Sudanese Lion Cub Propaganda

In early 2026, Bellingcat, an open source research collective, published an investigation regarding ‘lion cub’ propaganda in the ongoing Sudanese civil war. It shows that both parties to the conflict use child soldiers to make and distribute social media content in order to glorify their actions, vilify their enemies and recruit more (child) soldiers. The children, also called ‘lion cubs’, can, for instance, be seen interacting with military leaders, mocking enemy prisoners, carrying arms, and filming themselves alongside corpses. This content is quite popular as the ‘lion cubs’ videos amassed millions of views and they have thousands of followers.

However, one immediately feels that such content is morally dubious if not outright exploitative, resulting in questions about the children’s human rights. In this contribution, those questions are addressed. Specifically, it is examined whether creating and distributing social media content in which children are used for propaganda purposes in armed conflict is in compliance with their rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

To be sure, there are indications that the child soldiers identified in the Bellingcat investigation are also used for other operations. While that in itself is a violation of their rights, the focus here lies on their use as content creators. Furthermore, although only one belligerent party represents the recognised government of Sudan, in this contribution both parties’ actions are examined as if they are parties to the CRC. Both control parts of the State’s territory and are capable of executing governmental authority there. Hence, both should be held to the standards imposed under the Convention (Duffy, p. 41-43).

The CRC contains a whole host of rights to protect children, yet there are four that are especially interesting to the situation at hand. These are the obligation to act in the best interests of the child (article 3), the freedom from (harmful) child labour (article 32), the protection against other forms of exploitation (article 36), and protection from participation in hostilities (article 38(2)).

Best Interests of the Child

Article 3(1) CRC requires that public actors, such as courts of law and administrative authorities, address and take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in all decisions regarding them. This includes decisions regarding individual children (General Comment No. 14, para. II.).

What constitutes ‘the best interest of the child’ is complex, adaptable, and needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the Committee) has identified a non-exhaustive list of elements that need to be taken into account. These are: the child’s views, their identity, preservation of the family environment or relations, care, protection and safety of the child, their vulnerabilities, and the rights to health and education (General Comment No. 14, para. V.A.1.).

In this case, the relevant question is whether the care, protection and safety of the children were respected in the decision to use them to make war propaganda on social media. In General Comment No. 14, it is stated that both the current safety and integrity of children, as well as potential future risks and harms, need to be taken into account. The literature on children making content outside the context of armed conflict, also known as ‘kidfluencing’, indicates that such practices can expose children to certain harms and risks. First, the privacy of the involved children can be violated. For ‘ordinary’ kidfluencers, the risk exists that personal or even intimate moments are shared for the whole world to see outside of their volition and that this will leave a permanent digital footprint (Clark and Jno-Charles, pp. 47-49; Fishbein, pp. 135 & 137). The ‘lion cubs’ are encouraged – perhaps forced – to disclose far more sensitive information than ‘ordinary’ kidfluencers and are thus even more at risk of privacy violations. For instance, they widely broadcast which party they support in the ongoing war, which could lead to reprisals both in the present and future. Second, kidfluencers incur an increased risk of (online) harassment (Masterson, pp. 595-596; Fishbein, pp. 136-137). Again, this risk is worse for the lion cubs due to the fact that they are living through an armed conflict. One of them, for example, has signalled on TikTok that he has received death threats. Additionally, in a brutal war in which civilians and children have already been targeted numerous times, it is not unthinkable that the children would be earmarked for physical attack to halt their propaganda. Finally, questions can be asked regarding the consent of children who create online content (Clark and Jno-Charles, pp. 44-47). In the case at hand, it can and should be questioned whether children who are faced with the enormous pressures of growing up in a country devastated by war could make a free and informed decision to participate in a social media campaign (probably) organised by a belligerent party. For these reasons, it is highly doubtful that the parties had the best interests of the children in mind when making the decision to involve them in the production of their propaganda.

Economic Exploitation and Harmful Child Labour

Article 32 CRC enshrines the child’s freedom from economic exploitation and hazardous or harmful labour. However, it does not detail what constitutes such exploitation or labour. The International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour can offer some guidance. In article 3 of that Convention, the worst forms of child labour, which would ipso facto be prohibited under article 32 CRC, are listed. They include “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children”. Based on the Bellingcat investigation, it can be gathered that the content that the lion cubs are creating is very likely harmful to their safety. For one, the children are exposed to death threats, as stated above. Furthermore, some of them are present on or in close proximity to the battlefield. For instance, when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conquered the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) base in Babanusa in December 2025, a lion cub made celebratory videos from the front line. The work the lion cubs do is also likely harmful to their morals. They are exposed to (habitual) violence and encouraged – perhaps forced – to make violent remarks about enemy forces. In one particularly deplorable instance, one of the lion cubs even made content surrounded by corpses. Thus, the belligerent parties are not taking measures to safeguard the children from harmful labour as required under article 32 CRC.

Whether the lion cubs’ content creation also constitutes economic exploitation beyond harmful child labour is less clear. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has warned about the potential for economic exploitation of kidfluencers (General Comment No. 25, para 112). Moreover, it has been argued that such activity inherently amounts to economic exploitation if the proceeds do not go exclusively to the child (Abrams, p. 105). However, regarding the lion cubs, there is no indication of who garners the proceeds from the children’s content, making it impossible to determine whether they are economically exploited.

Other Forms of Exploitation

Another provision at issue is article 36 CRC, which ensures that children should be protected from all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to their welfare. The Committee has indicated in the past that media reporting regarding children in which the integrity of the child is not guaranteed is exploitative (Report on the eleventh session, p. 80). Moreover, there is ample evidence that kidfluencing can be exploitative (Abrams, p. 105; Archer and Delmo, pp. 299-300; Clark and Jno-Charles, p. 38; Fishbein, p. 148). In the case at hand, there is no doubt that encouraging – perhaps forcing – children to make war propaganda is exploitative. As discussed above, the integrity of the lion cubs is not guaranteed, it is even actively being harmed by exposing them to situations and actions which no child should see. Additionally, the children’s content is being used to attain goals that have nothing to do with them, such as influencing combatants in the conflict and recruiting more (child) soldiers. Hence, the lion cubs are not being protected from exploitation.

(Direct) Participation in Hostilities

Finally, article 38(2) CRC, which requires that State Parties take feasible measures to ensure that children under the age of fifteen do not take direct part in hostilities, may be at issue. This age limit was raised to eighteen in article 1 of the CRC’s Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC). The investigation does not disclose how old the lion cubs are. However, seeing the images, it is highly likely that none of them is over the age of eighteen and at least one is under the age of fifteen.

The text of the article refers to direct participation, and IHL scholars have pointed out that spreading propaganda cannot (or is very unlikely to) amount to direct participation in hostilities as it does not directly cause the required harm (Melzer, p. 51;  Schmitt, p. 708; Bosch, p. 1016; Jackson, pp. 105-108). Thus, at first glance, it would seem that parties to the conflict are not violating article 38(2) CRC by having the lion cubs make and distribute propaganda.

However, some, including the Committee, argue that all forms of participation in hostilities by children are prohibited under this provision (Ang, p. 41). Although this is a contra legem interpretation, there are strong arguments in its favour. First, the ICRC has shown that there is a rule of customary international law that prohibits allowing children to take part in hostilities, whether directly or indirectly (ICRC, rule 137). Second, using children to participate actively in hostilities in both international and non-international armed conflicts (IAC and NIAC, respectively) is a war crime under the Rome Statute (article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) & (e)(vii)). Moreover, ‘active participation’ is broader than ‘direct participation’ as the travaux préparatoires indicate that all activities related to combat are included in the term (Preparatory Committee, p. 21). Third, article 4(3)(c) AP II, to which Sudan is a party, prohibits allowing children to take part in hostilities during NIACs without making a distinction between direct or indirect participation. Thus, a reasonable argument can be made that under article 38(2) CRC parties have to take feasible measures to ensure that children do not take any part in hostilities.

The question, therefore, is whether creating and distributing propaganda amounts to such participation. The line set out in the travaux préparatoires to the Rome Statute, i.e. all activities related to combat, points to an affirmative answer. One makes and spreads propaganda in war to improve combat circumstances, for instance, by boosting recruitment, improving troop morale or weakening enemy resolve (Scriver, p. 395). Thus, a strong argument can be made that because the SAF and RSF allowed – perhaps forced – the lion cubs to make and distribute propaganda, they did not ensure that those children did not take part in the hostilities and, therefore, violated article 38(2) CRC.

Conclusion

By letting children make and distribute propaganda on social media, parties to the armed conflict in Sudan are violating multiple of their rights under the CRC. Specifically, they are not acting in their best interest, they are not respecting their freedom from harmful labour, they are not protecting them from exploitation, and they are not taking measures to exclude their participation in hostilities. Lion cub propaganda is, therefore, not just a social media trend, but an egregious and reprehensible violation of children’s rights.