Beyond Staatsraison

The following text is published in the category of “Open Letters and Statements“. 

 

The ongoing wholesale destruction of Gaza and starvation of its population by the State of Israel call for urgent action by the international community. This manmade human catastrophe is an affront to our shared sense of humanity and to everything the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union aspire to stand for.

The vaguely defined policy doctrine that has resurrected the pre-democratic concept of ‘Staatsraison’, has come to place support for the Israeli government over Germany’s own legal and moral obligations, national and European interests, the basic rights of Palestinians, the fate of the Israeli hostages, and regional peace efforts. The Hamas-led terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023 should have served as a wake-up call for those who thought that managing the status quo was a viable substitute for conflict resolution. The daily horrors witnessed since then show that prioritising the short-term security of an occupying power over peace-making and compliance with international law can achieve neither peace nor security. Instead, Israel’s depredation of the Gaza Strip over the past two years has made the doctrine’s incompatibility with Germany’s Constitution (Basic Law) and wider historic responsibility ever-more apparent. It’s time for a reset.

This paper presents a broad, non-partisan consensus among experts of Middle East affairs and other relevant fields^* on the pressing need for a new policy approach by Germany, including within the European Union. Many of its recommendations are valid for other countries and international actors as well. It is motivated by a firm commitment to international law and the Constitution, a sense of historic responsibility to uphold humanist values, and deep-felt empathy with the countless innocent victims of the human catastrophe unfolding in the Middle East. This includes Israelis killed, abused, and abducted on 7 October 2023 by Hamas and other militants and the vast, and still rising, number of Palestinians killed, abused, and detained by Israel without due process since then.

1. Enforce International and European Union Law

Disregard for international law and the institutions mandated to uphold it risks a full-on relapse into unmitigated power politics in the age of weapons of mass destruction and hybrid threats. Safeguarding and developing the post-WWII achievements should be the primary objective guiding German and EU foreign policy, including its relations with allies. Upholding the validity of international law begins with strict compliance and consistent enforcement.

Policy Recommendations for Germany, including within the European Union:

1.1. Reaffirm international law as the basis of German (and EU) policy, in line with Germany’s Constitution and its treaty obligations, and correct inconsistencies in current policies, in particular in response to grave breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law.

1.2. Take urgent action to fully comply with legal obligations under the Genocide Convention. In light of Germany’s special historic responsibility, as well as the political and legal obligation to prevent genocide, consecutive orders by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 26 January, 28 March, and 24 May 2024 on the situation in Gaza, and the ongoing ICJ case Nicaragua vs. Germany, the German government should fully support the ICJ.

1.3. Suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement without delay, as proposed by the European Commission in light of Israel’s breach of its Article 2, and in view of Israel’s non-compliance with the legally binding ICJ orders of 24 May 2024.

1.4. Impose an import ban on Israeli settlement products, ideally at EU-level, analogous to the existing ban on products from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, to align EU policy with the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, as well as to make the EU position on the illegal nature of settlements and our commitment to international law credible. Further steps to ban business with settlements in general should follow.

1.5. Ensure that the online Entry/Exit System (EES) for visa-free entry to the Schengen area, once rolled out, excludes residents of settlements in occupied territory from the visa waiver, and that persons residing outside the 1967 lines cannot obtain visas or consular services from the consular section in Tel Aviv, as a matter of geographic non-competence.[1]

1.6. Fully comply with legal obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and its national transposition laws.[2] Germany, being a state party to the ATT, must, on the one hand, prohibit arms transfers — including to Israel — where it has knowledge that such transfers could be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, attacks against civilian objects or civilians or other war crimes (Art. 6 (3) ATT); on the other hand, it “shall not authorize” arms exports if there is an “overriding risk” that these arms “would contribute to or undermine peace and security” or could be used to “commit or facilitate” serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law or acts amounting to international terrorist or transnational organized crime offences (cf. Article 7 (1), (3) of the ATT). These legal obligations are not discretionary and cannot be superseded by political considerations. Accordingly, Germany must impose an immediate and comprehensive export ban to Israel on all weapons and dual-use goods that could be used to commit or facilitate such crimes, including for ongoing contractual commitments.

1.7. Step up support to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to effectively protect it from extraterritorial effects of third-party sanctions and reaffirm full compliance with the Rome Statute, including with regard to the arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Minister of Defence Yoav Gallant. An urgent first step will be to activate the EU Blocking Statute, but additional protective measures by the EU are needed and feasible, given the ICC’s geographic location, in particular the urgent establishment of a special-purpose vehicle to shield the ICC and its staff against foreign sanctions. The EU should join the Assembly of States Parties in protecting the ICC against any form of external interference by states, be it by sanctions or otherwise.

1.8. Push for more effective mechanisms to enforce IHL when repeatedly and flagrantly violated, including a Conference of Parties to the Geneva Conventions, as requested by the UN General Assembly in September 2024.

2. Prioritise Peace Efforts based on Equal Rights and Self-Determination  

Decades of lip service to the two-state solution (TSS) without implementation and Israeli settlement policy have undermined its credibility in public perception. While the TSS remains the default option to realise the right to self-determination of both Palestinians and Israelis, enshrined in numerous UN resolutions, it must not serve as a fig leaf to avoid addressing the asymmetrical denial of Palestinian rights, including to self-determination. Pursuing the implementation of the TSS does not imply a rejection of alternative models based on the principles of equal rights, mutual recognition, and peaceful coexistence, provided they are agreed between sovereign parties. The role and duty of the international community is to ensure that both parties negotiate in good faith, at eye-level, and within the framework of international law.

2.1. Spotlight the Arab Peace Initiative (API) as the cornerstone for regional peace and underline that this pan-Arab, pan-Islamic peace offer, consistently endorsed by the Member States of the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for the past 20 years, is in line with the EU position and international law. Initiatives that draw on the API, are based on the principles of equal rights and mutual recognition and seek to update its parameters, particularly in light of the feasibility of a TSS, merit careful consideration and support.

2.2. Recognise the State of Palestine within the 1967 lines without further delay to make its commitment to the TSS credible. This step is overdue.

2.3. Operationalise the landmark ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 on Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), which specifies numerous legal obligations for both Israel and third countries that require active follow-up to ensure that EU and Member State policies and actions contribute to ending the unlawful occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel. In particular, this includes ensuring that European-funded cooperation, trade relations, or other economic activities do not benefit settlements.

2.4. Support Palestinian state-building, including by leveraging financial support to push for serious reforms to make the Palestinian Authority more accountable, more efficient in delivering services, more legitimate as a force for Palestinian unity, and eventually more democratic.

2.5. Actively support the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, as well as the process initiated at the July 2025 New York conference hosted by France and Saudi Arabia under the auspices of the UN, to develop positive incentives for peace, coordinate diplomatic and other efforts, share best practices, and generate the political momentum for a final-status settlement.

3. Support Civil Society Engagement for Peace and Reconciliation

The 101 of sustainable peace-making – in addition to addressing root causes and underlying injustices – is to identify agents of peace in each camp, whether government or civil society, Israeli or Palestinian, to amplify these voices, and empower them as preferred interlocutors. It requires a conscious effort to provide space for advocates of peace and reconciliation based on equal rights to take centre stage. Civil society plays a vital role in promoting peace narratives, shaping public discourse, and thereby influencing official policies. The Palestinian Armistice Plan and the Standing Together movement are examples of this.[3] Moreover, civil society can build bridges where governments fail to do so and show that there are people on the ‘other side’ fighting for peace and shared values. In this vein, and in the absence of any readiness from the Netanyahu government to engage in meaningful peace efforts, Israeli civil society activism for Palestinian rights needs to be spotlighted across Arab and Muslim countries.

3.1. Step up political and financial support to civil society and foster bottom-up peacebuilding efforts, such as joint Israeli-Palestinian civil society initiatives or cultural activities that are based on the principles of equal rights and mutual recognition and allow for broad representation of societies across age groups, ethnic, religious, and social backgrounds, as well as equal participation of women in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Implement international commitments to institutionalising support to civil society.[4]

3.2. Support inclusive civil society and academic efforts to formulate and spread a joint historic narrative rooted in academic standards and debates, modelled on post-conflict experiences in Europe and elsewhere, such as the truth and reconciliation commissions established in numerous other contexts around the world.

3.3. Actively support, both politically and financially, human rights defenders on the ground and protect them from criminalisation and repression.

4. Confront the Spoilers[5] Effectively and Consistently

Overcoming the staunch resistance of hardliners and spoilers, entrenched over many decades, will require a significant amount of pressure, both internal and external, which can range from ‘naming & shaming’ and other forms of political pressure to entry bans, asset freezes or other economic sanctions.

As there are spoilers on both sides of the conflict, consistency is vital. Not only is it a prerequisite for effective peace-making; inconsistency may even render well-intended efforts counterproductive. Inconsistent pressure ends up strengthening spoilers on both sides. For too long, German and EU policy has focused almost exclusively on spoilers on the Palestinian side, in spite of the already existing asymmetry of the situation and unlawfulness of the occupation. Apart from rallying Palestinians behind ‘their’ spoilers, this inconsistency has also undermined the credibility of Israeli moderates, whose counterargument vis-à-vis hardliners that the world will not accept this or that breach of international law was proven wrong time and time again.

4.1. Confront spoilers and extremists who seek to undermine prospects for peace, based on coherent, objective, and consistently applied criteria, at EU level, wherever possible and relevant, and/or through coordinated national measures. These measures should be appropriate and proportionate to the gravity of the act, ranging from diplomatic boycott at political level for all actors who openly deny the respective other people’s right to self-determination, to national or EU-wide entry bans for incitement and hate speech.

4.2. Keep all necessary channels of communication with spoilers open, non-publicly and at lower protocollary level.

4.3. Consistently sanction criminal acts that undermine prospects for peace, including war crimes, terrorism, genocidal incitement and acts against third-party mediators by judicial means, whenever possible. National legislation set to prevent acts by individuals constituting crimes under national or international law should also be applied consistently, in particular laws prohibiting to join mercenary forces or other unlawful armed groups, and not to commit illegal acts in conflict, including settler violence.

4.4. Propose and promote a dedicated EU spoiler sanctions regime for the Middle East, as the EU has established in various other contexts. Sanctions should be proportionate to the methods employed to disrupt peace efforts, ranging from political incitement and denial of the other people’s right to self-determination to criminal activities and violence.

4.5. Rescind the classification of the “Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions” (BDS) campaign as an extremist movement by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Freedom of speech means also tolerating views one may disagree with, provided they do not violate the Constitution and do not amount to criminal offences. While this paper should not be misconstrued as an endorsement of BDS, there is nothing manifestly unlawful in the aims formulated by the movement[6] nor in using non-violent forms of resistance, such as boycott, divestment and sanctions, as a response to an unlawful situation. Proscribing such non-violent forms of resistance against an illegal occupation is incompatible with Germany’s commitment to international law, as well as with constitutional rights and freedoms, and indirectly fosters radicalisation by leaving violence or emigration as the only remaining alternatives.

4.6. Seek to engage the BDS movement in a critical and constructive dialogue to ensure that boycotts are not racist, discriminatory or antisemitic, i.e. do not target any national, ethnic, or religious group as a whole and provide for exemptions based on objective and consistently applied criteria, including an unequivocal commitment to equal rights, mutual recognition, and peaceful coexistence based on international law.

4.7. Apply the same criteria to civil society in Germany and abroad to public funding decisions and stop the exclusion of organisations calling for boycott, which is wreaking havoc on Germany’s reputation and international civil society partnerships built up over decades.

5. Protect the UN and Empower Multilateralism

Germany strives to be a champion of multilateralism, as evidenced by its initiative to establish a global “Alliance for Multilateralism”. Since 7 October 2023, a number of decisions and statements have cast a shadow over this commitment. In light of its unique position and clout, Germany has a central role to play to make the multilateral system more efficient, more effective, and more resilient against the threats outlined above.

5.1. Reinvigorate the Alliance for Multilateralism to build an international coalition to protect the institutions mandated to uphold international law and strengthen multilateral cooperation.

5.2. Confront spoilers of multilateralism and peace mediation in word and deed to protect these institutions against intimidation, sanctions, threats, or the use of force. This could include anything from public statements and diplomatic boycott to entry bans and/or asset freezes.

5.3. Step up global strategic communication and civil society-led efforts to counter misinformation against the UN and better explain the importance of multilateralism to broader publics, including in partner countries and at home.

5.4. Increase measures to protect UN staff working in conflict zones and pressure to ensure their safe access, in particular to Gaza. Strongly condemn the killing of UN personnel, as witnessed at an alarming scale in Gaza.

5.5. Step up financial and political support to UNRWA, recognising its irreplaceable and indispensable role, as outlined in the Colonna report.[7] Clarify that the only acceptable way to dissolve UNRWA in the future is to resolve the refugee issue by way of a final-status agreement that takes the rights of the refugees into account.

5.6. Promote multilateral security cooperation across the Middle East, including through the establishment of a regional security cooperation framework aimed at achieving a region free of weapons of mass destruction.

6. Make the EU Relevant

The Gaza crisis has exposed the weaknesses of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy decision-making processes. In a fast-moving policy domain that relentlessly relegates latecomers to the back seats, it is time to find ways to overcome the crippling effect of having 27 veto powers around the table. As Europe deals with a second Trump presidency and increasingly assertive BRICS, the EU cannot afford to deprive itself of using the immense leverage it has. It is a strategic imperative for the EU to protect the international law-based order and promote its core values and vital interests by making full use of its levers of influence.

6.1. Reinvigorate the ‘European reflex’ in German foreign policy and use Germany’s weight to strengthen and shape joint European policy rather than pursuing unilateral efforts.

6.2. Prioritise the adoption of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under Article 31 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) across the board. In the absence of EU27 consensus, interested Member States could explore alternative options to achieve QMV in CFSP, such as enhanced cooperation under Article 20 TEU. Such a ‘CFSP+’ could incorporate all applicable tools of CFSP, including common positions, restrictive measures, and civilian missions.

6.3. Request a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s existing levers with regard to the Middle East conflict (incl. SWOT analysis), pressure points and options for engagement. The Association Agreements with their human rights clause, trade chapter, and broad bilateral cooperation portfolio with both parties, including via Horizon Europe, as well as the visa waiver are obvious examples.

7. Redress a Skewed Narrative and Promote Fact-based Discourse

A comprehensive understanding of the situation that takes the perspectives and narratives of all parties to the conflict into account is the foundation for a balanced policy. This means levelling out the partial narrative and the spread of misinformation on which the current Staatsraison doctrine is based. It includes, first and foremost, the misconceptions that there is no Palestinian or Arab partner for peace and that the emergence of Hamas is the root cause – rather than an effect – of an illegal occupation left to fester for far too long. As a declared champion of press freedom and civil liberties, Germany must safeguard and foster an even-handed and truthful discussion on the conflict, which begins with comprehensive, unbiased verification of facts.

It goes without saying that information provided by parties involved in an armed conflict must be treated with caution and that no one should be defendant and judge at the same time. For this reason, independent and impartial fact-finding by international bodies, specialised experts, and professional journalists is quintessential. When a state actor defies binding ICJ orders to ensure transparency and to cooperate with UN-mandated investigators, bars international journalists from entering Gaza for almost two years, and is accused of killing a historically unprecedented number of media workers and other key witnesses, such as medics and aid workers, they cannot be assumed to be acting in good faith. Yet, assertions made by Israel have been given the same or higher credence as those of UN bodies or local media.

7.1. Ensure that official statements and positions are firmly rooted in facts. Where conflicting accounts exist, absolute priority must be given to information from mandated independent verification mechanisms. For instance, the August 2025 determination by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) of a famine (IPC Phase 5) in the Gaza Governorate needs to be taken seriously.

7.2. Counter the spread of disinformation and misinformation, and prosecute incitement or dehumanisation, in particular by persons holding office or in a public role.

7.3. Give prominence to the urgent demand on the Government of Israel (GoI) to ensure the unimpeded access to Gaza of any UN-mandated investigative body in the context of allegations of genocide and to comply with the legally binding ICJ orders to this effect.

7.4. Strengthen the protection of journalists, humanitarian workers, medical personnel, and other potential key witnesses of war crimes and safeguard their ability to operate without restrictions, including access to Gaza. This includes insisting on accountability for crimes committed against them in bilateral relations with any partner aspiring to adhere to democratic values, including the State of Israel.

7.5. Actively support professional, transparent, and impartial truth-finding in all relevant fields: fact-finding and counter-disinformation; investigative journalism; academic research; criminal investigation and forensics; historiography and archaeology etc. Each of these disciplines has developed mechanisms to shed light on facts from a specific angle and, through their interdisciplinary interplay, play an essential role in getting the full picture.

8. Assume Comprehensive Historic Responsibility

Germany’s historic responsibility for the Shoah means combating antisemitism and protecting Jewish life – primarily within its own borders, and also in its foreign relations. ‘Never again’ is the foundation of its constitutional and international legal obligations, which must always remain the framework of its policy. At the same time, support for Israel to atone for the Shoah cannot be seen in isolation from its indirect effects on third parties, nor from Germany’s wider historic record in committing or abetting genocides and other crimes against humanity. Germany has a universal historic responsibility to uphold international law and protect human rights without discrimi­nation. Selectively accepting historic responsibility means choosing complacency over decency at the expense not only of Palestinian rights, but also of the long-term interests of Israel and of the Jewish people, as well as Germany’s international credibility.

8.1. Emphasise that the only cardinal precepts that take precedence over other considerations, such as the Staatsraison, are the protection of basic human rights in all policy domains and the primacy of international law in foreign relations as enshrined in Germany’s Constitution.

8.2. Reaffirm the special commitment to combatting anti-Semitism and protecting Jewish life, recognising that the responsibility derived from the Shoah, first and foremost, relates to people, not to a state or government.

8.3. Recall that ‘never again’ can only, and must always, be a universal principle. While Germany should strive to maintain a special, friendly, and supportive relationship with Israel and its people, the partnership that emerged from this unparalleled historic reconciliation must be firmly rooted in universal values and norms.

8.4. Recognise that both the creation of the State of Israel in the wake of the Holocaust and subsequent German support have had severe secondary effects on the Palestinian people, as well as neighbouring Arab and other native populations across the region, including Jewish communities in the Middle East and North Africa. Germany therefore also bears a historical responsibility to enable the Palestinian people to fully exercise its right to self-determination and to achieve peace, justice, and reconciliation throughout the Levant.

8.5. Announce its readiness to translate the recognition of secondary responsibility into policy by making substantial contributions to conflict resolution and lasting peace. These could include (i) offering to cover a portion of the reparations due by Israel for the damage caused by its illegal occupation to natural or legal persons concerned as stated in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, as an incentive for peace; (ii) issuing an official apology for contributing to the conditions that pitted Jews and Arabs against each other in the Middle East, building on previous apologies for the persecution of Jews by Nazi Germany; (iii) calling on Israel and other parties involved to recognise their share of historic responsibility, in particular for the Nakba of 1948, and issue an apology to all the native populations concerned, following the recent examples of Canada and Australia; and (iv) substantially contributing to a just solution to the issue of Palestine refugees, e.g. through compensation, in the context of a peaceful settlement to the conflict.

9. Adopt a Holistic Approach to Countering Conflict-Driven Hate

A partial approach to countering conflict-driven hostility towards certain communities, or between them, is not only ineffective but can even be counterproductive. Tackling conflict-driven antisemitism and other forms of racism can only yield results when the conflict is factored in as a key driver of both: Antisemitism has been fuelled in three ways: (i) the ongoing plight of Palestinians causes anger and resentment against Israel that is increasingly directed at all Jews; (ii) the inflationary misuse of accusations of antisemitism to discredit critics of Israel and Israeli policies trivialises a grave allegation; (iii) in the context of this deliberate conflation of Israeli and Jewish identity, Israel’s impunity for violations of international law feeds into conspiracy theories. In turn, the violent extremism fuelled by the conflict, often in the name of Islam, has been driving anti-Muslim or anti-Arab racism.

9.1. Develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to fight conflict-driven hostility towards Jews, Arabs, and Muslims in a holistic manner, involving civil society, academia, and the media.

9.2. Sponsor people-to-people contacts in Germany and Europe between Jewish, Arab, Muslim, and majority-society communities to foster much-needed exchange and debate, instead of reinforcing divisions between communities, as direct human interaction remains the most powerful means to tear down stereotypes and counter dehumanisation. In the context of social media algorithms that reinforce selective perception and exacerbate societal polarisation with customised ‘rage bait’, fostering understanding for the concerns and grievances of others has become a political imperative.

9.3. Ensure that the fight against antisemitism does not conflate protected speech, such as criticism of political entities and ideologies, or the use of legal terms such as genocide, with prohibited speech, such as racist hate speech, as is the case in several examples of the IHRA Working Definition on Antisemitism. Its adoption by the German Bundestag in its resolution on antisemitism of 7 November 2024, vehemently opposed, inter alia, by a broad coalition of civil society organisations, serves neither the fight against antisemitism nor the protection of fundamental rights. Alternative frameworks of reference, such as the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, should be considered.

9.4. Step up the fight against antisemitism not related to the Middle East conflict, which continues to lead in national crime statistics.

10. Foster a Culture of Shared Humanist Values

The protection of human dignity, basic rights, and civil liberties are the foundation for all government action, as stipulated by Germany’s Constitution. Limitations on freedoms of speech and of assembly, as well as on academic and other freedoms imposed since 7 October 2023 under the guise of fighting antisemitism are irreconcilable with these constitutional rights.

10.1. Actively support civil society-led initiatives aimed at reaffirming humanist values, such as the ‘Reclaiming our Shared Humanity’ conference organised by the European Institute for the Mediterranean (IEMed) in October 2024.

10.2. Consistently denounce statements by political leaders within and outside Europe that dehumanise any group based on ethnic, national, religious, or gender identity, including via strategic communication and civil society efforts.

10.3. Reinforce the principles of humanism in German and European school curricula, including the lessons to be learned from the post-7 October Gaza war and the ill-fated Staatsraison doctrine, by ensuring that the principle of dignity is applied universally and by countering any form of dehumanisation.

 

 

This policy paper has been initiated, composed, and coordinated by a core team around Philip Holzapfel and Dr Muriel Asseburg, with the invaluable support of Daniel Gerlach and Deutsche Levante-Verlag, as well as Xenia Kelemen, Paula Martini, Daniel Sen, and P.F. It has been reviewed and endorsed by a host of Middle East experts with (1) long-standing professional exposure to the contemporary politics of the region, including Israel and Palestine – whether in academia, foreign service, think tanks, political foundations, development agencies, or through other relevant work; (2) extensive first-hand experience from working and/or living in the region, including in Palestine and Israel; (3) knowledge of more than one Middle Eastern language, at least at basic level. In addition to this core group, it has also been reviewed and endorsed by a number of experts in other relevant fields, in particular international and constitutional law, political science, and international relations.

 

 

[1] Analogous to the geographic non-competence of any consular mission accredited to the Russian Federation for Ukrainian territories illegally annexed by Russia.

[2] In particular, the Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (KWKG) and Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG).

[3] https://cambridgepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Palestinian-Armistice-Plan.pdf; https://www.standing-together.org/en

[4] For example, the G7 statement of September 2024 and the New York Declaration of September 2025:  https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/2677180-2677180; https://docs.un.org/en/A/CONF.243/2025/1/Add.1

[5] Spoilers include any political actor who actively seeks to undermine prospects for peace based on international parameters in word and/or deed.

[6] https://bdsmovement.net/what-bds

[7] https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/unrwa_independent_review_on_neutrality.pdf

 

 

Website with contact information: staatsraison.net

 

 

Reviewed and endorsed, in personal capacity, by:

• Amany Abdelrazek, Adjunct Lecturer at Humboldt University Berlin; Board member of Ibn Rushd Fund for Freedom of Thought
• Aljoscha Albrecht, Political scientist
• Layla Al-Zubaidi, Anthropologist and Islam scientist
• Dr. Kai Ambos, Professor for Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, Comparative Law, International Criminal Law and International Law, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
• Muriel Asseburg, Senior Fellow, Research Division Africa and Middle East, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
• Gertraud Auer Borea, Senior advisor for international dialogue
• Dr. Hanan Badr, Associate Professor of Middle East Studies, Bard College Berlin
• Kilian Bälz, Lawyer, Berlin
• Dr André Bank, GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies
• Manon Barthod, MENA advisor to the former President of th European Council (2021-2024)
• Julia Bartmann, Political scientist
• Omer Bartov, Dean’s Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Brown University
• Ilan Baruch, Policy Working Group (PWG) – Israel
• Gershon Baskin, Middle East Director, International Communities Organisation; Co-Head, Alliance for Two States
• Bauke Baumann, Political scientist
• Dr. Martin Beck, University of Kurdistan Hewlêr; GIGA Associate
• Dr. Thomas Bierschenk, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
• Sophie Borel
• Josep Borrell, fmr. High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy; fmr. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs; President of the Barcelona Center for International Relations CIDOB
• Kristian Brakel, Political Analyst
• Martin Breidert, Bündnis für Gerechtigkeit zwischen Israelis und Palästinensern e.V.
• Dr. Doris Bühler-Niederberger, University of Wuppertal
• Avraham Burg, fmr. Speaker of the Knesset
• Hikmat Bushnaq-Josting, Ibn Rushd Fund for Freedom of Thought
• Helen Clark, Member of The Elders; fmr. Prime Minister of New Zealand; fmr. Head of the UN Development Programme
• Tsafrir Cohen, Executive Director, medico international, Frankfurt am Main
• Sebastian Damm, Legal scholar and historian
• Eitan Diamond, Manager and Senior Legal Expert, Israel & Palestine, Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Centre
• Janina Dill, University of Oxford
• Christoph Dinkelaker, Political and Islam scientist
• Asiem El Difraoui, Director of Jasmine Conseils; Initiative “Media Literacy for the Mediterranean”
• Schams El Ghoneimi, fmr. Foreign Policy / MENA Advisor, European Parliament
• Dörthe Engelcke, Acting Head of the Centre of Expertise for the Law of Arab and Islamic Countries, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
• Dina Fakousa, Senior MENA Analyst and Consultant
• Andrew Feinstein, fmr. Member of the South African National Assembly
• Deborah Feldman, Author and publicist
• Nimrod Flaschenberg, Israelis for Peace, Berlin
• Dr. Naika Foroutan, Humboldt University of Berlin; German Centre for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM)
• Benedikt Fries, Social worker
• Marc Frings, Secretary-General, Central Committee of German Catholics
• Christiane Fröhlich, GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies, Hamburg
• Daniel Gerlach, Deutscher Levante Verlag GmbH
• Andrew Gilmour, fmr. Executive Director, Berghof Foundation; fmr. UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights
• Ori Goldberg, Independent political analyst
• Robert Grabosch, Lawyer and Human Rights Expert
• Bettina Gräf, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
• Ariela Groß, MA Middle Eastern Studies
• Dr. Kai Hafez, Department of Media and Communication Studies, University of Erfurt
• Mariam Hamad, International Development and Humanitarian Policy Expert
• Adham Hamed, University of Vienna; Austrian Centre for Peace
• Dr. Cilja Harders, Free University Berlin
• Dr Sonja Hegasy, Senior researcher
• Marie-Christine Heinze, Islam scientist
• Kristin Helberg, Journalist and political scientist
• Sophia Hiss, Hertie School of Governance Berlin
• Anja Hoffmann, Political scientist
• Shai Hoffmann, Social entrepreneur, activist and moderator
• Dr. Sophia Hoffmann, University of Erfurt
• Sabine Hofmann, West Asian studies scholar
• Philip Holzapfel, fmr. MENA advisor to EU High Representative Dr Josep Borrell
• Daniela Huber, Roma Tre University
• Simon Ilse, International lawyer
• Dalal Iriqat, Associate Professor, Arab American University Palestine
• Alma Itzhaky, Israelis for Peace, Berlin
• David Jalilvand, Political scientist
• Dr. Uffa Jensen, Centre for Research on Antisemitism, Technical University of Berlin
• Hina Jilani, Member of The Elders; pioneering lawyer and pro-democracy campaigner
• Cora Josting, Ibn Rushd Fund for Freedom of Thought
• Prof Annette Jünemann, Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg
• Kristina Kausch, Political scientist
• Dr. Eberhard Kienle, Sciences Po Paris
• Dr. Katharina Kilian-Yasin, Professor International Business for Engineers, Pforzheim University; Intercultural consultant for Arab countries
• Heinrich Klassen, Cultural Diplomacy, Orchestra Musician and Oboist
• em. Menachem Klein, Professor emeritus Bar-Ilan University
• Florian Kohstall, Center for International Cooperation,Free University Berlin
• Martin Konecny, European Middle East Project (EuMEP)
• Kirsten Krampe, Political and Islam scientist
• Prof em. Gert Krell, Institute of Political Science, Goethe-University Frankfurt on Main
• Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff, fmr. EU Representative in Cuba, South Sudan, Mozambique and Palestine
• Wolfram Lacher, Senior Associate, Research Division Africa and Middle East, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
• Munir Lada’a, Political scientist and historian; German-Palestinian
• Georgia Langton, Hertie School of Governance Berlin
• Dr. Elad Lapidot, Professor for Hebraic Studies, University of Lille
• Michael Lüders, Publicist and political scientist
• Ahmed-Anders Lundgren-Bekov, fmr. Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste e.V.
• Dr. Itamar Mann, Lawyer
• Saskia Marsh, Almizan Advisors; conflict resolution & Middle East expert
• Daniel Marwiecki, University of Hong Kong
• Daniel McCormack, Social scientist
• Eva Menasse, Author and publicist
• Barbara Mittelhammer, Independent political analyst
• Dr. Susan Neiman, Director, Einstein Forum
• Achinoam Nini, Singer and peace activist
• Ulrich Nitschke, Chair, Partnerschaftsverein Bonn-Ramallah e.V.
• Neda Noraie-Kia, Political scientist
• Eliyahu Osheroff, Regional Thinking Forum
• Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
• Tim Petschulat, Expert on democratic governance
• Hanna Pfeifer, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
• Julia Pickhardt, Research Assistant Centre on Conflict, Peacebuilding and Development, Graduate Institute Geneva (IHEID)
• Sophie Pornschlegel, Maastricht University
• Mary Robinson, Member (and former Chair) of The Elders; first woman President of Ireland; fmr. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Alon Sahar, Analyst, Filmmaker and Chief editor of Staatsräson Monitor
• Salam Said, Economist
• Ilyas Saliba, Associate Fellow, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient Bonn
• Juan Manuel Santos, Chair of The Elders; fmr. President of Colombia; Nobel Peace Laureate
• Mithu Sanyal, Author, journalist and cultural scientist
• Bente Scheller, Political scientist and publicist
• Ingo Schendel, Expert in MENA affairs
• Prof Oliver Schlumberger, Eberhard Karl University of Tübingen
• Dr. Thomas Schmidinger, University of Kurdistan Hewlêr; University of Vienna
• Moritz Schmoll, Assistant Professor in Political Science, University Mohammed VI Polytechnic
• Marcus Schneider, Political scientist
• Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, Centre for Research on Antisemitism, Technical University of Berlin
• Dr Alexander Schwarz, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights
• Melanie Schweizer
• Daniel Seidemann, Terrestrial Jerusalem
• Alexandra Senfft, Author and journalist
• Katja Setzkorn, Anthropologist
• Muhammad Shehada, Palestinian writer and analyst from Gaza; Visiting Fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations
• Sebastian Sons, Political and Islam scientist
• Christian Sterzing, Author and publicist; fmr. Member of the German Bundestag
• Dr Friederike Stolleis, Ethnologist and Islam scientist
• Simone Susskind, Founder Actions in the Mediterranean; Former Federal Senator, Former Member of the Brussels Regional Parliament; Doctor Honoris Causa from Université Libre de Bruxelles
• Tobias Thiel, Expert on Middle East and Africa
• Dr. Hanan Toukan, University of Salzburg
• Achim Vogt, Political scientist
• Gabriele vom Bruck, Department of Anthropology, School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London; PhD, London School of Economics; Currently Emerita
• Hanna Voß, Political scientist and journalist
• Alexander Weber, Humboldt University of Berlin
• Irene Weipert, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
• Isabelle Werenfels, Senior Fellow, Research Division Africa and Middle East, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
• Charlotte Wiedemann, Journalist and author
• Dr. Peter Wien, University of Maryland, College Park, USA
• René Wildangel, Historian, Author and Middle East Analyst, Berlin
• Dr. Eckart Woertz, GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies, Hamburg
• Dr Anna Würth, Islam scientist
• Anja Zorob, Islam scientist