{"id":30294,"date":"2026-11-10T14:00:21","date_gmt":"2026-11-10T13:00:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/?p=30294"},"modified":"2026-11-10T09:47:08","modified_gmt":"2026-11-10T08:47:08","slug":"who-are-the-houthis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/who-are-the-houthis\/","title":{"rendered":"Who Are the Houthis?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Over the past decade, the Gulf of Aden has become the epicentre of a complex and multifaceted conflict characterised, among other things, by the presence and conduct of a private group named Houthis. Since 2015,\u00a0Houthis have en<\/u>gaged<\/u><\/a> in a civil war against the Yemeni government and, at the same time, have undertaken a set of piratical attacks against ships of various nationalities.\u00a0This conflict, which initially assumed the shape of a \u201cproxy war\u201d against Israel and Saudi Arabia in the context of the Gaza war, is now part and parcel of the wider Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb crisis<\/u><\/a>, but its precise boundaries and shape are very hard to define. S<\/u>ome authors<\/u><\/a> suggested framing the scenario in the Red Sea as the sum of several intertwined conflicts \u2013 a civil war taking place in Yemen and separate conflicts\u00a0involving other States. A partially different interpretation<\/u><\/a>\u00a0frames the conflict in Yemen as split into two: the initial coup <\/em>d\u2019\u00e9tat<\/em>\u00a0tentatively\u00a0put on hold in 2022 by a ceasefire and new conflicts between Houthis and other States.<\/p>\n

Be that as it may, the Houthis and their relationship with other concerned States in the area play a leading role in\u00a0what may be currently defined as a regional armed conflict, where the private component represents a pivotal aspect and has a direct and deep<\/u> impact<\/u><\/a> on, inter alia<\/em>, oil supplies at the global level. The aim of this post is therefore to sketch a reflection on the challenges posed by this group to the law of international\u00a0responsibility. Such reflection may, in turn, serve as a starting point to expand the discourse to further implications of the role of non-State actors, such as the intrinsic imbalances in the way international law apprehends these phenomena.<\/p>\n

The <\/strong>Houthis<\/strong> and General International Law<\/strong>:<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>I<\/strong>nsurgents or <\/strong>P<\/strong>irates<\/strong>?<\/strong><\/p>\n

At first sight, Houthis\u00a0may be defined as \u201csimple\u201d insurgents,\u00a0given their clear opposition to the official Yemeni government. However, the complexity of the current political landscape within this State\u00a0and, notably, its uncertain power structure prevent a straightforward definition under this legal category. Regarding the scenario at stake\u00a0here, it would be bold to argue that Houthis\u2019 attacks are by definition linked to the civil war taking place in Yemen, especially since\u00a07 October 2023, when their \u201cproxy war\u201d against Israel began. At the same time, such \u201cproxy war\u201d, and the related political aims, are not always clearly identifiable, also in light of its intertwining with the Straits crisis.<\/p>\n

On a wider level, these elements bring to the fore the long-debated issue of the interpretation of the \u201cprivate end\u201d requirement\u00a0mentioned by Art<\/u>icle<\/u>\u00a0<\/u>101 UNCLOS<\/u><\/a>\u00a0<\/u>as a component of piracy. Under the terms of this latter provision, maritime piracy is deemed to exist when an illegal act of violence is committed on the high seas by\u00a0a ship against another ship in the pursuit of \u201cprivate ends\u201d.\u00a0On the one hand, it is nowadays uncontroversial that animus furandi is not necessary and that \u201csimple\u201d acts of violence and depredation are sufficient for this purpose. On the other hand, the surge of maritime terrorism that took place at the end of the last century warned about\u00a0a possible abuse of allegedly \u201cpublic aims\u201d and, not by chance, prompted the adoption of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts<\/u> Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Such uncertainties are clearly reflected in the\u00a0recent codification work on piracy and armed robbery at sea undertaken by both the\u00a0International Law Commission<\/u><\/a> and by the Institut<\/u> de droit international<\/u><\/a>,<\/em><\/u> where the persistence of the \u201cprivate ends requirement\u201d coexists with the recognition that the notion may have a wide range of meanings, depending, inter alia, on the national legal order that needs to be taken into account. Additional insights come from the Special Rapporteur<\/u><\/a> of the ILC who, while admitting the contact points between maritime terrorism and piracy, raises doubts as to the usefulness of this theme in the light of the considerable differences between national legal systems, many of which do not even mention the purposes of piracy. A partially different view emerges from the Institut\u00a0de droit international<\/u><\/a> preparatory work, apparently based on a functional approach, i.e. avoiding any interpretation of this notion that could unduly justify \u201cacts of violence at sea\u201d.\u00a0In line with these developments, some authors<\/u><\/a> underline the possibility\u00a0that private individuals may evade classification as pirates when they act on political or philosophical grounds, thus considering these hypotheses as providing a more faithful picture of the situation when compared to a simple assessment of whether the concerned individuals represent a State or not.\u00a0It is finally important to highlight that at least some attacks by the Houthis might not satisfy the \u201ctwo-ships requirement\u201d set by\u00a0Art. 101 UNCLOS. This is notably the case with attacks carried out through drone boats and aerial drones:\u00a0The reference in Article 101(a) to crew and passengers seems to exclude unmanned vehicles from its scope, whereas drones would definitely not fit the definition laid down in this provision, which is based on the notion of \u201cship\u201d.<\/p>\n

The <\/strong>Houthis <\/strong>as <\/strong>a <\/strong>N<\/strong>on-<\/strong>I<\/strong>nternational <\/strong>A<\/strong>rmed <\/strong>G<\/strong>roup (N<\/strong>IAG<\/strong>)<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>U<\/strong>nder<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>International Humanitarian Law<\/strong><\/p>\n

Given the Houthis\u2019 involvement in armed conflicts, their potential role under the relevant categories of international humanitarian law (IHL)\u00a0definitely deserves attention. Assuming that the conflict with the Yemeni government could hardly be considered as having been undertaken in pursuance of the principle of self-determination under Article 1(4) of the 1977 <\/u>Additional Protocol I<\/u><\/a> to the Geneva Conventions, the Houthis could qualify as a NIAG.\u00a0Therefore, their conduct may be regulated by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by the 1977 Additional Protocol II<\/u><\/a>, whose Article 1(1)\u00a0\u201cdevelops and supplements\u201d this last provision.\u00a0As is well known, Article 3 binds \u201ceach Party\u201d to a non-international armed conflict taking place in the territory of a Contracting Party to respect a noyau dur of legal obligations.\u00a0In this respect, it is interesting to take note of the creation, since 2024, of a Houthis-run Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre<\/u><\/a>, precisely aimed at mitigating the humanitarian effects and repercussions of military operations through adherence to inter alia\u00a0IHL.<\/p>\n

Though of a certain weight, such an element is not sufficient\u00a0in itself\u00a0to ground the application of Article 3 to Houthis. While the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols do not clearly define an armed conflict, relevant criteria to this end are to be found in the so-called \u201cTadic<\/em><\/u> formula<\/u><\/a>\u201d\u00a0\u2013 e.g., the existence of an organized structure, the threshold of the conflict, the control over a part of territory. As things currently stand, it could be argued that such a formula is, in many respects, fulfilled. The Houthis have reached a rather developed internal organization, exercise control over a part of territory and marine areas and are capable of large-scale attacks, as the ones recently carried out against Saudi Arabia airports<\/u><\/a> and pipelines<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Houthis\u2019 role might be analysed by focussing on their capacity to incur international responsibility\u00a0based on the scope of application of IHL. Notably, such a hypothesis may be grounded on common Article\u00a01 of Geneva Conventions and, notably, on the due diligence obligation<\/u><\/a> stemming from the duty to \u201censure respect\u201d for their provisions. Such \u201cexternal dimension\u201d of Article 1 would attribute both positive\u00a0and negative obligations concerning the conduct of any person or entity, under the Parties\u2019 jurisdiction, that is a party to a conflict and, as has been observed,\u00a0would be fully justified in light of the humanitarian purpose<\/u><\/a> of this corpus of international law. As linear as this reasoning may appear, its application to the case under analysis herein is not straightforward, if one considers that for Article 1 to deploy its \u201cexternal dimension\u201d, a sufficiently close relationship between the NIAG and a concerned State is necessary. It is precisely this aspect that might hinder the application of a due diligence obligation in this context, as it would currently be difficult to identify\u00a0a State in the position to influence or even to direct Houthis\u2019 conduct.<\/p>\n

The <\/strong>Houthis as <\/strong>P<\/strong>rivate <\/strong>A<\/strong>ctors <\/strong>E<\/strong>ngaging <\/strong>State <\/strong>R<\/strong>esponsibility<\/strong><\/p>\n

Widening the analysis from IHL to general international law and, more precisely, to the law of international responsibility, the question arises as to whether the relationship between the Houthis and other States could lead to\u00a0the attribution of the Houthis\u2019\u00a0conduct to one of them through one of the modalities set out by ARSIWA. In this respect, the most plausible option seems to be the attribution of the Houthis\u2019 conduct to Iran on the basis that Iran directs or controls them,\u00a0under the terms of Article 8 ARSIWA, by virtue of logistical, financial and military support. On the one hand,\u00a0it is doubtful whether such support could satisfy the requirements normally set by the\u00a0International Court of Justice\u00a0for the purposes of attribution, notably the existence of\u00a0an \u201ceffective control<\/u><\/a>\u201d over the group\u2019s activities. On the other hand, some authors<\/u><\/a> put such test into discussion based on the specific test of attribution applicable in the field of aggression, requiring a \u201csubstantial involvement\u201d in the activity \u2013 a requirement that Iran would probably easily satisfy. Unlike Article 8, Article 11 ARSIWA does not seem to lead to the attribution of the Houthis\u2019 conduct to Iran. Although reliable sources have reported that Iran requested the Houthis to intervene in Bab el-Mandeb <\/u>Strait<\/u><\/a>,\u00a0this State has never officially endorsed the Houthis\u2019 action.\u00a0Hence, the Houthis\u2019 conduct cannot be deemed to have been acknowledged and adopted by Iran as its own, in accordance with Article 11.<\/p>\n

Even less likely is to conclude to the attribution of the Houthis\u2019 conduct to Iran under Article 9 ARSIWA whose application, according to the ILC Commentary<\/u><\/a>, requires inter alia that the conduct of a person or group of persons was carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities and that \u201cthe circumstances must have been such as to call<\/em> for the exercise of those elements of authority\u201d. A similar negative outcome would apply to Article 10 ARSIWA, which concerns the attribution of the conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of a State, considering that Houthis as an insurrectional movement have not succeeded in the creation of new State, together with the lack of any continuity between the movement and the eventual Government.\u00a0As regards, finally,\u00a0the\u00a0possibility of responsibility arising through one of the forms of responsibility \u201cin connection with the act of another State\u201d (Articles 16-18 ARSIWA), the main obstacle relates to the fact that these articles concern the relationship between States, and, thus the relationship between Houthis and Iran falls beyond their scope.<\/p>\n

Naval <\/strong>O<\/strong>perations <\/strong>A<\/strong>gainst<\/strong> the<\/strong> Houthis and t<\/strong>he <\/strong>P<\/strong>uzzle of <\/strong>S<\/strong>elf<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>D<\/strong>efence<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Houthis\u2019 actions have been followed by several naval operations, including the US-led operation <\/u>Prosperity Guardian<\/em><\/u><\/a> and the EU-led operation EUNAVFOR <\/u>Aspides<\/em><\/u><\/a>, whose legal basis is not always easy to detect.\u00a0<\/strong>In particular, doubts may arise in relation to the argument\u2013 purported by the US Department of Defence as well as by some authors<\/u><\/a> \u2013that the Houthis\u2019 attacks constitute a direct threat to commerce and maritime security and to \u201cessential security interests<\/u><\/a>\u201d, potentially justifying a response based on self-defence. One of\u00a0the more evident problematic features of these arguments lies in the lack of any authorization to this end in UN Security Council resolution 2722 (2024)<\/u><\/a>: nowhere does its text refer to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, nor does it qualify conduct by the Houthis as a breach of peace or as an act of aggression. International peace and security are mentioned in relation to the stability and prosperity of the coastal States of the Red Sea, whose sovereignty and territorial integrity are reaffirmed a few lines below. Hence, it is these latter aspects \u2013 and not the attacks \u2013 that are the focus of a potential intervention based on Chapter VII. Concerning the hypothetical use of force as a form of collective self-defence, the language employed by resolution 2722 (2024) equally raises several doubts, which are further confirmed by the lack of any clear reference to article 51 of the UN Charter. Besides this, resort to collective action would be excluded in the light of the lack <\/u>of any request<\/u><\/a> on the part of States other than those leading the naval operations.<\/p>\n

Moreover, relevant uncertainties arise with respect to the threshold of gravity that an attack must reach to trigger self-defence: notwithstanding their seriousness, attacks by the Houthis might not have reached the degree of gravity required for this purpose, i.e. that giving rise to an armed attack. In this respect, specific legal issues are raised by the\u00a0argument<\/u><\/a> based on the reference to the \u2018fleets\u2019 of another State in the definition of aggression under UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974), as the\u00a0generic nature of this term leaves open the question of whether an\u00a0attack on a limited number of ships would suffice to satisfy this requirement. Nor could it be argued that the gravity of the attacks by the Houthis might be based on the cumulative effect of individual attacks on targeted ships:\u00a0as has been underlined<\/u><\/a>, such an assessment must be made with regard to each State whose flag the targeted vessel flies, taking into account that one single attack would not be sufficient. Furthermore, the status of ships that have been the object of attacks is not irrelevant\u00a0for the purposes of the fulfilment of the notion of aggression, in light of the language employed by Article 3(d) of UNGA Resolution 3314 (1974), which clearly states\u00a0that an aggression occurs in the event\u00a0of an attack \u201cby the armed forces of a State on the [\u2026] sea [\u2026] forces<\/em>\u201d of another State. While naval vessels undoubtedly fall within this category, the same does not necessarily apply to cargo ships, especially if they are the only ones<\/u><\/a> that have been targeted. A further, unresolved issue concerns the availability of self-defence against non-State actors, an option which has been excluded by the ICJ in its Wall<\/em><\/u> advisory opinion<\/u><\/a>. This acknowledgment of the ICJ delimits substantively, at least from an international law perspective, the relevance of the US Administration\u2019s decision to qualify Houthis as \u201cspecial designated global terrorists<\/u><\/a>\u201d in 2021 and, after having overcome some humanitarian concerns, as \u201cforeign terrorist organization<\/u><\/a>\u201d in 2024.<\/p>\n

Some <\/strong>T<\/strong>entative <\/strong>C<\/strong>onclusions <\/strong><\/p>\n

In the light of the analysis above, it becomes clear that, on the one hand, due to their multifaceted features and to the complexity of the scenario where they act, the Houthis escape or at least seriously\u00a0challenge international law categories such as those of piracy and insurgency. Notably, while the definition of piracy is still limited to a very specific phenomenon and, particularly because of the restrictive notion of \u201cprivate ends\u201d and by the \u201ctwo-ships requirement\u201d, insurgency refers to a very precise specific situation in which a private group aspires to become a new State and succeeds in this respect. On the other hand, the identification and application of legal constructs and devices suitable to link private actors to public international law, even when present, give rise to challenges. This is particularly true\u00a0in the context of the law of\u00a0state responsibility that, by definition, does not address the conduct of non-State actors if not under residual categories and in connection with state conduct. At the same time, similar difficulties may arise under IHL norms, for two reasons: the requirements a group must satisfy in order to fall under the definition of NIAG according to the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions and\u00a0the application of the due diligence standard, potentially linking the group to a State.<\/p>\n

At the same time, such lacunae\u00a0are definitely inconsistent with the legal consequences that private actors, including the Houthis, often endure\u00a0by virtue of their conduct.\u00a0This is the case with the multinational naval missions undertaken by some States, whose legal justification is debatable.\u00a0Similarly, the Houthis, like any other non-state actor, may be \u2013 and have been<\/u><\/a>, in 2015 \u2013 the target of sanctions by the Security Council, while having no standing whatsoever in the structure of the UN and with very limited forms of review available. Notwithstanding the apparent advantage in terms of impunity arising from the gaps mentioned above, these inconsistencies reflect inherent asymmetries within the international community,\u00a0which, despite struggling to recognise the agency shown by non-State actors, subjects them to its power structures. The dramatic and decisive impact of the Houthis\u2019 actions in the current Straits crisis highlights the pressing need to identify legal tools to acknowledge the role and influence of these non-State actors\u00a0in contexts where international peace and security, but also the availability of essential global supplies are at stake.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Over the past decade, the Gulf of Aden has become the epicentre of a complex and multifaceted conflict characterised, among other things, by the presence and conduct of a private group named Houthis. Since 2015,\u00a0Houthis have engaged in a civil war against the Yemeni government and, at the same time, have undertaken a set of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":39,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[3888,3880,3599],"article-categories":[3572],"authors":[8155],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-30294","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-law-of-the-sea","tag-state-responsibility","tag-use-of-force","article-categories-symposium","authors-elisa-ruozzi"],"acf":{"subline":"Non-State Actors as Actors of Conflict Between Civil War, Piracy and International Responsibility\r\n"},"meta_box":{"doi":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30294","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/39"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=30294"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30294\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":30296,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30294\/revisions\/30296"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=30294"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=30294"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=30294"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=30294"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=30294"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=30294"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}