Four states have set out to hold Afghanistan to account under CEDAW for the Taliban\u2019s systematic discrimination against women and girls. The initiative now appears stalled, perhaps partly over fears that engaging the Taliban would amount to recognising them and could enable them to take Afghanistan out of the Convention. This post argues that, recognised or not, the Taliban cannot release Afghanistan from CEDAW.<\/p>\n
In September 2024, Australia, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands, supported<\/u><\/a> by 22 other, mostly European, states, announced<\/u><\/a> that they had taken formal steps under Article 29<\/u><\/a> of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to call on Afghanistan to cease its human rights violations. Although the Taliban seized power in August 2021, Afghanistan remains a party<\/u><\/a> to CEDAW.\u00a0<\/em>Under Article 29 CEDAW, a dispute \u201cnot settled by negotiation\u201d goes to arbitration at the request of one of the parties and, if the parties are \u201cunable to agree on the organization of the arbitration\u201d within six months of that request, the dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).<\/p>\n Two years on, little is known about what has followed. In December 2025, the Dutch government told<\/u><\/a> the parliament that Afghanistan had been invited to negotiate and that the four states were \u201corganising these negotiations\u201d (answer 6, p. 3). It refused, however, to give further information on the state of the process. No meeting with Taliban representatives for these negotiations, and no request for arbitration, has been publicly reported as of writing.<\/p>\n In September 2026, 27 civil society organisations criticised<\/u><\/a> the \u201climited public information regarding the status and anticipated next steps of the CEDAW initiative\u201d in a joint open statement. They found \u201cno publicly visible indication that negotiations are moving the dispute toward resolution\u201d and called on the four states to proceed to arbitration. A few days later, Fatema Ahmadi and Mark Kersten asked<\/u><\/a> the obvious question: have the four states moved towards arbitration, and \u201cif not, why not?\u201d<\/p>\n Recognition Through Accountability?<\/strong><\/p>\n One concern that may explain the caution is the potential legal recognition that might follow from the initiative. Unlike political recognition, which signals approval, legal recognition acknowledges that a regime is entitled to act for the state. Lukas Willmer has argued<\/u><\/a> that pursuing the Article 29 initiative would amount to legal recognition of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, despite the four states\u2019 denomination of the Taliban as a de facto<\/em> authority. Such a recognition could have consequences for the former government\u2019s diplomats, for access to Afghanistan\u2019s assets abroad and for CEDAW itself. To Willmer, it \u201cappears difficult to argue\u201d that the Taliban may negotiate for Afghanistan but lack \u201cthe capacity to terminate the agreement\u201d. The Taliban, in his view, \u201cwill likely be able to withdraw Afghanistan from CEDAW\u201d.<\/p>\n Whether Afghanistan can leave CEDAW, however, is a question not of who may act for it but of the law of treaties. As the Open Society Justice Initiative has noted<\/u><\/a>, even a recognised Taliban government would face \u201csignificant legal barriers to withdrawal\u201d as the CEDAW does not provide for a withdrawal and the respective conditions under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) are not fulfilled (p. 11). This post builds on that point: recognition would still give the Taliban no way out of the Convention. The \u201cIslamic Emirate\u201d is a new government, not a new state. Claiming that the ratification of 2003 was invalid has no basis in the law of treaties; and CEDAW offers no unilateral exit. Recognition would settle who represents Afghanistan, not whether Afghanistan is bound.<\/p>\n No New State<\/strong><\/p>\n The Taliban could be expected to argue that the Islamic Emirate is not the state that ratified CEDAW. The Taliban have suspended<\/u><\/a> the 2004 Constitution (para. 24), renamed the country and, through measures such as the 2024 vice and virtue law<\/u><\/a>, rebuilt the legal order around its reading of Islamic law. None of this, however, turns a change of government into a succession of states. In the\u00a0Tinoco<\/em><\/u> arbitration<\/u><\/a>,\u00a0Chief Justice Taft, referring to John Bassett Moore, stated that \u201cthough the government changes, the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired\u201d (p. 377). The Articles on State Responsibility rest on the same premise, attributing to the state the conduct of an insurrectional movement that becomes its new government (Article 10(1)<\/u><\/a>).<\/p>\n Besides, the Taliban\u2019s own conduct points towards continuity. Its claim to Afghanistan\u2019s existing seat at the United Nations, which the Credentials Committee continues to defer<\/u><\/a>, presupposes that the state is the same. When the Taliban announced its interim government in September 2021, its leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, said<\/u><\/a> that it was committed to international law and to Afghanistan\u2019s treaties and commitments \u201cnot in conflict with Islamic law\u201d. In 2023, a de facto<\/em> deputy prime minister, Abdul Ghani Baradar, stated<\/u><\/a> that Kabul was \u201ccommitted to the water treaty of 1973\u201d with Iran. The Taliban\u2019s own claims thus show that they regard the Islamic Emirate as merely the new government of an existing state.<\/p>\n Others have equally acted on that basis. In June 2025, the CEDAW Committee reviewed<\/u><\/a> Afghanistan\u2019s fourth periodic report after inviting the Taliban to take part informally; they did not respond. In July 2025 the General Assembly urged<\/u><\/a> Afghanistan to \u201chonour and fully respect and implement all treaties [\u2026] to which it is Party\u201d and encouraged the full implementation of CEDAW (paras. 6, 11). In a General Comment in 1997, the Human Rights Committee has also confirmed<\/u><\/a>\u00a0the\u00a0continuity of human rights with respect to the ICCPR: Once people are accorded the human rights protection, that protection \u201cdevolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in Government of the State party\u201d (para. 4).<\/p>\n An Invalid Ratification?<\/strong><\/p>\n Instead of claiming new statehood, the Taliban might deny the validity of Afghanistan\u2019s consent. It had similarly done so in February 2025, when its deputy spokesperson declared<\/u><\/a> that the Islamic Emirate \u201cdoes not recognize any obligation to the Rome Statute\u201d and \u201cdeems the previous administration\u2019s accession to this statute to be devoid of legal validity\u201d. The reasons given were political and religious rather than legal. The same reasoning could be turned on CEDAW, which Afghanistan ratified<\/u><\/a> only weeks after acceding<\/u><\/a> to the Rome Statute, under the same administration.<\/p>\n However, the claim has no footing in the international law of treaties. Article 42(1) VCLT allows<\/u><\/a> the validity of a state\u2019s consent to be impeached only on grounds specified in the convention. While Afghanistan has not ratified the VCLT, its provisions are legally binding insofar as they reflect customary international law, and its rules on invalidity largely codify<\/u><\/a> earlier practice. None of the grounds to invoke invalidity as mentioned in the VCLT turns on whether a later government regards its predecessor as legitimate. The closest, a violation of internal rules on competence to conclude treaties, applies only where the violation was \u201cmanifest\u201d and concerned a rule \u201cof fundamental importance\u201d (Article 46 VCLT). Nothing suggests that the ratification of 2003 involved any such violation. Even if there was a genuine defect, it could no longer be invoked. According to Article 45(b) VCLT, a state may no longer invoke a ground for invalidity if, after becoming aware of the facts, it must by reason of the state\u2019s conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty. This would be the case here, as Afghanistan considered<\/u><\/a> the CEDAW as binding for almost two decades before August 2021. As recently as 2020, the CEDAW Committee published<\/u><\/a> its concluding observations on Afghanistan\u2019s third periodic report.<\/p>\n Appeals to occupation or illegitimacy fare no better. Though a treaty procured by the threat or use of force is void (Article 52 VCLT), nothing suggests that any state coerced Afghanistan into ratifying the CEDAW. The administration that ratified CEDAW took office following the Bonn Agreement<\/u><\/a> on Arrangements Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, which the Security Council endorsed<\/u><\/a>\u00a0(para. 1). Tinoco<\/em><\/u><\/a> is again instructive. In that case, Taft assessed the British claims against Costa Rica \u201cunaffected by the Law of Nullities\u201d, which Costa Rica\u2019s restored government had introduced earlier to annul its predecessor\u2019s transactions. He once again adopted a principle from Moore that applies whatever view one takes of Afghanistan\u2019s governments between 2001 and 2021: The \u201cstate is bound by engagements entered into by governments that have ceased to exist; the restored government is generally liable for the acts of the usurper\u201d.<\/p>\n No Unilateral Way Out of CEDAW or Its Dispute Settlement Procedure<\/strong><\/p>\n As established above, Afghanistan under the Taliban regime is still bound to the CEDAW. The concern that then rises is that a Taliban government with the capacity to legally represent Afghanistan could try to withdraw from the convention. However, the CEDAW contains no denunciation clause, unlike,\u00a0e.g. its own Optional Protocol<\/u><\/a> (Article 19). The Open Society Justice Initiative reads<\/u><\/a> CEDAW\u2019s drafting history as having excluded withdrawal deliberately. Under the customary rule reflected in Article 56<\/u><\/a> VCLT, a treaty without such a clause cannot be denounced unless the parties intended to allow it or a right of withdrawal is implied by its nature. E.g., when North Korea purported to withdraw from the ICCPR in 1997, the Secretary-General took the view<\/u><\/a> that, since the Covenant has no withdrawal clause, withdrawal \u201cwould not appear possible unless all States Parties to the Covenant agree with such a withdrawal\u201d. The Human Rights Committee reached<\/u><\/a> the same conclusion, treating Article 56 as customary: the drafters had deliberately excluded denunciation, which the Optional Protocol adopted alongside the Covenant expressly permits, and the Covenant\u2019s rights belong to the people living in the state\u2019s territory (paras. 1\u20135). Both arguments apply to CEDAW, whose rights, too, belong to Afghanistan\u2019s women and girls rather than to whoever governs them.<\/p>\n Short of the agreement of every other party as required under Article 54(b) VCLT, no government of Afghanistan, recognised or not, could take Afghanistan out of CEDAW. Even if withdrawal were possible, Article 56(2) VCLT would require at least twelve months\u2019 notice. Additionally, withdrawal would not affect \u201cany right, obligation or legal situation\u201d created before it took effect (Article 70(1)(b) and (2) VCLT). Therefore, responsibility for breaches already committed would survive.<\/p>\n Afghanistan\u2019s obligations and the Court\u2019s jurisdiction cannot be narrowed by a late reservation either. Article 29(2) CEDAW permits a state to opt out of the dispute settlement clause only at signature, ratification or accession. Afghanistan ratified<\/u><\/a> CEDAW in 2003 without doing so or making any other reservation. Moreover, a reservation may be formulated after ratification only if no other contracting state \u201copposes\u201d its late formulation (ILC Guide to Practice<\/u><\/a>, guideline 2.3). Here, states would certainly object to such a potential reservation. Germany and the Netherlands, for example, objected<\/u><\/a> to Saudi Arabia\u2019s general reservation to CEDAW in favour of Islamic law.<\/p>\n Even if Afghanistan successfully withdrew from CEDAW \u2013 despite the legal challenges mentioned \u2013 it would be obligated to ensure equal rights between men and women under different legal regimes. Firstly, it would remain<\/u><\/a> a state party to the ICCPR<\/u><\/a> and the ICESCR<\/u><\/a>, which also guarantee equality between men and women. Secondly, it would be bound by any customary obligation that exists independently of CEDAW (Article 43 VCLT). Nonetheless, the CEDAW contains rights addressed specifically to discrimination against women, as well as a route to the ICJ.<\/p>\n The Steps Ahead<\/strong><\/p>\n Even if continuing the procedure under Article 29 CEDAW results in legally recognizing the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, it would not threaten CEDAW\u2019s hold on Afghanistan. It would at most settle who speaks for Afghanistan. The Islamic Emirate is a new government of an old state, the ratification of 2003 stands, and the Convention offers no way out. Afghanistan\u2019s obligations would be the same at the end of the proceedings as at the start.<\/p>\n The next step is largely in the applicants\u2019 hands: in Belgium v. Senegal<\/em><\/u><\/a>, a note proposing arbitration and six months without agreement on its organisation satisfied the near-identical clause in Article 30 of the Convention against Torture<\/u><\/a>. The four states may have good reasons for their pace, including the need to show the \u201cgenuine attempt\u201d at negotiation that the ICJ required in Georgia v. Russia<\/em><\/u><\/a>. The risk that the case might release Afghanistan from CEDAW should not be among them. Two years after the initiative was announced, the applicants could move to arbitration, and from there to The Hague.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Four states have set out to hold Afghanistan to account under CEDAW for the Taliban\u2019s systematic discrimination against women and girls. The initiative now appears stalled, perhaps partly over fears that engaging the Taliban would amount to recognising them and could enable them to take Afghanistan out of the Convention. This post argues that, recognised […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[5732,7839,7920],"authors":[8133],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-30059","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-afghanistan","tag-gender-justice","tag-womens-rights","authors-ratyansh-garg","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"Why the Taliban Cannot Undo Afghanistan\u2019s CEDAW Obligations\r\n"},"meta_box":{"doi":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30059","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=30059"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30059\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":30065,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30059\/revisions\/30065"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=30059"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=30059"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=30059"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=30059"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=30059"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=30059"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}