{"id":30416,"date":"2026-11-19T12:00:33","date_gmt":"2026-11-19T11:00:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=30416"},"modified":"2026-11-20T09:36:44","modified_gmt":"2026-11-20T08:36:44","slug":"a-verdict-with-no-public-record","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/a-verdict-with-no-public-record\/","title":{"rendered":"A Verdict with No Public Record"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In August 2026, a Damascus court sentenced Bashar al-Assad to death in absentia, but it has yet to publish its reasoned judgment. The trials of senior Assad-era figures are the most important criminal proceedings in Syria\u2019s modern history. Their significance does not shield them from scrutiny. I argue that serious shortcomings in their legal and procedural foundations prevent anyone from properly assessing their outcomes. I examine four areas: the legal basis of the convictions, the integrity of the proceedings, trials in absentia, and the death sentences. Across all four, one concern dominates: the Court announced its legal conclusions without publishing the material anyone, in Syria or abroad, would need to test them.<\/p>\n<p>Between August 11 and 24, the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus issued the first Syrian judgments against senior figures of the ousted Assad government. In Case No. 1 of 2026, it\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/8\/11\/bashar-al-assad-atef-najib-sentenced-to-death-in-landmark-syria-trial\"><u>con<\/u><u>v<\/u><u>icted<\/u><\/a>\u00a0one defendant in person \u2013 Atef Najib, former head of Daraa\u2019s Political Security Branch \u2013 and seven in absentia, among them\u00a0the former president himself, his brother Maher al-Assad, and former Defense Minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij. The Court sentenced all eight to death. It imposed <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/8\/18\/syrian-court-sentences-wassim-al-assad-to\"><u>the same pe<\/u><u>n<\/u><u>alty<\/u><\/a> on Wassim al-Assad on August 18 and <a href=\"https:\/\/snhr.org\/blog\/2026\/10\/26\/the-comprehensive-report-on-monitoring-the-trial-sessions-of-atef-najib-wassim-al-assad-and-ahmad-badreddin-hassoun-before-the-fourth-criminal-court-in-damascus\/\"><u>life imprison<\/u><u>m<\/u><u>ent<\/u><\/a> on the former Grand Mufti, Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun, on August 24. All sentences remain open to appeal\u00a0before the Court of Cassation, though not by the absent defendants.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What Do the <\/strong><strong>Damascus<\/strong><strong> Rulings Achieve?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The legal achievement is real but limited. In its oral ruling of August 11, the Court held three things: Syrian courts have jurisdiction over international crimes committed on Syrian territory, immunity does not protect a former head of state, and neither statutes of limitation nor amnesties bar prosecution of the crimes before it. It also ordered the convicted defendants, jointly and severally, to compensate the admitted\u00a0civil parties.\u00a0According to the <a href=\"https:\/\/sana.sy\/en\/syria\/2335708\/\"><u>offici<\/u><u>a<\/u><u>l account<\/u><\/a>, it preserved later claims by other victims and the families of the missing.<\/p>\n<p>The institutional value lies elsewhere: for the first time, Syria\u2019s own courts\u00a0have determined criminal responsibility for Assad-era crimes. Until then, such trials had taken place only\u00a0abroad, under universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/germany-charges-suspected-former-syrian-intelligence-agent-with-murder-assad-2025-12-22\/\"><u>Germa<\/u><u>n<\/u><u>y<\/u><\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ecchr.eu\/fileadmin\/Publikationen\/UJAR_2026_digital.pdf\"><u>France<\/u><u>,<\/u><u>\u00a0<\/u><u>Sweden,<\/u><u> the Netherlands<\/u><\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/opa\/pr\/former-syrian-prison-official-sentenced-torture-and-immigration-fraud\"><u>the United<\/u><u>\u00a0<\/u><u>States<\/u><\/a>. The UN\u2019s International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism and the Commission of Inquiry on Syria\u00a0collected and analyzed evidence <a href=\"https:\/\/iiim.un.org\/who-we-are\/mandate\/\"><u>without dete<\/u><u>r<\/u><u>mining<\/u><\/a> criminal responsibility. A national conviction makes Syria\u2019s judiciary a partner, not merely a source of evidence, for foreign prosecutors and international mechanisms.<\/p>\n<p>The symbolic value\u00a0invites overstatement. For more than fifty years, the presidency stood above the law.\u00a0Read out on state television before victims in the courtroom, a sentence against the former president affirms that the office is subject to judicial authority.\u00a0That principle matters to millions of Syrians, even if no one\u00a0ever enforces the sentence. But symbolism cannot substitute for scrutiny of the legal and procedural questions the sentence raises.<\/p>\n<p>The\u00a0trials\u00a0may also curb incentives for revenge,\u00a0a function\u00a0that calls for particular caution. Criminal justice assigns guilt to individuals for proven conduct, not to groups defined by identity or presumed loyalty.\u00a0By <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icty.org\/x\/file\/Outreach\/view_from_hague\/jit_accomplishments_en.pdf\"><u>individualizi<\/u><u>n<\/u><u>g guilt<\/u><\/a>, it spares communities collective blame and removes a pretext for collective revenge. However, selective prosecution can defeat this purpose: accountability confined to one side, without clear criteria, invites the charge of victor\u2019s justice, a real danger in Syria.\u00a0So far, the Court has tried only\u00a0cases concerning the former regime\u2019s crimes.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2026\/08\/23\/questions-answers-syrias-first-and-future-trials-for-assad-era-crimes\"><u>No <\/u><u>national proc<\/u><u>e<\/u><u>edings<\/u><\/a>\u00a0have yet addressed\u00a0violations committed before December 2024 by other parties to the conflict, including armed opposition groups and the Islamic State.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Conviction<\/strong><strong>s for Uncodified International Crimes<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Syria\u2019s\u00a01949\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/mail.jle.gov.sy\/sites\/default\/files\/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA.pdf\"><u>Penal C<\/u><u>o<\/u><u>de<\/u><\/a>\u00a0defines neither crimes against humanity nor war crimes, and it\u00a0leaves command responsibility and\u00a0indirect perpetration\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/snhr.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/R260502E.pdf\"><u>un<\/u><u>r<\/u><u>egulated<\/u><\/a>. The Court\u00a0nonetheless based the\u00a0convictions on\u00a0national\u00a0provisions criminalizing the underlying acts:\u00a0the 2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/alwatan.sy\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9-2\/\"><u>Ant<\/u><u>i<\/u><u>-Torture Law<\/u><\/a> and the Penal Code <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2026\/08\/23\/questions-answers-syrias-first-and-future-trials-for-assad-era-crimes\"><u>artic<\/u><u>l<\/u><u>e<\/u><u>s<\/u><\/a> on killing, deprivation of liberty, and incitement. Yet it also characterized these acts as crimes against humanity\u00a0as defined in\u00a0Article 7 of the <a href=\"https:\/\/asp.icc-cpi.int\/sites\/asp\/files\/asp_docs\/Publications\/Compendium\/RomeStatute-ENG.pdf\"><u>R<\/u><u>o<\/u><u>me Statute<\/u><\/a>, to which Syria is not a party. To bring that definition into Syrian law,\u00a0the Court relied on Article 12(2) of the <a href=\"https:\/\/constitutionnet.org\/vl\/item\/constitutional-declaration-syria-2025\"><u>Constitutional De<\/u><u>c<\/u><u>laration<\/u><\/a>\u00a0of March 13, 2025 (Declaration). Article 12(2)\u00a0incorporates the rights and freedoms in human rights treaties ratified by Syria, not the treaties in their entirety.<\/p>\n<p>The Court\u2019s approach\u00a0raises two often-conflated\u00a0questions. The first asks whether the prosecution violates the legality principle under international law. Not necessarily. Syria acceded to the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/publications\/coretreatiesen.pdf\"><u>International Covenant on<\/u><u>\u00a0<\/u><u>Civil and Political Rights<\/u><\/a> (ICCPR) in 1969, and its Article 15\u00a0permits prosecution for conduct criminal under international law when committed.<\/p>\n<p>The second, national question is harder. Syrian law also enshrines the legality principle. Article 17(1) of the Declaration provides that there is no crime or punishment without law, Article 1 Penal Code bars punishing conduct not criminalized when committed, and Article 6 any penalty not then prescribed. Article 49(2) of the Declaration, however, exempts war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and all crimes committed by the former regime from the principle of non-retroactivity. Does Article 12(2) of the Declaration\u00a0allow a Syrian judge to apply an international crime the legislature never enacted, defined by a treaty Syria has not joined? No published ruling has addressed the question. In my view, the answer is no. Article 12(2) is a rights clause. It raises individual rights, including those of the accused, to constitutional rank, but\u00a0gives the courts no power to criminalize. Using it to import such a definition against the accused turns a guarantee into a source of liability. This reading\u00a0also sits uneasily with the legality principle in Article 15 ICCPR, a right Article 12(2)\u00a0itself incorporates. Nor does Article 49(2) fill the gap. It lifts the bar on retroactive legislation, but Syria has yet to enact a law defining these crimes. The sounder course would have been to convict on the national offenses, which carry their own penalties, and treat the international characterization as a contextual finding, pending legislation. At a minimum, the judgment must explain how these definitions entered Syrian law.<\/p>\n<p><strong>A <\/strong><strong>Court in Question, a <\/strong><strong>Judgment<\/strong><strong> Unpublished<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>A <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2026\/08\/23\/questions-answers-syrias-first-and-future-trials-for-assad-era-crimes\"><u>ministerial decis<\/u><u>i<\/u><u>on<\/u><\/a>, rather than legislation, appears to have designated the chamber hearing these cases, yet Article 44 of the Declaration and Article 14(1) ICCPR\u00a0both require courts to be established by law. The Court\u00a0has not publicly addressed this tension.<\/p>\n<p>The record is also thin. The indictment is unpublished, and the <a href=\"https:\/\/sana.sy\/en\/syria\/2335708\/\"><u>396-page judgment<\/u><\/a> announced on August 11 remains inaccessible, although the Court\u00a0promised its release\u00a0after redacting protected witnesses\u2019 names. At the hearings, the prosecution relied mainly on witnesses, though the indictment and oral summary cited documentary, medical, and audiovisual evidence. Articles 310(1) and 311 of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/issues\/torture\/cfi-report-hrc52\/submissions\/csos\/submission-srtorture-hrc52-cso-SyrianNGOs-2.pdf\"><u>Code of Criminal Proc<\/u><u>e<\/u><u>dure<\/u> (CCP)<\/a> require courts to\u00a0give reasons for criminal judgments and to pronounce them in open court, but impose no general duty to publish them. The only exception is the summary of an in absentia judgment, which Article 329 CCP requires the Public Prosecutor to publish in the Official Gazette and a local newspaper within eight days. Under Article 330 CCP, authorities can enforce the judgment only from the day after the summary appears in the Gazette.\u00a0No such summary has appeared for the seven absent defendants. In practice, Syrian trial judgments rarely appear in print, so withholding this one is not unusual, but the weight of this case makes that practice inadequate.<\/p>\n<p>According to the Justice Minister,\u00a0Najib has thirty days to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.newarab.com\/news\/syria-justice-ministry-defends-assad-trial-death-sentence\"><u>app<\/u><u>e<\/u><u>al<\/u><\/a>. If that period runs out before counsel receives the reasoned judgment, a serious issue arises under Article 14(5) ICCPR: counsel cannot challenge facts, standards of proof, or reasoning they have not seen.\u00a0Non-publication does not prove the defense lacks\u00a0the judgment, but no one outside the proceedings can verify whether an effective appeal is possible. It also prevents a foreign court or international mechanism from assessing what the Syrian proceedings <a href=\"https:\/\/snhr.org\/blog\/2026\/09\/03\/snhr-from-documentation-to-accountability-cumulative-documentation-since-2011-has-contributed-to-some-paths-of-judicial-accountability\/\"><u>estab<\/u><u>l<\/u><u>ished<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><strong>In Absentia<\/strong><strong> Rulings<\/strong><strong> Need Notice and Counsel<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Trials in absentia can be <a href=\"https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/606075\"><u>law<\/u><u>f<\/u><u>ul<\/u><\/a>, but authorities must prove proper notification, not presume it from absence.\u00a0Article 14 ICCPR <a href=\"https:\/\/docstore.ohchr.org\/SelfServices\/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=uOEfbFvYzJgivREtD9r1oveLr4Iw6S9fOU2ZSV1nev59guJOALVd4fin1AlCZcXfE6I4PH2mTalqv7w2K847AA%3D%3D\"><u>requ<\/u><u>i<\/u><u>res<\/u><\/a>\u00a0them\u00a0to show that they took the necessary steps to summon and notify the accused. Bashar al-Assad has resided in Russia since December 2024, and\u00a0posting the order to appear at his last residence in Syria, as Article 323 CCP prescribes,\u00a0falls short of this standard. A record of the channels tried, and why each failed, would allow others to verify whether notice was proper. No such record is public.<\/p>\n<p>No counsel represented the absent defendants. Article 325(1) CCP bars counsel from appearing for an absent accused, even though the right to legal representation <a href=\"https:\/\/ks.echr.coe.int\/documents\/d\/echr-ks\/guide_art_6_criminal_eng\"><u>pe<\/u><u>r<\/u><u>sists<\/u><\/a> in the defendant\u2019s absence. Without counsel, the prosecution\u2019s case goes untested. This gap matters all the more\u00a0because the Court <a href=\"https:\/\/sana.sy\/en\/syria\/2352858\/\"><u>relie<\/u><u>d<\/u><\/a>, at least in part, on command responsibility, a mode of liability that Syrian law does not regulate but customary international law recognizes. Its elements\u00a0\u2013\u00a0effective control, knowledge, and necessary and reasonable measures \u2013 especially need adversarial scrutiny.<\/p>\n<p>This combined absence of the accused and counsel limits the judgment\u2019s uses. Article 333\u00a0CCP offers a strong safeguard that also makes the judgment provisional: if the accused surrenders or is arrested before the penalty becomes time-barred, the law automatically annuls the judgment, and the court retries the case. Presenting it as final and irrevocable would overstate what it settles.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Death Sentences<\/strong><strong> Require a Clear Legal Basis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Syria has never joined the ICCPR\u2019s\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/docstore.ohchr.org\/SelfServices\/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=ZGwIVE8rLMg9sdDDICecgWCgFT0NZS8MnhpCXYG%2FVnTy8Hqtn2EbkBlDBgQ43x3Idbuwr9GjA4Ro%2FXlJuu6AfA%3D%3D\"><u>Second Optional <\/u><u>P<\/u><u>rotocol<\/u><\/a>, so it may lawfully retain the death penalty. Article 6(2) ICCPR, however, confines capital punishment to the \u201cmost serious crimes,\u201d which\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/3884724\"><u>General Comm<\/u><u>e<\/u><u>nt No. 36<\/u><\/a> of the Human Rights Committee\u00a0reads narrowly as extremely grave crimes involving intentional killing. Convictions for intentional killing could, in principle, qualify.<\/p>\n<p>Published <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2026\/08\/23\/questions-answers-syrias-first-and-future-trials-for-assad-era-crimes\"><u>reports<\/u><\/a> indicate that the homicide charges rest on Articles 534 and 535 Penal Code.\u00a0Article 535 prescribes death for premeditated murder,\u00a0so a national basis exists. But <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2026\/08\/23\/questions-answers-syrias-first-and-future-trials-for-assad-era-crimes\"><u>publ<\/u><u>i<\/u><u>shed reports<\/u><\/a> list them alongside Articles 216 and 556 Penal Code and the 2022 Anti-Torture Law, without identifying which provision carries the death sentence. The judgment must identify the crime and the provision that authorized the death penalty\u00a0when the conduct occurred, since an international characterization cannot supply a penalty national law did not then prescribe.<\/p>\n<p>Two practical considerations also arise. First, death sentences can complicate extradition and mutual legal assistance with abolitionist states, which may demand assurances against execution. Second, executing Najib would end any chance of learning what he knows about Daraa\u2019s security agencies and the fate of those they detained.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Verdicts Need Reasons<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Hassoun verdict suggests that the Court\u00a0can distinguish between cases. It rejected the prosecution\u2019s request for the death penalty and addressed\u00a0Hassoun\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/snhr.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/R260906E.pdf\"><u>public rheto<\/u><u>r<\/u><u>ic<\/u><\/a> using Article 298\u00a0Penal Code.\u00a0Read with Article 216 Penal Code, Article 298 punishes an assault aimed at inciting civil war or sectarian strife. Without the reasoned judgments, no one can yet\u00a0say whether the Court reasoned\u00a0more rigorously than in Case No. 1. Still, the verdict indicates that the difficulties discussed here are not inherent to the Court.<\/p>\n<p>The August rulings show Syria reaching judicial outcomes faster than it is building the legal framework to sustain them.\u00a0The courts can close some gaps themselves by publishing reasoned judgments and the notification record. Others need legislation: codifying international crimes, allowing counsel for absent defendants, protecting witnesses, and giving the chamber a clear statutory basis.<\/p>\n<p>These corrections are not about satisfying external opinion. Appellate review at home, evidence in European courts, or the eventual arrest of those now in Moscow \u2013 every such use of these verdicts depends on a record others can examine. With that record, these trials can become what the families of the detained and the disappeared have waited more than a decade for: a reckoning grounded in proof, not power. The value of these verdicts will depend less on who was convicted than on whether the Syrian judiciary can show why.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In August 2026, a Damascus court sentenced Bashar al-Assad to death in absentia, but it has yet to publish its reasoned judgment. The trials of senior Assad-era figures are the most important criminal proceedings in Syria\u2019s modern history. Their significance does not shield them from scrutiny. I argue that serious shortcomings in their legal and [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":39,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[7793,4094,4409,3836],"article-categories":[6000],"authors":[6664],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-30416","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-fair-trial","tag-international-criminal-law","tag-syria","tag-transitional-justice","article-categories-article","authors-fadel-abdul-ghany"],"acf":{"subline":"Syria\u2019s First Domestic Trials of Senior Assad-Era Figures"},"meta_box":{"doi":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30416","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/39"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=30416"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30416\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":30444,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30416\/revisions\/30444"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=30416"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=30416"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=30416"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=30416"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=30416"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=30416"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}