{"id":29137,"date":"2026-07-08T16:00:13","date_gmt":"2026-07-08T14:00:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=29137"},"modified":"2026-07-06T14:09:25","modified_gmt":"2026-07-06T12:09:25","slug":"from-spectators-to-stakeholders","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/from-spectators-to-stakeholders\/","title":{"rendered":"From Spectators to Stakeholders"},"content":{"rendered":"

As the United Nations moves towards negotiating the world’s first Convention on Crimes Against Humanity (Cah), countries of the Global South face an important choice: either shape the convention or remain spectators while others define its contours. Despite substantial changes in the world, the schism between the Global North and the Global South remains<\/a> grounded in existing power asymmetries that shape legitimate voice, representation, and narrative disproportionality in favour of the Global North. Therefore, for a forward-looking future, it is essential that the Global North-Global South binary be addressed.<\/p>\n

In this context, effective participation of the Global South in the upcoming Cah Convention could ensure a better, more democratised, integrated, and inclusive space for international law. Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars link<\/a> the existing universal claim in international law to the pedigree of colonial violence. In such a framework, the conceptualisation of universalism and the international community appears mechanical rather than organic.<\/p>\n

This piece examines the structural nuances of the proposed convention and how the Global South could bring transformative changes in it, first by objectifying the limits of state power, and second, by creating an organic solidarity among the international community to tackle the fragmented spaces by addressing the concerns of subaltern populations in both the Global North and the Global South. It is true that rigid categorisation oversimplifies existing power hierarchies, the role of regional hegemons, and domestic dynamics, in which movements of suppressed nationalities resurface time and again across formerly colonised nations. However, the Global North could still be framed as powerful actors and norm-makers through treaties; their practice is counted as customary international law (CIL); their academics\u2019 opinions are counted or valued as juristic writings and pronouncements of their worldview in an institutional capacity, which then become judicial pronouncements.<\/p>\n

At present, the conception of Cah is primarily situated<\/a> within the framework of individual criminal responsibility (ICR). A Convention on Cah will detail state responsibilities, establish rights, duties, liabilities, and cooperation among states within a clear legal framework, and define national jurisdiction. It will open the door to mutual legal assistance and ease jurisdictional ambiguities in ascertaining the culpability of the wrongdoers. Furthermore, some issues that are in flux across different branches of public international law, such as questions of immunity and the conundrum surrounding the extradition framework, could be approached with sophistication. In this regard, the International Law Commission (ILC) has drafted<\/a> a Draft Article on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity in 2019. In December 2024, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted<\/a> Resolution 79\/122 to move the ILC Draft Articles to a Conference of Plenipotentiaries to be held in 2028 and 2029. The Conference is preceded<\/a> by two Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) meetings on 19 to 30 January 2026 and 12 to 15 April 2027.<\/p>\n

Why does Cah still lack a Treaty? <\/strong><\/p>\n

Cah draws<\/a> its lineage from international humanitarian law, from which individual criminal responsibility arises, thereby creating laws against war crimes. The Hague Conventions, before the Second World War, addressed two main issues: the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians. Broadly, prior to the conceptualisation of non-international armed conflict, armed conflict\/war was understood to mean a fight between two states. When two states are at war, the laws of war protect the people of the adversary, and vice versa. However, people were not protected against atrocities and dehumanising treatment by their own state. Additionally, criminal responsibility for war crimes arises only within the scope of international humanitarian law, which applies in situations of armed conflict. Hence, peacetime violence by the own state and its accountability cannot be ascertained. Considering this major gap, the Nazi regime\u2019s mass atrocities<\/a>, including the murder of six million Jews and millions of other victims, among them Poles, Romani people, Afro-Germans, homosexuals, and other targeted groups, raised the question of accountability, including for crimes committed against German citizens.<\/p>\n

To fix the culpability of perpetrators for the crime that they had committed on their territory against their own citizens, it was necessary to fix<\/a> the gaps in war crimes laws. Considering this, Cah was included<\/a> in the International Military Tribunal<\/em> (IMT), and in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East<\/em> (IMTFE), to prosecute acts committed during or before the war. On this, Bassiouni argues<\/a> that Cah was disseminated through developments in domestic trials in Germany, Austria, Israel, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, Argentina, and Indonesia, and the codification of international human rights treaties furthered the push. Then, many states began<\/a> claiming universal jurisdiction based on the conceptualisation of Cah within their domestic jurisdictions, but this move was initially predominantly confined to the Global North.<\/p>\n

In addition, Robinson argues<\/a> that the significant developments in the Cah jurisprudence came from the judgments of various International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) established after the end of the Cold War. He further reiterates that the evolution of the concept of crimes against humanity in CIL has not been orderly. Additionally, Article 7 of the Rome Statute<\/em> expands the definition of Cah. However, violence has remained<\/a> under-theorised, particularly from the perspective of the Global South.<\/p>\n

Sadat argues<\/a> that the Cah has only been conceptualised for ICR within these ICTs; however, major state engagement in the prevention and punishment of acts of Cah for which state\/collective responsibility could be fixed has remained underdeveloped, and thus, a treaty will significantly reduce the impunity gap.<\/p>\n

Definitional Ambiguity in Cah and Other Inhumane Acts<\/strong><\/p>\n

Article 2 of the Draft Article of the Cah Convention 2019 defines<\/a> Cah. This definition is broadly taken<\/a> from the Rome Statute. The proposed convention leaves the definition of Cah as set out in Article 2(1) of the Draft Convention, which refers to \u2018other Inhumane acts\u2019 (OIA) under subclause (k), open to definitional ambiguity.<\/p>\n

Historically, international crimes have remained<\/a> grounded in radical evil. In terms of definition, to address situations of atrocities in ICL, OIA was inserted, which would otherwise have made it impossible to indict acts of residual criminality. Article 6 (c) of the IMT<\/em> lists<\/a> only four acts, and the remaining inhumane acts are to be regulated under the OIA. Likewise, Article 5(c) of the IMTFE<\/em> carries<\/a> forward the same format. Similarly, Control Council Law No. 10<\/em>, Article II, retained<\/a> 7 enumerated acts along with residual criminality. The same formula was reiterated by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia<\/em> under Article 5, which retained<\/a> 8 enumerated acts along with OIA, and by Article 3 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which <\/em>repeated<\/a> the same. Finally, the Rome Statute<\/em> of 1998, under which the International Criminal Court<\/em> (ICC) was established in 2002, enumerated<\/a> 10 acts, and OIA.<\/p>\n

First and foremost, this definition has been developed in the context of ICR to address individuals\u2019 wrongdoing against the civilian population. So, the pedigree of ICR and how far it could be relevant to determining state responsibility remain questions to be considered and examined. In essence, ICL was born in crisis; it drew its lease of life from the heart-wrenching human depravity of the Nazi regime, the Balkan conflict, the Pol Pot regime\u2019s carceral measures, the Rwandan massacres and others. ICL follows the typical common-law approach that arises from a crisis. In this scenario, negotiations on the proposed Convention on Cah require leisurely hours, good sense, and a momentum to bring a paradigm shift from the existing status quo.<\/p>\n

Why does this matter for the Global South and South Asia?<\/strong><\/p>\n

In recent years, the focus of ICL has shifted from Africa to South Asia. Officially, there are situations under review<\/a> in Myanmar before the United Nations for mass killings of Rohingyas, and, in the same manner, an arrest warrant has been issued<\/a> by the ICC. In another matter that draws the attention of the global audience, the former head of government, Sheikh Haisna, is convicted and sentenced<\/a> to death in absentia by the ICT in Bangladesh on charges of Cah. In addition, the ICC has issued<\/a> an arrest warrant against the two Taliban leaders. These arraignments involve charges of Cah. To better understand, it is desirable for South Asian states to create a resource pool that can disseminate knowledge, ensure effective participation in the Convention, and speak beyond the binaries of the North-South divide. Formulation of such binaries tends to invisibilise the power hierarchies and gross human rights violations within the Global South.<\/p>\n

The existing praxis between North and South must be guided by a framework of dialogue and mutual understanding to address questions of the abuse of state and non-state power in a way that does not appear to suggest that the Global North theorises the violence while the Global South empiricises it. In this respect, it is urgently necessary to address how state sovereignty can set its boundaries in light of the needs of Cah, which require the urgent formulation of a framework, the creation of capacity to disseminate knowledge, and the development of non\u2013governmental institutions that could address questions of selectivity and institutional bias. The substance of Cah must be understood and well calibrated so that states can make informed decisions and avoid becoming victims of decisive politics, as international crimes are international; whether a state is a party to it or not does not change the situation in significant terms. Hence, these matters demand the serious, focused attention and active participation of the Global South and South Asian nations regarding the Convention on the Cah.<\/p>\n

Why is engagement better than opposition? <\/strong><\/p>\n

The Convention on the Cah is just a matter of time. The Genocide Convention has almost universal acceptance. However, given the use of Cah, it suffers from birth defects because there is<\/a> no standalone convention for Cah. Cah defines inhumane acts, yet it lacks a comprehensive framework for understanding humaneness and inhumanness. The Genocide Convention is<\/a> quite narrow, and the act of genocide is difficult to prove, whereas the Cah is very broad and could encompass a wide range of actions that may not meet the threshold of gravity as defined in Article 5 of the Rome Statute. For this reason, many nations are nervous about participating in the Convention on Cah, then signing, ratifying, and establishing a nodal agency to coordinate its implementation.<\/p>\n

Instead of opposing Cah, states from the Global South must seek to root Cah in the Principle of Legality. In this scenario, it is better to understand Cah, and there is an urgent need to shift state institutions from the Westphalian system to an accountable one. However, it is also true that international law suffers from a lack of objectivity, particularly for nations situated in the Global South. Practice suggests that legality doesn\u2019t necessarily lead to objectivity. The sovereign space of third-world states remains fragile, and interventions occur in countless ways. Additionally, ICC and ICL have long been accused<\/a> of selective enforcement. However, the rules of the game require active and thoughtful participation. Only an enlightened effort will be a step towards a better and just world.<\/p>\n

The Cah must include the concerns of the Global South, and this is only possible if these concerns are expressed in coherent, institutional terms. Crimes such as the use of nuclear weapons, terrorism, sex trafficking, ecocide, famine-related crimes, and other concerns must be accommodated. Additionally, the rules of CIL, the application of general principles of law, and the Principle of Legality, in both substantive and procedural terms, must be settled in more objective terms. Furthermore, the Global South must incorporate the perspectives of grassroots movements and civil society to better formulate policy-level interventions that could bring about transformative change.<\/p>\n

Way Forward <\/strong><\/p>\n

Post-colonial states largely represent the Global South. The proposed Convention must address existing ambiguities surrounding the definitional openness and opacity of OIA. It must include strong legal safeguards, particularly regarding the interpretation and application of CIL in determining the OIA. The draft article remains ambivalent about the conceptualisation of state responsibility. It must also address the temporal, subject-matter, territorial, and other jurisdictional limits. Grassroots organisations and civil society from the Global South must be included as stakeholders in the negotiation process by the relevant state itself, ensuring that the understanding of these complex issues within the Global South is multi-layered and evolving. Finally, the proposed Convention must provide strong safeguards against selective enforcement. The question is no longer whether a Crimes Against Humanity Convention will emerge. Rather, the real question that surfaces ontologically is whether the Global South will help write its own rules or live under them.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As the United Nations moves towards negotiating the world’s first Convention on Crimes Against Humanity (Cah), countries of the Global South face an important choice: either shape the convention or remain spectators while others define its contours. Despite substantial changes in the world, the schism between the Global North and the Global South remains grounded […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":37,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[5117,3616],"authors":[8051],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-29137","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-crimes-against-humanity","tag-global-south","authors-aklavya-anand","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"The Global South and the Crimes Against Humanity Convention"},"meta_box":{"doi":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29137","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/37"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29137"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29137\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":29251,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29137\/revisions\/29251"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29137"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29137"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29137"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=29137"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=29137"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=29137"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}