IACtHR’s Advisory Opinion No. 32/25 and Rights of Nature

International Environmental Law (IEL) was imagined through the prism of anthropocentric values (which allocates worth to Nature based on its utility for humans). Despite this, IEL has been progressively experiencing a shift towards ecocentric values (which awards Nature intrinsic value and rights). As observed by Rajamani and Peel, there is a ‘reckoning’ in IEL of ‘ethical values, approaches, choices and conflicts’ where ‘non-anthropocentric values are gaining ground’.

The growing recognition of rights of Nature (RoN) (i.e. the assertion of Nature as a right-holding entity with legal personality) is an example of the above. Currently, a handful of Latin-American countries recognize RoN in their constitutions, legislation and case-law. The Advisory Opinion No. 32/25 (AO-32/25) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), by acknowledging RoN, can drive a more ample protection of Nature in the region and in two ways. Fist, by driving normative and judicial recognition of RoN in domestic legal systems advancing State practice in favor of Nature’s Rights. Second, by advancing a progressive incorporation of ecocentric principles into the legal fabric of international environmental instruments.

This essay aims to analyze the legal implications of the AO-32/25 acknowledgement of RoN for State Parties of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) under the theory of conventionality control and its effects on IEL. It explores how RoN can contribute to build a more balanced notion of sustainable development based on ecocentric values. Finally, it argues that the AO-32/25 recognition of RoN can, through conventionality control, catalyze State practice in Latin-America, which might, in turn, permeate IEL.

The Anthropocentric Hard Wiring of Early IEL

Anthropocentrism is based on a worldview that prioritizes humans’ interests, where Nature is worth protecting for its instrumental value and utility (see Bosselmann). Deeply hardwired in early IEL rhetoric is the anthropocentric ultimate goal of protecting the environment as a tool for securing human well-being (see du Toit and Kotzé, p.11).

Anthropocentric values can be viewed in every instrument that Dupuy and Viñuales (p.11)  have identified as the foundational backbone of IEL. For instance, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803 highlights the rights of nations and peoples to exercise sovereignty over their ‘natural wealth and resources’ in pursuit of ‘national development’. The Stockholm Declaration (Principles 1-4) claims that ‘men’ have a right to live in an environment that allows a life of ‘dignity and well-being’ for present and future generations. In the same vein, the Rio Declaration (Principles 1 and 3) states that humans are at the ‘centre of concerns’ of sustainable development and are ‘entitled’ to an adequate life in ‘harmony with nature’. Similar considerations are found in other basal instruments like the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (paras. 16-18) and ‘The Future We Want’ (para. 6).

‘Sustainable development’, a key concept transversal to most previous instruments, serves as the scaffolding of all recent IEL, especially after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. At its core, this concept is grounded on the notion that economic, social and environmental considerations are ‘interdependent’ and ‘mutually reinforcing’ pillars that must be balanced to achieve development. (see Rio Principle 4 and Political Declaration of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, para. 5). Even if founded on the idea of ‘balancing’, in practice, sustainable development discourse is often used to ‘rationalize’ anthropocentric ‘Earth system altering practices’, pondering human interests over Nature’s protection (cf. Kotzé, p. 222).

The Rise of Ecocentrism in IEL

Ecocentrism has progressively gained ground in IEL as a reaction to anthropocentric approaches’ inability to attain structural environmental reforms and halt the crossing of critical planetary boundaries (cf. Kotzé and Kim, p. 4). It presses for the acknowledgement of Nature’s intrinsic value and is mainly concerned with all ecological ‘correlations and networks’ that enable Earth’s ‘life-support systems’ of which humans are only a part (cf. Bosselmann, paras. 16-18).

Threads of ecocentric values can be appreciated in the UN World Charter for Nature. In the field of biodiversity conservation, treaties were originally motivated by economic interests surrounding the exploitation of species; however, over time, its focus pivoted towards conservation and the protection of ecosystem’s inherent worth (see Dupuy and Viñuales, p. 202). Notably, ecocentric values can be observed in the Convention on Biological Diversity (preamble), and subsequent agreements of its conferences of parties (CBD COP5 Decision V/6 and COP7 Decision VII/11, Annex 1) that highlight the significance of the ecosystem approach to conservation. Also, under the Ramsar Convention, the ‘international significance’ of wetlands is ascertained solely on their ecological characteristics (art. 2.2). Additionally, the preamble of the recent Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdictions (preamble) stresses the relevance of preserving biological diversity’s intrinsic value.

The RoN Movement Is an Example of the General Turn Towards Ecocentrism

The rising RoN movement is also anchored in ecocentrism. It seeks the recognition of natural entities as right-holders that have legal standing, through guardianship, to request the cessation of deleterious human behaviour and integral environmental redress (see Stone, p. 463). The UNGA has acknowledged that RoN can help promote sustainable development in real ‘harmony with nature’. Currently, RoN are protected in constitutions, in Ecuador and Bolivia, and extended legislation and case-law in ACHR States, including inter alia Brazil, Mexico, Panama and Peru, as well as other countries worldwide (AO 32-25, para. 286).

On the one side, supporters of RoN contest that securing Nature’s legal personality can, in practice: (i) guarantee access to justice through ample legal standing to cease and repair ecosystemic damage in absence of direct human affectations (Stone, 463-473); (ii) increase political and public surveillance of otherwise ignored environmental issues (Wesche, p. 554), and (iii) advance nature-based policies aimed at protecting critical ecosystems (Gilbert et. al., p. 363), designed with the participation of local communities, often indigenous populations, as guardians. On the other side, empirical studies criticize RoN for the lack of clear regulations on liability in the guardianship regimes (see Kahui et. al., p. 221), and of political enforcement in ‘weak governance settings’ (cf. Wesche, p. 555).

Although further research is required to ascertain the effectiveness of the different RoN frameworks, its recognition arguably has, at least, a strong symbolic force capable of harmonizing sustainable development with Nature’s needs. The IACtHR underlined this symbolic power and stressed its importance in the context of climate change.

The IACtHR Rides the Wave of Ecocentrism with RoN

The climate change framework is grounded on the anthropocentric Leitmotif of preventing dangerous human interference with the climate system, mitigating emissions and stabilizing the global average temperature to secure inter-generational survival and address climate impacts on humans (see UNFCCC, art. 2 and Paris Agreement, art. 2). In the AO-32/25, the IACtHR implicitly questioned this paradigm by highlighting the relevance of shifting towards a climate governance model deep-seated in ecocentrism that prioritizes the protection of the climate system as a means to harmonize sustainable development with Nature’s needs.

The AO-32/25 on State obligations regarding climate change and human rights was rendered by the Court in July 2025 on request of Chile and Colombia. In this AO, the IACtHR firmly rode the wave of ecocentrism by asserting that, under the ACHR, acknowledging the right of Nature to preserve its ecological processes builds to a ‘truly sustainable development model’ aligned with ‘planetary boundaries’. Furthermore, it claimed that advancing to a ‘paradigm’ that protects ecosystem’s ‘inherent rights’ is pivotal for securing its long-term integrity (para. 279). Finally, it stated that normatively protecting RoN is ‘fully compatible’ with the general obligation to adopt domestic legislation to progressively protect social, economic, cultural and environmental rights (paras. 281).

Some clarifications are pertinent to dissipate the smoke that blurs the general understanding of commentators surrounding the scope and reach of the Court’s pronouncement. First, it should be noted that the Court did not impose an obligation on ACHR to recognize RoN. Nonetheless, the Tribunal did send a strong signal regarding the desirability to advance in this direction and its compatibility with the object and purpose of the ACHR. Second, the Court did not recognize locus standi to Nature to bring cases (through its guardians). Consequently, the right of legal persons to appear before the Tribunal as potential victims remains reserved to Indigenous Peoples and unions, federations and confederations under the current rules of the Inter-American System (see AO 22-16, paras. 72-84 and 85-105).

Overall, the IACtHR’s stance regarding RoN has no procedural influence in the context of future contentious procedures: Nature will not have its day in Court (as a direct victim, at least!). However, the Court’s reflections on the central role of RoN in harmonizing sustainable development might ultimately influence IEL through the mechanism of conventionality control, as discussed below.

Conventionality Control Can Drive State Practice and Impact IEL

The Court’s standards on RoN have utmost importance due to the conventionality control doctrine fiercely ingrained in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. This doctrine claims that there is an international obligation on all public authorities of all State Parties to ex officio interpret and, if necessary, amend domestic legislation, in a manner compatible with the ACHR, as interpreted by the IACtHR in its contentious and advisory capacity (see Burgorgue-Larsen, para. 1-3, 13-28).

In practical terms, this means that the Court’s interpretation carries normative authority beyond the specific cases it decides. Hence, the decision of the Court in its Advisory Opinion No. 32 (AO-32) to recognize RoN as integral to the realization of sustainable development and environmental protection under the Convention, would have to be officiously internalized by domestic judges, legislators, and administrative bodies across the region. In more receptive or “compliant” States—those with a demonstrated record of aligning domestic norms with Inter-American jurisprudence—this could catalyze the judicial and legislative entrenchment of Nature’s rights. The doctrine thus possesses transformative potential: it could convert an interpretive innovation at the regional level into binding normative change within national legal systems.

Moreover, if AO-32 were to articulate an expansive recognition of RoN, it could exert influence well beyond the Inter-American system. The consolidation of RoN practices in Latin America—driven by judicial dialogue, transnational advocacy networks, and regional norm diffusion—may eventually shape the evolution of IEL more broadly. This could manifest in the progressive incorporation of ecocentric principles into soft law instruments, multilateral environmental agreements, or interpretive developments under existing regimes. In this sense, the IACtHR’s engagement with RoN would not only reflect but also reinforce a paradigmatic shift in global environmental governance: from an anthropocentric framework of rights and obligations toward a more relational, ecocentric conception of legal subjectivity and planetary stewardship.

Conclusions

As a corollary, three major conclusions can be drawn.

First, as Rajamani and Peel observed, IEL is experiencing a paradigmatic shift from anthro to ecocentrism. The RoN movement fits into this growing trend.

Second, the IACtHR’s did not recognize locus standi to Nature (through its guardians) to appear as a claimant before the Court in a future contentious case. The overall relevance of the Tribunal stance is that it advances the idea that RoN hold a sturdy symbolic power capable of enhancing climate governance by more effectively harmonizing sustainable development with Nature’s protection.

Ultimately, the Court’s standards could trigger, through conventionality control, wider judicial and legislative recognition of RoN in Latin-America. This may advance State practice in favor of RoN and, subsequently, foster its recognition in international forums and instruments pushing further the wave of ecocentrism in IEL. In this equation, conventionality control’s ability to drive State conduct is determinant.