Autocratic Alliance?
The North Korea–Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty
On June 19, 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the North Korea–Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in Pyongyang. The signing of the treaty marked a formal step in what has been a rapidly intensifying relationship. In the span of less than two years, the two countries moved from limited cooperation to a structured and multi-dimensional form of alignment involving military assistance, economic exchange, and public diplomatic endorsement. Against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) prolonged international isolation, many observers have interpreted the treaty as an emerging “autocratic alliance” – a partnership rooted in shared ideological convictions and a common opposition to Western norms and institutions.
Yet the content, timing, and broader context of this agreement suggests that, far from signaling an equal or principled alliance of autocratic states, the treaty serves as a pragmatic instrument for advancing North Korean national interests. Its purpose is not primarily to project joint influence or to reshape the international order through coordinated action, but to reinforce domestic political structures, especially the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty, expanding the DPRK’s strategic room to maneuver, and reducing its structural dependence on China. The agreement provides symbolic parity with a global power, tangible military and economic benefits, and enhanced geopolitical relevance – without compromising Pyongyang’s ideological or political autonomy.
The treaty invites questions not only about military alignment but about its legal character and implications for the international legal order. While its language recalls Cold War-era mutual assistance pacts, its legal significance lies elsewhere: in reinforcing principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and rejection of unilateral sanctions. This post examines how the treaty fits into the broader shift whereby authoritarian regimes use international law as a tool to legitimize state behavior, contest liberal norms, and reinforce domestic political structures.
This post examines how the treaty fits into the broader shift whereby authoritarian regimes use international law as a tool to legitimize state behavior, contest liberal norms, and reinforce domestic political structures. It examines the treaty through the lens of North Korean strategic interests, arguing that the agreement is less an ideological alliance and more a pragmatic instrument of statecraft. It places the treaty in historical and political context, analyzes its domestic drivers, economic implications, and regional impact, and concludes with reflections on the legal dimensions and broader significance of the agreement.
Historical Context: From Dependency to Selective Alignment
North Korea’s external relations have long been defined by a tension between alignment and autonomy. After its founding with Soviet backing in the wake of World War II, the DPRK maintained close military and ideological ties with Moscow throughout the early Cold War. The 1961 Mutual Assistance Treaty formalized this alignment. But Kim Il Sung’s adoption of the Juche ideology (self-reliance) in the 1960s marked the beginning of a deliberate move toward strategic independence. Seeking to avoid dependency on either the Soviet Union or China, North Korea engaged in a balancing act that persisted through the Cold War.
The post-Cold War period disrupted this equilibrium. The Soviet Union’s normalization of relations with South Korea in 1990 and its subsequent dissolution left North Korea politically isolated and economically strained. Moscow’s retreat from Korean affairs, combined with a collapsing domestic economy and famine, drove the DPRK into deeper dependence on China. In recent years, however, the leadership under Kim Jong Un has made concerted efforts to regain autonomy – not least by resisting Chinese-led initiatives, sidelining pro-China voices within the regime, and recalibrating foreign policy priorities.
From Tactical Cooperation to Treaty Formalization
North Korea–Russia relations deepened rapidly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Pyongyang was among the few governments to openly support Moscow, recognizing the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in July 2022. That year, it reportedly began supplying artillery and munitions to Russian forces and, later, to the Wagner Group. These transfers escalated in late 2023, with Western intelligence confirming over 13,000 shipping containers of military supplies sent from North Korea to Russia. Since December 2023, at least 40 DPRK-produced ballistic missiles have reportedly been used in Ukraine.
In October 2024, the Pentagon reported that around 10,000 North Korean troops had been deployed to Russia, followed by another 3,000 in early 2025 – the first such deployment in a foreign war since the Korean War. Satellite imagery showing increased rail activity at the Tumangang–Khasan crossing suggests sustained logistical cooperation. In exchange, Russia has reportedly provided oil, food aid, and technical assistance, likely contributing to North Korea’s successful ICBM test in December 2023 and its first military satellite launch in February 2024. Russia’s March 2024 veto of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts further shielded this cooperation from international scrutiny.
The treaty signed on 19 June 2024 formalized this partnership. Replacing the 2000 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation, it echoes aspects of the 1961 mutual defense pact. Among its key provisions are a mutual assistance clause referencing Article 51 of the UN Charter (Article 4), a commitment to immediate security consultations (Article 3), a ban on agreements with third countries that harm core interests (Article 5), and a rejection of unilateral coercive measures (Article 16) – clearly aimed at the U.S. and UN sanctions regimes.
Domestic Drivers: Neo-Juche Revivalism and Regime Consolidation
The DPRK has long pursued a foreign policy that leverages relationships with great powers without becoming subordinated to them. Central to this strategy is the ideology of Juche, often interpreted as self-reliance, which has served both as a domestic pillar of legitimacy and a guiding principle for foreign engagement. Under Kim Jong Un, this position has hardened. The domestic logic behind the treaty with Russia is best understood in the context of what might be termed a Neo-Juche revivalism. The regime has reaffirmed its ideological commitment to self-reliance, entrenched military-first governance (Songun), and systematically rejected reformist tendencies that briefly emerged in the early 2000s. External engagement is no longer framed as a path to development or normalization, but as a tool to reinforce internal control and regime durability.
Moreover, economic liberalization has been rolled back, and the longstanding goal of Korean reunification – central to DPRK identity since its founding – was officially abandoned in January 2024. South Korea is now framed not as a counterpart in national unity, but as a hostile state. This reframing has coincided with an increasingly aggressive posture along the inter-Korean border and growing rhetorical hostility.
The revised nuclear doctrine adopted in September 2022 reflects this strategic shift. It authorizes the preemptive use of nuclear weapons not only in the face of nuclear threats but also in response to conventional military attacks, particularly those targeting the leadership. In parallel, the regime has prioritized the development of satellite and missile technologies, presenting them as symbols of national sovereignty and technological competence.
Against this backdrop, the treaty with Russia allows the leadership to assert symbolic parity with a permanent member of the UN Security Council and to present the DPRK as a globally relevant actor. It provides tangible benefits – energy supplies, foreign currency access, and military technology – while reinforcing the ideational claim that North Korea can survive and operate under sustained international sanctions. Crucially, the partnership with Russia is free of political conditionality. Unlike previous engagements with the United States or South Korea, this relationship does not require concessions on denuclearization, transparency, or governance. Instead, it supports the regime’s core priorities: survival, autonomy, and the preservation of the Kim family’s rule.
Emancipation from China
A further function of the treaty is its contribution to North Korea’s longstanding efforts to reduce its dependence on China. Despite being Pyongyang’s largest trading partner and a crucial source of support, Beijing is increasingly viewed with suspicion. North Korean dissatisfaction has grown over China’s participation in UN sanctions, its diplomatic engagement with South Korea, and its broader regional initiatives.
This unease is reflected in North Korea’s internal politics. The 2013 purge and execution of Jang Song-thaek, a senior figure with close ties to Beijing, marked a turning point in DPRK–China relations. In the years that followed, North Korea declined to join major Chinese-led efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative and refused Chinese COVID-19 vaccines during the pandemic. Beijing’s military contingency planning for potential instability in North Korea and its recent diplomatic coordination with Japan and South Korea on denuclearization (as seen in March 2025) have only deepened Pyongyang’s resolve to diversify its external alignments.
Economic Survival and Sanctions Evasion
The treaty also supports the DPRK’s attempt to alleviate economic pressure, particularly in light of the downturn experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Border closures and intensified sanctions during this period triggered a severe contraction in trade and GDP. According to international estimates, the North Korean economy contracted significantly between 2020 and 2022.
Against this backdrop, renewed ties with Russia offer modest but symbolically significant economic relief. Russian oil shipments and financial transfers, though limited in volume, have allowed the regime to redirect resources previously used for smuggling toward military and infrastructure investments. Reports suggest that Moscow has unfrozen $9 million in North Korean assets, facilitated access to financial channels, and allowed North Korean laborers to return to Russian territory in violation of UN sanctions. There are also signs of increased tourism and cultural exchange, with Russian visitors entering North Korea as part of tightly controlled tour groups – marking the first such arrivals since the pandemic. These developments, while economically marginal, play into the regime’s narrative of resilience and normalization under sanctions.
Legal and Strategic Implications
The treaty raises several concerns from an international legal perspective. If North Korean troops are indeed active in Russia and its weapons are being used in Ukraine, this would amount to direct involvement in an international armed conflict and undermine the principle of neutrality. While North Korea is not party to many core legal instruments, its actions may nevertheless be viewed as supporting a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Russia’s position is even more problematic. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it is now openly undermining binding sanctions it once helped enact under Chapter VII. The facilitation of oil transfers, asset unfreezing, and the employment of North Korean laborers not only contravenes existing resolutions but weakens the credibility of the Council as an enforcement body.
Regionally, the treaty introduces new uncertainties. Although it does not amount to a formal military bloc, it establishes channels of cooperation that could destabilize the East Asian security environment. The alignment reduces the effectiveness of trilateral frameworks between the United States, Japan, and South Korea and complicates diplomacy by making Pyongyang less responsive to inducements or pressure. While large-scale provocations may decrease in the short term due to Russian backing, North Korea’s capacity for longer-term deterrence and disruption is likely to grow.
Conclusion: Strategic Instrument, Not Ideological Alliance
The DPRK–Russia treaty should not be viewed as the emergence of a new autocratic bloc. Instead, it reflects North Korea’s use of strategic partnerships to serve domestic objectives and protect regime sovereignty. The agreement reverses North Korea’s traditional role as a buffer state, turning its geopolitical position into a source of leverage. Rather than subordinating itself to Russian interests, the DPRK uses its engagement in Ukraine to assert autonomy from both Moscow and Beijing, while reinforcing its claim to equal status on the international stage.
Characterizing the treaty as an “autocratic alliance” risks obscuring the asymmetry at its core. The DPRK’s calculus is shaped less by ideological solidarity and more by the logic of survival, regime consolidation, and strategic diversification. Russia may benefit tactically, but it also risks becoming entangled with a partner that has no intention of aligning its interests beyond the narrow margins of mutual convenience. For both international lawyers and policymakers, understanding these dynamics is crucial. The real significance of the treaty lies not in its ideological rhetoric, but in what it reveals about North Korea’s evolving role in the international system.

Gordon Friedrichs is a Senior Research Fellow in the MAGGI research group at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, specializing in international relations and comparative foreign policy analysis with a focus on polarization, populism, and global governance. He has authored three books and published widely in top academic journals, including International Studies Review, International Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis, Globalizations, and Journal of Global Security Studies.