{"id":28986,"date":"2026-06-29T14:00:25","date_gmt":"2026-06-29T12:00:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=28986"},"modified":"2026-07-02T16:54:18","modified_gmt":"2026-07-02T14:54:18","slug":"threatening-the-use-of-force","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/threatening-the-use-of-force\/","title":{"rendered":"Threatening the Use of Force?"},"content":{"rendered":"

On\u00a05 June 2026, L<\/u>aw No.<\/u> 149-FZ<\/u><\/a>\u00a0<\/u>entered into force. Signed by Vladimir Putin, the law amended two foundational statutes, the Citizenship Law and the Defence Law. The amendment of the former means that the Citizenship Law\u00a0<\/strong>now\u00a0<\/strong>obliges Russian authorities \u201cto take necessary measures to protect Russian citizens who have been arrested (detained) or are subject to criminal or other proceedings abroad by judicial authorities whose jurisdiction is not based on a Russian international treaty or a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII.\u201d The amendment of the latter now explicitly authorises the President to \u201cdeploy the Armed Forces with weapons and outside their standard operational purpose\u201d to protect\u00a0such Russian citizens. In this blog\u00a0post, I argue that Law No. 149-FZ should not be thought of as a citizen protection statute but rather seen as what it really is: a legislative deterrent against international criminal accountability, purporting to authorise extraterritorial armed force in violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.<\/p>\n

The <\/strong>Protection of Nationals and its Limits<\/strong> under International Law<\/strong><\/p>\n

The protection of nationals abroad is a contested doctrine in international law. The International Law Commission\u2019s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection<\/u><\/a> (2006) codified a state\u2019s right to espouse claims on behalf of nationals harmed by internationally wrongful acts of another state. As\u00a0several scholars, including Yoram <\/u>Dinstein<\/u><\/a> and Tom Ruys<\/u><\/a>,\u00a0point out, however, this right is conditional and requires: (i) an imminent threat of injury to nationals and (ii) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them.\u00a0Furthermore, (iii) the action of the intervening state must be strictly confined to the objective of protecting its nationals \u2013 armed forces cannot, for example, be used to overthrow the foreign government or occupy its territory.<\/p>\n

Even on the most expansive reading of the protection of nationals doctrine \u2013\u00a0which does\u00a0not constitute a recognised exception to the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter<\/u><\/a> \u2013 the situations the doctrine covers are fundamentally different from what Russian Law No. 149-FZ purports to authorise. To recall, armed rescue operations are considered legitimate when nationals face imminent physical danger from non-state actors or state failure. An example of a situation covered by the protection of nationals doctrine is the Israeli Entebbe mission<\/u><\/a> in Uganda in 1976, during which Israeli special forces rescued hostages, including around 80 Israelis, held by armed plane hijackers in Entebbe, while the Ugandan authorities were unwilling to intervene. By contrast, the doctrine does not extend to extracting persons from regular criminal proceedings lawfully conducted by a foreign state or by an international judicial body. A state exercising criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national pursuant to its domestic law or a treaty obligation is not committing an internationally wrongful act against that individual\u2019s state of nationality. Rather, the foreign state is exercising a sovereign prerogative that international law recognises and, in the case of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in some circumstances, even expressly obliges (e.g., Geneva Convention <\/u>IV<\/u><\/a>, Art. 146).<\/p>\n

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations<\/u><\/a> and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations<\/u><\/a>\u00a0require protective action to be conducted through legal and diplomatic means precisely because armed extraction from foreign criminal proceedings would violate the foreign state\u2019s territorial sovereignty under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The prohibition of the use of force does not allow for any unilateral exceptions based on disagreement with the legal grounds for prosecution.<\/p>\n

Law No. 149-FZ in Context<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Explanatory Note<\/u><\/a> accompanying Law No. 149-FZ framed it as a natural extension of existing protective obligations\u00a0indicated in Article 8 of the Russian Law on Security (amended in April 2023<\/em>), which states that the President shall take measures to protect the state\u2019s citizens from decisions of foreign and international bodies that run counter to Russia\u2019s\u00a0interests.<\/p>\n

Interestingly, the note did not refer to Article 69(3) of the Russian Constitution<\/u><\/a>\u00a0which, following amendments made in 2020, provides for \u201csupporting compatriots living abroad in the exercise of their rights, ensuring the protection of their interests and preserving their shared Russian cultural identity.\u201d It seems that this provision was primarily prompted by the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict then\u00a0ongoing in Ukraine, where, according to the Russian authorities, Russian armed forces were supporting compatriots who spoke the Russian language and adhered to Russian culture. New Law No. 149-FZ\u00a0peruses different objectives; it concerns \u201ccitizens\u201d rather than \u201ccompatriots\u201d, between which a difference appears to be made.<\/p>\n

I propose that the language of the new law is\u00a0crafted with the International Criminal Court (ICC)\u00a0and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine in mind.\u00a0Following Russia\u2019s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016, the state no longer has a treaty relationship with the ICC.\u00a0In theory, a\u00a0Security Council referral of the situation in Ukraine to the ICC would still be possible, however, in light of UN Charter Chapter VII.\u00a0But any such attempt will be vetoed\u00a0since Russia is one of the five veto power holding permanent members<\/u><\/a> of the Security Council. The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, currently under discussion, would similarly fall within the wording of Law No. 149-FZ: the Tribunal was established by multilateral treaty with neither Russian participation nor Security Council authorisation. Both the ICC and the Tribunal (would) target high-ranking Russian officials. In 2023 and 2024, the ICC issued<\/u><\/a> arrest warrants for eight individuals falling in this category, including Vladimir Putin. As for the Tribunal, once it begins its work, it will investigate<\/u><\/a>\u00a0the crime of aggression for which high-ranking officials may be held accountable.<\/p>\n

As indicated above, Law No. 149-FZ permits the deployment of armed forces into the territory of a state that has arrested a Russian citizen, including where this was done in fulfilment of an obligation under the Rome Statute such as when a state party arrests a suspect against whom the ICC has issued a warrant. Thus, the new law can be interpreted as a warning to states that decide to enforce decisions by the ICC or the Tribunal to arrest Russian citizens.<\/p>\n

Law No. 149-FZ, moreover, addresses foreign states in an even more direct manner. As was explained<\/u><\/a> by Andrei Kartapolov, Chair of the State Duma Defence Committee,\u00a0\u201cthe introduction of such provisions\u00a0[Law No. 149-FZ] will help prevent situations such as the arrest in Poland of the Russian archaeologist Aleksandr Butyagin.\u201d Butyagin was arrested<\/u><\/a> in Poland at Ukraine\u2019s request in December 2025 for allegedly conducting illegal excavations in Crimea after 2014.\u00a0On 28 April 2026, Butyagin returned to Russia as part of an exchange<\/u><\/a> of detained nationals between Russia and Belarus, on the one hand, and Poland and Moldova, on the other.\u00a0According to one independent Russian media outlet, there are currently around 15<\/u><\/a> Russian citizens, who are arrested (detained) in European countries on suspicion of committing crimes on behalf of the Kremlin.\u00a0The new law\u2019s wording (\u201cjudgments of foreign courts granted jurisdiction by other states without Russia\u2019s participation\u201d) indicates that Russia deems it legitimate to challenge any foreign criminal prosecution of a Russian national.\u00a0Consequently, the objective of the new law may be not only to prevent the enforcement of judgments rendered by international judicial bodies, but also those of national courts at the request of another state or of their own accord\u00a0(which is, for example, what Finland did when its court sentenced<\/u><\/a> Russian soldier Yan Petrovskii to life imprisonment for committing war crimes in Ukraine in 2014).<\/p>\n

Additionally, for ordinary Russians and probably some allied states,\u00a0the law could provide domestic legal \u2018cover\u2019 for military operations in Ukraine that are in reality dictated by the ongoing armed conflict. Through the new Law No. 149-FZ,\u00a0these operations could formally be characterised by the Russian authorities as a reaction to \u201cRussian citizens who have been arrested (detained)\u201d in Ukraine.\u00a0Such a cover is important for the authorities, as Russia is, formally speaking, still a state governed by the rule of law (see its Constitution<\/u><\/a>, art. 1).<\/p>\n

And, lastly,\u00a0the law communicates to Russian officials, including military commanders and political leadership, that the state will potentially militarily protect them from international prosecution. This helps to maintain the cohesion of the \u201celite\u201d in the face of weariness following four years of armed conflict, constant external pressure, and ongoing discussions about the criminal accountability of Russian officials.<\/p>\n

One might compare Law No. 149-FZ\u00a0to the American Service-Members<\/u>\u2019<\/u> Protection Act<\/u><\/a> (\u201cHague Invasion Act\u201d), pointing out that powerful states have long sought legislative protection from international criminal jurisdiction, and this comparison would not be without merit. However, despite all similarities, the American law was strictly directed against the ICC and\u00a0it was adopted in the absence of any arrest warrants from the ICC or national jurisdictions.\u00a0The law also does not explicitly provide for the deployment of armed forces onto the territory of another state though section 8(a) that authorises the US President \u201cto use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of\u201d persons then defined, including US citizens, could be read to encompass this power with regards to the Netherlands, where the ICC is located.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

Law No. 149-FZ\u00a0was enacted in full compliance with Russian constitutional procedure. It was submitted by the Government, passed by the Parliament, and signed by the President in accordance with established legislative practice. Its formal validity under Russian law is not in question; its conformity with international law and its true purpose, however, are an entirely different matter.<\/p>\n

The law purports to authorise extraterritorial armed operations in an effort to \u201crescue\u201d nationals subject to ongoing foreign criminal proceedings for which no recognised exception to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter exists. Even on the most expansive reading of the protection of nationals doctrine, as indicated above, the permissible use of force is confined to situations of imminent physical danger where the foreign state has failed to protect the individuals concerned. To be clear: A national or international foreign court conducting lawful criminal proceedings satisfies none of those conditions.<\/p>\n

In this blog post, I have argued that the real objective of this law lies not in the operational measures, but in intimidation. The law is primarily aimed at deterring states from executing ICC arrest warrants against Russian officials and those that will be issued by the future Special Tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine. By transforming its political stance of non-recognition into a formal legislative threat of an armed response, Russia has moved from declarative non-compliance with international criminal law to codified, militarised opposition. Whether this escalation is an end point or a step towards actual implementation of this threatened use of force is a question that the new law deliberately leaves open.<\/p>\n

States and international organisations including judicial bodies that still believe that \u201cthe most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished<\/u><\/a> and that their effective prosecution must be ensured\u201d must not remain silent when such laws are enacted. To ensure that faith in international justice is not eroded by Russia\u2019s agenda of disregarding international law and the ongoing commission of international crimes, it is important to reiterate the importance of punishment for such crimes, particularly when laws that directly contradict this principle are enacted.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On\u00a05 June 2026, Law No. 149-FZ\u00a0entered into force. Signed by Vladimir Putin, the law amended two foundational statutes, the Citizenship Law and the Defence Law. The amendment of the former means that the Citizenship Law\u00a0now\u00a0obliges Russian authorities \u201cto take necessary measures to protect Russian citizens who have been arrested (detained) or are subject to criminal […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[4715,7105,3597,3599],"authors":[8033],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-28986","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-diplomatic-protection","tag-international-criminal-justice","tag-russia","tag-use-of-force","authors-a-russian-human-rights-lawyer","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"Russia\u2019s Law on Armed Citizen Protection Abroad"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20260629-190054-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28986","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28986"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28986\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":28991,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28986\/revisions\/28991"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28986"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28986"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28986"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=28986"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=28986"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=28986"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}