Eurocentrism in Ukraine’s Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter, the ICC Statute) has reignited the war of words over the pros and cons of this decision. Domestically, the debate has focused on the potential risks for the Ukrainian military (see, e.g., Kostenko and Lutsenko), with the pro-ratification group ultimately prevailing (see, e.g., Mudra and Kovalenko).

On 21 August 2024, the Ukrainian Parliament ratified the ICC Statute. After the adoption of the implementation law, the ratification law came into effect on 24 October 2024, and Ukraine officially deposited its instrument of ratification the following day. Consequently, Ukraine will become the 125^th state party to the ICC Statute on 1 January 2025. While these steps were welcomed, civil society and legal scholars criticised Ukraine’s declaration under Article 124 of the ICC Statute (see, e.g., Amnesty International, Pechonchyk, Matviichuk, Heller and Dannenbaum).

Largely absent from the critique, however, is the Eurocentrism inherent in the ratification process. This gap is addressed in my blog post, with due consideration given to Ukraine’s liminal space between the Global North and the Global South within the field of international criminal law.

Eurocentrism in the Legal Framework

Article 8 of the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement obliges the parties to ‘cooperate in promoting peace and international justice by ratifying and implementing the [ICC Statute] […] and its related instruments’. All members of the European Union (hereinafter, the EU) are states parties to the ICC Statute. Despite Ukraine making two declarations under Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute, and amending both its Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure, ratification was consistently postponed in Kyiv. Such delays, however, did not violate international law. As I have argued elsewhere, the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement imposes no specific time limits, and its flexible commitment to co-operation differs from a straightforward obligation to ratify.

In June 2022, Denys Maliuska, then Minister of Justice of Ukraine, bemoaned that many members of the Ukrainian armed forces had been misinformed or possibly disinformed about the consequences of ratification—something that, in his estimation, could not be remedied during wartime. In February 2024, the high level of risk perception was reflected in the Action Plan approved by the Ukrainian government to implement the European Commission’s recommendations outlined in the Report on Ukraine’s progress within the 2023 Enlargement Package. In particular, a draft law on the ratification of the ICC Statute was to be developed and submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ‘within one year of the termination or lifting of martial law’.

Eurocentrism and the Home Straight to Ratification

A fundamental shift occurred in the spring of 2024 when Iryna Mudra was appointed as Deputy Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office. Together with her team, she seems to be the architect behind the U-turn towards ratification amidst the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.

In August 2024, when explaining the decision to ratify the ICC Statute to the general public, Iryna Mudra provided five major reasons, the first of which was Ukraine’s integration into the EU (hereinafter, European integration). Interestingly, she linked this issue to Ukraine’s security co-operation agreements, particularly those concluded with Germany and the Netherlands. Both instruments stipulate that ‘Ukraine will ratify’ the ICC Statute ‘as mentioned in the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement’ and ‘on the way to its membership in the EU’. In my view, this wording suggests that no new obligations were undertaken by Ukraine; rather, the existing ones were simply reiterated.

Moreover, the wind of change swayed Denys Maliuska’s rigidity. In the Explanatory Note to the ratification bill dated 15 August 2024, he presented European integration as the sole justification for the necessity and relevance of ratification. In this respect, he relied not only on the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement but also, paradoxically, on the above-mentioned Action Plan, which, as previously discussed, did not prioritise ratification for the current year. According to the same Explanatory Note, the anticipated outcomes of ratification included preventing and punishing international crimes, obtaining full membership rights in the International Criminal Court (hereinafter, the ICC) and demonstrating Ukraine’s dedication to both the rule of law and the maintenance of international peace and security.

By way of comparison, in the Explanatory Note to the implementation bill dated 15 August 2024, Denys Maliuska refrained from making any Eurocentric points. Rather, he emphasised the necessity of amending both the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to align with the latest developments in international law, particularly the ICC Statute.

Subsequently, similar reasoning was employed in the two Opinions of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Committee on Law Enforcement. Yet, the Committee also stressed that the implementation bill’s objective was to adapt national law to EU acquis in the context of Ukraine’s European integration.

A Critique of Eurocentrism

The Eurocentric approach taken by Ukrainian executive and legislative officials raises controversy. On the one hand, it does make sense in relations with the EU, which has emerged as a key ally of Ukraine. This supranational organisation, notably its Common Security and Defence Policy, has been significantly affected by the Russo-Ukrainian war, prompting reinforced defence co-operation. In addition, the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine has provided strategic advice, training, funds and equipment to the national authorities in order to ‘facilitate the investigation and prosecution of international crimes committed in the context of the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine’.

On the other hand, the approach in question may harm both Ukraine and the broader project of international criminal justice. The latter has been extensively lambasted for its Eurocentric epistemology and biases (see, e.g., Martineau, Ambos, Nielsen and Ananthavinayagan). Although assertions about the ICC’s lack of attention to non-European conflicts fall apart in light of past critiques regarding its preoccupation with Africa, the unprecedented operational support from Eurojust and financial backing from the European Commission for the Situation in Ukraine do indeed give rise to a legitimate rebuke for selectivity.

It is important to remember that international crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction ratione materiae transcend merely regional affairs. Rather, these offences constitute ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’. The language of international criminal justice is utilised to condemn perpetrators as enemies of humankind. Furthermore, if Ukraine seeks to win hearts and minds in the Global South, relying on Eurocentric positions is a self-defeating strategy. Whether it pertains to the execution of ICC arrest warrants against Russian suspects, including Vladimir Putin, or the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression, Ukraine needs a helping hand from the entire international community.

Last but not least, it remains unclear whether the European integration argument played a decisive role in convincing the Ukrainian military to change its stance on ratification. More likely, the domestic opposition was artfully assuaged by Ukraine’s declaration under Article 124 of the ICC Statute.

Designed to promote the treaty’s universality, this provision allows a ratifying state to opt out of ICC jurisdiction over war crimes for a seven-year period following ratification ‘when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory’. By invoking only the clause concerning its nationals, Ukraine may exacerbate the problem of Eurocentrism. The idea of selective justice embedded in Ukraine’s declaration creates grounds for accusations of double standards—ironically, the very issue Ukraine sought to counter by ratifying the ICC Statute.

In any case, the Global South is not immune to such criticism either, especially after Mongolia, a state party to the ICC Statute, not only failed to apprehend Vladimir Putin but also rolled out the red carpet for him in September 2024. According to Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC, this failure amounted to a breach of Mongolia’s obligations under the ICC Statute.

Conclusions

Ukraine’s ratification of the ICC Statute, along with the adoption of the implementation law, marks a milestone in its pursuit of justice for international crimes. Nevertheless, the emphasis on European integration as a rationale, if not the sole rationale, for ratification raises crucial questions about Ukraine’s self-positioning in the international arena.

While it is vital to maintain good relations with the EU, Ukraine’s framing of its actions through a chiefly Eurocentric lens risks not only alienating non-EU states but also undermining the universality of the international criminal justice project. To effectively combat international crimes and garner global support, Ukraine should, therefore, adopt a more inclusive approach to international criminal justice that recognises diverse interests within the international community.