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The Judge Who Armed the War

Sudan, Russia, and the Duty to Abstain

17.11.2026

While fourteen members of the UN Security Council voted in favour of draft resolution S/2024/826 to halt the devastating hostilities in Sudan, Russia cast a solitary, decisive veto. Behind that single vote lies a staggering humanitarian catastrophe, displacing eleven million people and forcing nearly twenty-one million into the depths of starvation. Yet, beyond the immediate political paralysis, this episode revives a profound legal question under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, which is was Russia legally obligated to abstain from voting in the first place? Indeed, by shielding its deep material and strategic stakes in the conflict, Russia’s veto directly challenged the integrity of the Charter’s most vital ethical safeguard.

This post argues that S/2024/826 was a Chapter VI measure and that Russia’s involvement made it a ‘party’ required to abstain under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. If this conduct does not engage the abstention obligation, it is difficult to imagine what would.

Reading Between the Lines of Russia’s Justification

Article 27(3) contains an explicit textual trigger. A permanent member’s mandatory duty to abstain applies strictly to decisions under Chapter VI. Because the Security Council notoriously avoids explicitly designating chapters in its resolutions, we must look to the core substance and framing of the draft (Namibia Advisory Opinion, para. 114).

The operative language of S/2024/826 is entirely hortatory. It urges the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to halt hostilities, recommends mediation through the Personal Envoy, and calls for unhindered humanitarian access. It carefully avoids invoking Article 39 of the Charter, which grants the Security Council the authority to address threats to international peace and security, or authorizing coercive enforcement measures.

Paradoxically, the clearest confirmation of this framework came from Russia itself. Deputy Permanent Representative Anna Evstigneeva justified the veto by claiming the resolution bypassed Sudan’s sovereign government and meddled in its national agenda. This specific brand of diplomatic outrage makes sense only within a Chapter VI context. Because Chapter VII enforcement actions can legally operate completely independent of host-state consent, Russia’s own legal rationale effectively presupposes that S/2024/826 falls within the persuasive, non-enforcement domain of Chapter VI.

This characterization, however, might be contestable. There is a thin line of difference between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, and the Council has at times adopted Hybrid Resolutions. However, from the evidence available, it is reasonable to assume that S/2024/826 fits more comfortably within Chapter VI. Article 27(3) is thus applicable in principle.

Rethinking ‘Dispute’ in the Age of Proxy Warfare

To trigger the obligatory abstention rule, we must cross a second conceptual threshold. That is, does the civil war in Sudan constitute a ‘dispute’ under Article 27(3)?

Strict formalists often lean on the Permanent Court of International Justice’s classic Mavrommatis definition, which requires “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons” (para. 19). Under a hyper-narrow reading, Sudan’s conflict is purely domestic. There is no identifiable legal claim to which Russia stands opposed. Critics may object that Sudan’s civil war is a domestic ‘situation’ and not an interstate dispute; and consequently, Russia is not a formal belligerent.

The ICJ’s treatment of the distinction in the Namibia Advisory Opinion provides useful historical backing. South Africa had argued that the matter was a “dispute” requiring abstention under Article 27(3) and participation under Article 32. The Court noted that the question of Namibia had been placed on the Security Council’s agenda as a ‘situation,’ not a ‘dispute’ (para. 25) and that South Africa had failed to raise the issue at the appropriate time. The Court therefore declined to treat the matter as a dispute for the purposes of those Charter provisions. The precedent underscores that the Council’s own agenda characterization carries significant weight, yet it also leaves open the possibility that external involvement of sufficient intensity can transform the legal character of a matter. Sudan’s tragedy highlights exactly why revisiting that possibility is necessary.

Looking at modern conflict through a purely formalist lens completely misses the reality of global politics. A purposive interpretation is required to capture how intrastate conflicts with intense external entanglements function today. There is at least some Council practice supporting this move. In the 1974 debates concerning South Africa, Madagascar raised the possibility that substantial military and political assistance could render a State subject to the abstention rule. While that question was left open at the time, Sudan’s current tragedy highlights exactly why revisiting it is necessary and why a purposive approach is better suited. Russia’s involvement is an obvious conflict of interest; the kind that Article 27(3) was designed to prevent.

Why Russia Is a ‘Party’ in Sudan

Can a permanent member finance, arm, and politically leverage a conflict, yet escape accountability simply by refusing to put its own soldiers on the ground? To answer this, we must reject a rigid textual approach to the word ‘party’ and adopt a realistic, functional assessment. Under a textual approach, party status requires direct legal participation, i.e., a State has to be formally recognised as a party to proceedings. Going by that, Russia is not a party. It has not declared war and a part of its military presence is operated by affiliates.

But this is where the functional assessment matters. Russia is not a mere observer. Russia’s footprint in the war actively shifted over time. In an investigation it was revealed that the Wagner Group (which dissolved later in 2023) had supplied surface to air missiles to the RSF only two days before the civil war started. This claim has further been corroborated by satellite imagery and testimony from captured Wagner operatives. While multiple other external players like Egypt and UAE have also helped fuel the tension, what makes Russia’s involvement unique is that it was the only external power actively securing material assets in Sudan while holding a UN Security Council veto to cover its tracks.

By mid-2024, Russia pivotally increased its direct strategic engagement with the SAF through the Africa Corps, a state-supported successor to the Wagner Group. Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov visited Port Sudan, where he finalised military supply contracts with the SAF and concluded the naval base agreement granting Russia access to the Red Sea. Kalashnikov Concern and Molot, both subsidiaries of Rostec, exported at least $5.8 million worth of small arms to Sudan, where the weapons have been documented in conflict zones on both sides. Kholood Khair, a Sudan expert, called this act of Russia as “having a horse in the race no matter how this shakes out”.

By the time Moscow vetoed the resolution in November 2024, it had a direct material and strategic interest in the conflict. Moscow’s entire gamble depended on the SAF staying in power long enough to deliver on its naval base and resource concessions. There is an obvious conflict of interest. The kind that nemo judex was designed to prevent. One can contend that Russia was not a formal belligerent. However, an exclusively formal reading of Article 27(3) risks depriving it of much of its purpose. A policy designed to expel bias would be considerably easy to circumvent if a state were able to finance, arm or provide strategic assistance and still retain full voting rights simply because it’s not a formal belligerent.

Ironically, recent reports show that the base deal has completely collapsed, a direct casualty of the war Russia chose not to stop. A case could be made that if the benefits never materialized, was Russia’s stake sufficient to require an abstention? That line of thinking, however, fundamentally misunderstands Article 27(3).

Nevertheless, Article 27(3) is not judged in hindsight. What matters is where a country stands the exact moment they cast their vote, not whether their gamble eventually paid off. When Russia voted, they were holding onto basing rights and resource deals that hinged entirely on keeping a friendly regime in power. That is the exact conflict of interest the rule is designed to catch. The naval base might have sunk, but the veto problem is still very much afloat.

An Underenforced Guarantee, Not a Dead Letter

The last leg of criticism might be that no State has successfully invoked Article 27(3) against permanent member in the last six decades. But does political non-use mean a law ceases to exist? Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 31(3)(b)), subsequent practice can help interpret a treaty, but the International Law Commission has consistently resisted the idea that mere political inaction can quietly delete an explicit treaty obligation. Permanently altering treaty obligations requires a deep consensus, not just historical compliance born of political paralysis.

Furthermore, the international community has actively resisted letting this rule die. Germany invoked Article 27(3) in response to the Russian vetoes on Ukraine in 2023, UNGA Resolution 76/262 establishes automatic debate in the General Assembly in case of a P5 veto, which is precisely the institutional recognition of the fact that vetoes are not beyond scrutiny. A 2024 workshop convened by Oona A. Hathaway and Stewart Patrick for the Carnegie Endowment identified the revival of Article 27(3) as a live non-amendment reform proposal, leaving open the question of whether states providing material support to belligerents are parties for purposes of the provision.

The Cost of Silence

Was Russia’s veto of S/2024/826 cast in violation of Article 27(3)? There may be disagreements; and reasonably so. The concepts of ‘dispute’ and ‘party’, according to the UN Charter, may very well be contested. Even if Russia did cast the veto in violation, it cannot be judicially invalidated, because the Charter does not provide any mechanism for that. But those are arguments about application and enforcement, not about whether the obligation exists.

Sudan lays bare the horrific human cost of that underenforcement. We are left watching a permanent member arm both sides of a civil war, secure its own strategic naval and resource deals from the wreckage, and then cast the deciding vote to kill the only multilateral measure designed to stop the bleeding. If Russia’s conduct here does not trigger the mandatory obligation to abstain, then it is difficult to imagine what ever would. The human cost of that inaction is already glaringly obvious in Sudan. Since the veto, the fall of El Fasher has brought devastating mass atrocities, famine has spread across the country, and the state has effectively fractured in two. This is what happens when legal safeguards are treated as optional.

Article 27(3) is not a dead letter; it is an underenforced one, and Sudan is paying the ultimate price for the international community’s silence.

Author
Sanchari Bhattacharjee

Sanchari is a fourth-year law student at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences in Kolkata.

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