{"id":28860,"date":"2026-06-15T09:00:48","date_gmt":"2026-06-15T07:00:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=28860"},"modified":"2026-06-16T08:03:41","modified_gmt":"2026-06-16T06:03:41","slug":"you-cant-hide-you-cant-run","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/you-cant-hide-you-cant-run\/","title":{"rendered":"You Can\u2019t Hide, You Can\u2019t Run"},"content":{"rendered":"

On 13 April 2026, the Paris Criminal Court convicted<\/a> the French building materials company Lafarge and four of its former executives for financing armed groups in Syria during the Syrian civil war and for violating EU sanctions. Lafarge was ordered to pay a fine of 1.125 million Euro. The judgment<\/a> is remarkable not only because it concerns corporate conduct in an armed conflict, but because it appears to be the first conviction<\/a>\u00a0in France of a company, as a legal person, for conduct falling within the broader field of conflict-related criminal law. Meanwhile, separate proceedings against Lafarge for complicity in crimes against humanity remain pending<\/u><\/a> before the French courts.<\/p>\n

This post argues that the judgment should not be read as a merely domestic criminal law decision. Its significance is threefold. First, it exposes the limits of the \u2018neutral conduct\u2019 argument that corporations use to try to hide<\/em> behind economical business decisions in conflict zones. Second, the post shows how the doctrinal foundation for future convictions for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity is being laid out by the court. Third,\u00a0it underscores the structural importance of national courts for the enforcement of International Criminal Law (ICL).<\/p>\n

The Judgement<\/strong><\/p>\n

Lafarge was convicted of financing terrorism under Article 421-2-2<\/u><\/a>\u00a0of the French Penal Code (C. p\u00e9n). Until 2014, Lafarge operated a cement plant in northern Syria through its Syrian subsidiary. The court found that, between 2013 and 2014, Lafarge paid approximately 5.5 million Euro to armed groups, including, in particular, the Islamic State \u00a0(point 425<\/u>). These payments allowed plant operations by securing safe passage and access to resources (point 416<\/u>).<\/p>\n

The conviction was based on Article 421-2-2<\/u><\/a>\u00a0C. p\u00e9n, which criminalizes the financing of terrorism, read in conjunction with Article 121-2<\/u><\/a>\u00a0C. p\u00e9n. The latter provision allows corporate liability when offences are committed by leading company representatives. Four former executives, including ex-CEO Bruno Lafont, were also convicted and sentenced to prison, which enabled the possibility of legal person conviction.<\/p>\n

Article 421-2-2<\/u><\/a>\u00a0provides that financing a terrorist enterprise may itself constitute an act of terrorism where a person provides funds, values, or property while knowing<\/em> that they are intended to be used, in whole or in part, to commit terrorist acts. According to French case law, it is not necessary that the paying part itself intended to commit such acts; rather, knowledge<\/em> about the terroristic character of the other is sufficient (point 410<\/u>). The court found that the recipient organizations had committed several massacres in Syria and that Lafarge, through its executives, was aware of their terrorist character (points 556\u2013561<\/u>). On this basis, Lafarge must have known that the organizations were terrorist groups and that the funds provided would, in one way or another, support the financing or commission of terrorist acts.<\/p>\n

The End of <\/strong>Neutral Conduct<\/strong>?<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the past, corporations operating in conflict-affected areas have often justified their activities\u00a0with the \u201cneutral conduct<\/a>\u201d argument.\u00a0According to this, acts that are not unlawful in themselves \u2014 such as commercially motivated payments, the provision of goods, or the maintenance of contractual relations \u2014 should be treated as legally neutral and therefore incapable of giving rise to criminal liability, irrespective of the subsequent conduct of the recipient\u00a0(Hajdin, p. 381<\/a>). In practice, this argument has offered companies a convenient way of hiding<\/em> themselves from criminal liability.<\/p>\n

Although Lafarge did not invoke the \u201cneutral conduct\u201d argument in precisely these terms, it advanced a closely related line of defence. The company argued that it had been \u201cforced\u201d to make the payments in order to protect its employees and ensure their safety (points 537\u2013538<\/a>). The court rejected this argument in unequivocal terms, even describing it as \u201cshocking\u201d (points 537\u2013538<\/a>).<\/p>\n

It would, however, be too far-reaching to read the judgment as a fundamental reorientation of the law, let alone as a doctrinal shift that could automatically be transposed to other legal systems or to ICL. The conviction was made possible by the specific structure of French criminal law, and in particular by the knowledge-based threshold under Article 421-2-2<\/u><\/a>\u00a0C. p\u00e9n. Nevertheless, the decision may still carry significance beyond French law.\u00a0Its potential implications for international criminal law become apparent when placed in relation to the pending proceedings against Lafarge for complicity in crimes against humanity.\u00a0We have also seen similar arguments in the Lu<\/em>n<\/em>din Energy<\/em><\/a>\u00a0<\/em>lawsuit in Sweden, where oral arguments are currently under way.<\/p>\n

Implication<\/strong>s<\/strong> for Future Cases<\/strong><\/p>\n

The greater significance of the Lafarge judgment for ICL lies in its possible implications for the still pending proceedings concerning complicity in crimes against humanity.<\/p>\n

Under French law, complicity is governed by Article 121-7<\/a>\u00a0C. p\u00e9n. The provision establishes criminal liability for anyone who \u201cknowingly, through aid or assistance,\u201d facilitates the preparation or commission of a felony. This presupposes the existence of a principal offence \u2014 in the present context, crimes against humanity as defined in Article 212-1<\/u><\/a>\u00a0C. p\u00e9n. The act of assistance interpreted broadly under French law and may include the provision of funds (point 81<\/a>). On the mens rea<\/em> side, French case law requires that the accomplice be aware that the principal perpetrator is committing, or will commit, the relevant crime \u2013 here, crimes against humanity (point 67<\/a>).<\/p>\n

French courts have also made clear that the economical<\/u> purpose<\/u><\/a> of international corporations does not, as such, shield them from liability for complicity where they knowingly provide aid or assistance that facilitates the preparation or commission of crimes. Here, too, the logic of \u2018neutral conduct\u2019 is pushed aside: the fact that payment is embedded in a business relationship does not automatically deprive it of criminal significance.<\/p>\n

The crucial link to the pending crimes against humanity proceedings lies in the findings the Paris court in its April judgment. The court has already established that Lafarge knew<\/em> that the recipients of its payments were committing massacres against the civilian population in Syria and nevertheless continued to provide funds (points 556\u2013561<\/a>). This judicially established knowledge may become directly relevant in the proceedings concerning complicity in crimes against humanity. A company that knowingly finances an organization which systematically and extensively commits crimes against the civilian population can plausibly be understood as knowingly aiding and assisting those crimes within the meaning of Article 121-7<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0C. p\u00e9n.<\/p>\n

In this respect, the judgment already provides strong support for establishing the required mental element in the pending crimes against humanity proceedings. Given the extensive\u00a0evidence<\/a> of widespread and systematic attacks<\/a> committed by the Islamic State and Al-Qaida affiliated groups in Syria, the establishment of the principal offences is unlikely to constitute an obstacle.<\/p>\n

Why <\/strong>D<\/strong>omestic <\/strong>Jurisprudence<\/strong> I<\/strong>s <\/strong>E<\/strong>ssential for ICL<\/strong><\/p>\n

That the Lafarge case was tried before a national court rather than on the grand stage of ICL in The Hague is no coincidence. According to the complementary principle, domestic prosecution of international crimes is a vital part of ICL. The International Criminal Court\u2019s (ICC) role is to complement domestic systems and not replace it (Article 1 Rome Statute\u00a0(RS<\/a>)). But this case also shows structural deficits of the ICC-System.<\/p>\n

Under Article 25 RS, the ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons, not legal entities. Although the inclusion of corporate criminal liability was discussed during the negotiations of the RS, it was ultimately not adopted (Scheffer, p. 38<\/a>). This shows domestic\u00a0courts\u2019 importance in international criminal law. They can address cases the ICC cannot reach.<\/p>\n

Unlike in France, there is no established case law from the ICC when it comes to aiding and abetting. Under Article 25(3)(c) RS<\/a>, a person is only criminally responsible if they, \u201cfor the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aid, abet or otherwise assist in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission.\u201d The 1996 ILC Draft Code had envisaged a requirement of \u201cdirect and substantial\u201d assistance to the commission of the crime (ILC Draft Code 1996, p. 18<\/a>). Ultimately, however, the actus reus<\/em> of aiding and abetting has been shaped through international case law. The ICTY initially relied on a similar formulation in Tadi\u0107<\/em><\/a>, requiring a \u201cdirect and substantial contribution\u201d and understanding substantiality as a causal link between the assistance and the result (ICTY Tadi<\/em>\u0107<\/em>, para. 688<\/a>). In Furund\u017eija<\/em><\/a>, the ICTY later refined this standard by asking whether the assistance made a \u201csignificant difference\u201d to the commission of the crime by the principal perpetrator (ICTY Furund\u017eija<\/em>,\u00a0<\/em>para. 233<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The Rome Statute itself adopts a less restrictive formulation, since Article 25(3)(c) RS<\/a> does not expressly require that the assistance be \u201cdirect\u201d or \u201csubstantial\u201d. Nevertheless, ICC case law has at times required that the assistance have an \u201ceffect on the commission of the offence\u201d (ICC\u00a0Bemba<\/em>,<\/u>\u00a0<\/em>para. 35<\/a>). This effect does not necessarily need to be indispensable but it has often been described as requiring a certain degree of substantiality (Ambos, p. 1222<\/a>). Later ICC decisions, however, appear to lower this threshold again by rejecting the need for a \u201cspecific threshold\u201d (ICC Ongwen,<\/em>\u00a0para. 43<\/a>; ICC Al Mahdi<\/em>, para. 26<\/a>).<\/p>\n

As a result, international criminal law does not offer a fully settled standard on which corporate-related assistance cases can safely rely. This doctrinal uncertainty is worrying, particularly in light of the principle of legality and the requirement of specificity. What can be said is that where assistance has a substantial effect on the principal offence, aiding and abetting may clearly be established (see also Ambos, p. 1223<\/u>). Whether looser\u00a0forms of contribution also suffice remains considerably less certain.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Lafarge case shows the importance of a strong domestic system to address this kind of corporate wrongdoing. Had these acts occurred in a state unwilling or unable genuinely to prosecute, the ICC \u2013 given its jurisdictional and doctrinal limits \u2013 could not have stepped in to fulfil its role as a court of \u201clast resort<\/u><\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n

Legal entities fall outside its jurisdiction, the doctrine of aiding and abetting remains unsettled, and the Rome Statute contains no standalone offence of terrorist financing. These are not mere technicalities. They are normative gaps that become particularly visible where economic actors support violent groups without themselves taking up arms.<\/p>\n

For corporations operating in conflict-affected environments,\u00a0the judgment sends a clear warning. Those who seek to \u2018buy their way out\u2019 of engagement with armed actors<\/a>, or to secure access to markets<\/a>\u00a0through payments to such actors, will find it increasingly difficult to hide<\/em> behind formally neutral business transactions. Even without the ICC, the message from Paris to corporations acting in Syria<\/a>, Sudan<\/a> or Mozambique<\/a> is unmistakable: you can\u2019t hide, you can\u2019t run<\/em>.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

(All translations from the original French judgment and penal code <\/em>were <\/em>conducted with<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>DeepL<\/em><\/a>.)<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The \u201cBofaxe\u201d series appears as part of a\u00a0<\/em>collaboration<\/em><\/u><\/a>\u00a0between the\u00a0<\/em>IFHV<\/em><\/u><\/a>\u00a0and V\u00f6lkerrechtsblog.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On 13 April 2026, the Paris Criminal Court convicted the French building materials company Lafarge and four of its former executives for financing armed groups in Syria during the Syrian civil war and for violating EU sanctions. Lafarge was ordered to pay a fine of 1.125 million Euro. The judgment is remarkable not only because […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[7848,7743,5117,7403,4094,5804],"authors":[7234],"article-categories":[5108],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-28860","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-corporate-accountability","tag-corporate-responsibility","tag-crimes-against-humanity","tag-france","tag-international-criminal-law","tag-rome-statute","authors-aaron-dumont","article-categories-bofaxe"],"acf":{"subline":"The Lafarge Judgement\u2019s Influence on International Criminal Law"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20260615-190043-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28860","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28860"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28860\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":28894,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28860\/revisions\/28894"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28860"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28860"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28860"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=28860"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=28860"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=28860"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}