Who Is “Too Many”?
On the Politicization of Demographics. An Interview with Dana Schmalz
In her book Das Bevölkerungsargument (The Population Argument; Suhrkamp; Bpb), Dana Schmalz examines the politics of demographics. A conversation about population growth, migration – and the tension between law and politics.
Dear Dana, in your book you explore the politics of numbers—and, more specifically, the question of how population growth has been politicized throughout the modern era. As you show, the British economist Thomas Malthus was a key figure in the politicization of demography. Why?
Thomas Malthus wrote an influential treatise in which he warned against population growth. This was a novel perspective, in fact, he was writing in 1798, at a time when noticeable population growth was just beginning in England. A declining infant mortality rate coincided with a still-high birth rate, causing the population to grow rapidly. Over time, the birth rate declined and growth levelled off—the so-called demographic transition. Malthus’s essay not only presented an economic calculation regarding food supply but was also a political intervention—specifically against the Poor Laws. Giving money to the poor would only cause them to have even more children, Malthus argued. Malthus’s theory then became very influential in the 19th century.
As you show in your comparison of Malthus and critical approaches—“Malthus versus Marx,” as the book pointedly puts it—Malthus faced opposition early on. How was his argument that population growth leads to poverty criticized?
There was criticism of Malthus’s economic theory, particularly his assumptions about food production. But the central objection raised by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels was that focusing on birth rates is a distraction and a shifting of responsibility. Workers toiled for starvation wages in the factories and saw little of the profits generated. The Enlightenment ideals of equality were present, people took offense at the striking economic inequality—which could lead to radical demands for a fairer distribution of wealth. In contrast, Malthusian theory individualized the problem. This perspective allowed the bourgeoisie to express concern about poverty without viewing the problem as one of distribution.
The debate between Malthus and critical approaches became globalized during the era of decolonization, in the context of development policy—for example, when it came to food programs or discriminatory birth control policies. To what extent did international institutions such as the UN tend to reproduce Malthus’s theses, those of his critics—or elements of both sides at the same time?
In the 19th century, population growth occurred primarily in Europe. By the mid-20th century, birth rates in industrialized states had fallen on average, while the so-called developing countries were in the midst of demographic transition and experiencing rapid population growth. This was a period in which many countries, after a long history of colonization, gained formal independence and were striving to reduce economic inequality as well. At the same time, high birth rates were a major issue.
It is important that people—especially women—have reproductive freedoms, meaning knowledge of and access to contraceptives. However, the strong focus on family planning programs in those decades has also been problematic: First, there were human rights violations such as forced sterilizations. Second, the focus on birth rates could serve, here too, as a distraction from radical demands for a New International Economic Order. In this respect, the pattern of Malthus’s argument was, in a sense, repeated on a global scale: debates about the number of children rather than about distribution. However, the discussions within the UN did not follow simple lines of division, as I have described in a paper.
Across its five chapters, the book vividly illustrates the diverse policy areas and arenas in which the debate over the “population argument” played out: from poverty to the environment, so to speak. In your research on international law, you focus in particular on migration law. Was that the field in which you began to think more deeply about the “population argument”?
In fact, I’ve been interested for years in the concept of superfluity as discussed by Hannah Arendt and Zygmunt Bauman, and this came from observing how, in the context of migration, there is a regular assumption of “too many”. Legal regimes do not, after all, react to a neutral number of refugees, for example; rather, they contribute to that number and to the perception of “too many.” I’ve written about this and, more broadly, have increasingly examined the connections between migration management and assumptions about population growth. I believe we can see that the focus of control shifted in the 1980s and 1990s: People no longer spoke of a “population problem,” and population conferences were oriented less at controlling birth rates and more at reproductive rights. This was a positive development, but at the same time, the control paradigm shifted to the area of migration, with increasingly strict visa regimes, carrier sanctions, and restricted access to asylum—the so-called non-entrée regimes. To put it bluntly: the Global North was still concerned about “too many” births in the Global South, but the goal was no longer to control births, but rather the movement of people.
Why will population issues in the future be primarily issues of migration?
We are heading toward an end to population growth worldwide. At the moment, the world population is still growing, mainly because the resulting growth occurs decades after the period of high average birth rates. However, according to all projections, the world population will peak during the 21st century and then begin to decline. This will change our discussions, because so far the economy continues to need workers—we have by no means moved away from a growth paradigm. Yet the number of people available will continue to dwindle. I believe that in 30 years, we will look back with utter astonishment at all the costly efforts to deter and deport people. Currently, birth rates are still comparatively high, especially in Africa, while in Europe and many other regions of the world they are below the replacement level. Migration is a natural consequence—an opportunity for people in countries with high birth rates and for countries that would otherwise be shrinking rapidly in population and are already fighting over their pension policies. In fact, when Europe’s population was growing, it was also accompanied by significant emigration.
Especially in debates about immigration law, we see a tension between individual rights and the politicization of demographics. The latter manifests itself, for example, in political demands for upper limits or restrictions on the right to asylum, because—so the argument goes—this right was not intended for “mass migration”—a term that already evokes Malthus. You clearly reject any restriction on the individual right to asylum. Why, in your view, should numbers still be taken seriously in debates about migration?
We need both: an individual right to asylum and the recognition that migration often takes place in large groups. It is an achievement—and also a result of a human rights consensus—that people are not judged solely based on group characteristics, but that their individual situations are taken into account regarding a need for protection. At the same time, there are situations in which many people flee for the same reason, such as a war. The legal approach requires flexibility; the admission of Ukrainian refugees under the Temporary Protection Directive is a positive example of this. Assessing so many parallel situations would create an unreasonable administrative burden. But beyond that, we need to consider the numbers because, in practical terms, they play a role—for example in determining reception capacities. Numbers are important—not in opposition to the logic of individual rights, but in harmony with it. This means, for example, to discuss reception capacities not only when it comes to overcrowding but also addressing what capacities for housing and education are being established and maintained. Taking numbers into account also means an emphasis on the responsibility-sharing between states. Reliable cooperation and the sharing of responsibility are essential for the asylum system to function.
You argue that the law does not merely protect migrants—but rather reinforces the perception that some people are “too much.” How should we address this dilemma, namely that the law can always be both a means of domination and a means of emancipation? Is political discourse ultimately the only arena left? Or, to put it more bluntly: Is the law ultimately “just” politics?
Law is shaped by politics, and in that sense, it is an instrument of politics. But it is more than just politics, because legal rules follow procedures and claim to apply in a general manner, without discrimination. International law, in particular, preserves political consensus: The agreements on the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights were political decisions, but we can see how these international obligations now keep politics in check. While states can withdraw from treaties, the hurdle for doing so is significantly higher than for individual political projects that contradict the treaties. In the area of migration, we clear see the resources that the law offers. In many countries, we are witnessing a politics of scapegoating that attempts to give majorities a sense of control by narrowing the access to asylum. The law cannot prevent this politics, but it does set some limits. When lawyers and judges are verbally attacked by politicians and the media, it reflects the fact that the law is a force of resistance. But we must not lose our critical perspective on the law itself. While we defend and make use of legal achievements, we must also look ahead to identify what has been overlooked and where the law can be further developed.
In mid-July 2026, a representative survey by the polling firm Ipsos UK made headlines: According to the survey, 51 percent of Germans supported a complete closure of the borders to refugees. Sixty-nine percent of Germans certainly recognized the right to flee to another country to escape war and displacement, but 62 percent believed that many asylum seekers were not actually in need of protection. What do these figures tell us about the state of the debate? Has Malthus won out after all?
First, for good reasons, there are legal guarantees that are not dependent on the will of the majority. Think of legal safeguards for accused criminals: Fortunately, the law removes certain protections from the realm of sympathy. Second, regarding the political debate: We live in an age of demoscopism. But polls are not democracy, and in such polls, people often repeat what they have been told time and again. The complexity of the world poses a real challenge to political decision-making. Right-wing populism flourishes in barren landscapes where visions for the future are lacking. I do not believe in a simple debunking of populist promises, but I do believe in democracy: that even in a very complex world, people are ultimately capable of distinguishing genuine answers from superficial ones. However, this requires protecting our public debates from orchestrated polarization and disinformation, which currently thrive on social media through AI, bots, and algorithms. Third, I do not wish to demonize Malthus; he was writing in his own time, with flawed assumptions. What’s important is that today we can look back on 200 years of population debates and learn from them.
Let’s briefly discuss the broader historical context once more: In my view, one of the particular strengths of your book is this connection between historical and contemporary debates on population. Where do you see historical lessons for the present: How can history help us better understand the present? Where are the continuities in discourse, and where are the significant breaks and disruptions?
Looking back, we see that concerns about overpopulation have been present since there has been any noticeable population growth. This invites the question of whether it’s really just about objective concerns like food security, or whether other, more psychological factors also play a role: the fear of losing significance, fear for one’s place in the world, fear of becoming superfluous. I try to view the debates on population in the context of other developments in the history of ideas: the debates about equality following the French Revolution, the enthusiasm for science hand in hand with the pitfalls of wanting to measure everything, and the critique of growth in the second half of the 20th century—a critique of which mostly the warning against “overpopulation” resonated with the public, while other aspects tended to fall on deaf ears. Overall, history shows how unequal power relations shaped the debates on population.
Looking ahead: At the end of your book, you write that with the end of population growth predicted for 2084, the nearly 300-year-old concern about overpopulation is likely to disappear. But given the striking global inequality and democratic regression, shouldn’t we rather expect the opposite by then—that is, that isolationism and the politicization of demography will continue to gain prominence even in the 21st century?
The fact that the world’s population is no longer growing will not mean an end to the politicization of demography. Concerns about too few births, for example, can also threaten women’s hard-won rights. The narrative of “population replacement” is a central theme of the far right: it links anti-feminism with anti-migration resentments and racism. Yet the answer cannot be to avoid talking about demography. Demographics are always political, and politics always influence demographic developments. Decisions about reproduction are never made in a vacuum, but they should be as free as possible. Pretending that demographic developments are not collectively important makes one easy prey. The lesson to be learned from past debates on population is that we talk about population figures, but under the banner of equality, without creating hierarchies among people
Dana Schmalz is a professor of public law at the BSP Business & Law School in Munich. She co-founded Völkerrechtsblog in 2014 and was a member of the blog’s editorial team until July 2022; she is now a member of the scientific advisory board.
Hendrik Simon is a senior researcher at the Research Institute Social Cohesion (RISC) at Frankfurt University and a research associate at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). He is an editor at Völkerrechtsblog.