought due to climate change (Carême, paras 78, 80). Still, the application was dismissed due to lack of victim status, because the applicant no longer lived in the municipality in question.

In the absence of detailed submissions on the areas concerned, it is not surprising that the ECtHR did not elaborate on this aspect. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the Court will adopt a similar approach to climate cases as it does to environmental cases. When entire regions are affected by severe environmental damage, the Court grants victim status due to mere residency in those areas. Applicants are not required to prove specific adverse effects on their quality of life or health (e.g. Cordella and Others v Italy, paras 101–107; Cannavacciuolo and Others v Italy, para 390; L.F. and Others v Italy, para 124).

Climate anxiety

Under Art 8 ECHR, the applicants alleged that climate change had impacted their mental health (‘climate anxiety’, ‘eco-anxiety’). However, the medical documents submitted did not reveal any correlation between the claimed harm and climate change (Uricchio and De Conto, para 14). Thus, the Court rightly rejected these complaints.

Notably, these are the first decisions in which the ECtHR has engaged with climate anxiety. In Duarte Agostinho and KlimaSeniorinnen, it did not deal with the applicants’ mental health claims (see Duarte Agostinho, paras 26, 66; KlimaSeniorinnen, paras 66, 530). In Carême, it only alluded to feelings of anxiety in the context of actio popularis (Carême, para 84; see also here). The present findings of the Court suggest that mental health impacts caused by climate change could enable applicants to be recognised as victims for complaints under Art 8 ECHR. At first glance, this is not surprising given that Art 8 ECHR also protects mental health (for the environmental context, compare Tătar v Romania, para 122). The Court appears to set a high threshold, stating that the medical documents submitted did not mention states of ‘severe anxiety’ (De Conto, para 14). However, upon closer inspection it is questionable whether the aforementioned criteria for victim status can be applied at all to persons with mental health conditions. Rather, these criteria seem to be tailored to physical suffering (compare KlimaSeniorinnen, para 530). For example, at what level of climate anxiety is an applicant ‘subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change‘? What constitutes a ‘pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection‘? Can ‘reasonable measures to reduce harm’ be taken at all if an applicant suffers from climate anxiety?

Intergenerational burden-sharing

In a first for climate cases before the ECtHR, the applicants alleged a violation of Art 14 ECHR due to the harmful effects of climate change on younger generations. However, the Committee did not address this issue, merely stating that these ‘other complaints’ did not meet the admissibility criteria of Art 34 and Art 35 ECHR (Uricchio and De Conto, paras 6, 17).

In KlimaSeniorinnen, the Grand Chamber frequently referred to the concept of intergenerational justice. For example, it stated that future generations are particularly exposed to the negative effects of climate change and related State failures (KlimaSeniorinnen, para 420). The Court also recognised the legal standing of associations for the protection of future generations (KlimaSeniorinnen, paras 489, 499). Moreover, it found that Art 8 ECHR should be interpreted to prevent a disproportionate burden on future generations (KlimaSeniorinnen, para 549).

The present decisions would have provided an opportunity to clarify and specify the concept of intergenerational burden-sharing in the context of victim status. The Court’s inaction cannot be justified by the applicants’ unsubstantiated claims about the personal impact of climate change. In fact, this highlights the key issue for young applicants in climate cases. As all individual applicants, they need to demonstrate that they are highly exposed to the adverse effects of climate change. However, young people generally suffer fewer physical health problems than older generations. The strict criteria developed in KlimaSeniorinnen do not adequately address this, because they require high and current exposure to the adverse effects of climate change. Since younger generations will be particularly exposed to climate change in the future (KlimaSeniorinnen, para 420), the Court could have set a lower threshold for this group or focused on mental health impacts (e.g. substantial fear of the future) instead. This could have incorporated intergenerational burden-sharing into the Convention and advanced its role beyond that of an argumentative tool. Moreover, this would comply with the notion of ‘victim’ under Art 34 ECHR.

Conclusion

Following the three Grand Chamber climate cases, Uricchio and De Conto were the first such cases to be decided by a smaller panel of the ECtHR. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of future cases, the Court’s decisions suggest that it will likely adopt a more pragmatic approach to climate litigation. Both decisions are remarkably concise. This was mainly due to lack of substantiated submissions. However, it is notable that the Committee did not address open legal questions (e.g. on the victim status of applicants living in areas particularly exposed to climate change). The criteria developed in Duarte Agostinho and KlimaSeniorinnen were applied, but additional argumentation (e.g. on intergenerational burden sharing) was not considered.