{"id":28753,"date":"2026-05-29T09:00:23","date_gmt":"2026-05-29T07:00:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=28753"},"modified":"2026-06-01T09:05:11","modified_gmt":"2026-06-01T07:05:11","slug":"violating-neutrality-enabling-harm","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/violating-neutrality-enabling-harm\/","title":{"rendered":"Violating Neutrality, Enabling Harm"},"content":{"rendered":"

Political neutrality occupies a central place in the constitutional architecture of international sports governance. Within the Olympic Movement, neutrality is described as a \u201cuniversal fundamental ethical principle<\/u><\/a>\u201d embedded in the International Olympic Committee\u2019s ethics framework and closely linked to the principle of universality. International sporting organisations (ISOs) frequently portray themselves as institutions capable of transcending geopolitical divisions, presenting global sport as a platform through which athletes and states may interact<\/u><\/a>\u00a0independently of the political conflicts that structure the international system.<\/p>\n

In February 2026, the Board of Peace\u00a0(the Board), a Trump-backed international organisation established in January 2026 to oversee post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza<\/u><\/a>, operating outside the United Nations framework,\u00a0and the F\u00e9d\u00e9ration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) concluded<\/u><\/a> a strategic agreement, under which FIFA agreed to serve as a donor to the Board. This collaboration raises questions as to the applicability of \u00a0political neutrality to institutions that enforce it. The International Olympic Committee\u2019s response to the situation is pertinent. When asked whether Gianni Infantino\u2019s appearance at the Board\u2019s inaugural meeting constituted a breach of neutrality, the IOC answered in the negative<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Neutrality in international sport has been constructed primarily as a regulatory burden on athletes, prohibiting political expression during competition, rather than on the ISOs that govern them<\/u>.<\/u><\/a>\u00a0It is precisely this structural asymmetry that has allowed this collaboration to escape any legal\u00a0scrutiny. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) serves as the primary dispute-resolution forum in international sport. However, its jurisdiction under Article 56 of the FIFA Statutes<\/u><\/a> is limited to disputes between FIFA and its members, clubs, players, and officials, and does not extend to challenges to FIFA\u2019s own institutional conduct. No external adjudicatory body holds compulsory jurisdiction to sanction FIFA<\/u><\/a> or the IOC for breaches of their own neutrality commitments, rendering the consequence of such violations one of pure institutional impunity rather than any mandated legal liability.\u00a0Compelled by a broader critique of the Board\u2019s constitutionality, the piece advances a two-part argument.\u00a0Firstly,<\/em>\u00a0it problematises\u00a0the existing neutrality framework which does not require FIFA to avoid this collaboration, leaving ISOs free to engage politically without consequence. Secondly,<\/em> it argues that, even setting aside the neutrality question, FIFA\u2019s engagement with the Board violates the human rights obligations it has acknowledged.<\/p>\n

Structural Asym<\/strong>m<\/strong>etry in Sporting Neutrality<\/strong><\/p>\n

Historically, neutrality in international sport has been enforced primarily through restrictions on athlete conduct. The clearest expression of this approach is Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter<\/u><\/a>, which prohibits political demonstrations within Olympic venues. Its application is illustrated by the sanctions imposed on Tommie Smith and John Carlos<\/u><\/a>\u00a0 and more recently when the Union of European Football Associations declined a request to illuminate Munich<\/u>\u2019<\/u>s Allianz Arena<\/u><\/a> in rainbow colours during UEFA Euro 2020.<\/p>\n

Yet the application of neutrality becomes far less clear when attention shifts from athletes to governing institutions themselves, as the recommendations to Rule 50<\/u><\/a> also highlight. While athletes are expected to exercise strict restraint in their political expression, ISOs have historically exercised considerable discretion in determining when to engage with political issues.<\/p>\n

At a statutory level<\/u>,<\/u><\/a> although fundamental principle 5 of the Olympic Charter as well as mission 5 of the Olympic Charter both talk about political neutrality and the establishment of sporting autonomy, rule 50 of the charter restricts the applicability of these principles to mere advertising of political opinions in Olympic competitive spaces<\/u><\/a> through player merchandise, etc. This narrow regulatory focus reduces neutrality to a question of athlete expression<\/u><\/a> rather than institutional conduct. The result is a structural disjunction between the Charter\u2019s broad normative commitment to political neutrality and its limited statutory implementation. Such a gap creates space for neutrality to be selectively enforced, enabling instances where political engagement by ISOs escape scrutiny.<\/p>\n

FIFA\u2019s\u00a0participation<\/u><\/a> in the Board, launched in connection with diplomatic efforts under the administration of Donald Trump, has been presented as a platform to promote peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction through sport and development programmes, with early discussions focusing<\/u><\/a>\u00a0on reconstruction efforts in Gaza. Although presented in humanitarian terms, this engagement situates FIFA within a broader diplomatic association with a particular political administration. It illustrates how international sporting bodies may become embedded in geopolitical initiatives without formally breaching existing neutrality rules. This dynamic is reflected in the structure of FIFA\u2019s regulatory framework as well. The FIFA Statute<\/u>s<\/u><\/a> formally do recognise neutrality as a governing principle. Article 4(2) provides that FIFA \u201cremains neutral in matters of politics and religion.\u201d Similarly, Article 15(a) requires member associations to adopt statutes that ensure neutrality in matters of politics and religion. Article 15(c) further obliges them to maintain institutional independence and avoid political interference.\u00a0Yet these provisions primarily frame neutrality as a mechanism for safeguarding football governance from external political influence rather than as a comprehensive constraint on FIFA\u2019s own institutional engagements and initiatives. As such, the current asymmetrical regime raises scepticisms of accountability.\u00a0While Article 4(2)<\/u><\/a> nominally binds FIFA directly, it preserves FIFA\u2019s discretion to depart from neutrality where matters engage its statutory objectives, effectively rendering neutrality a default position rather than an absolute constraint. Article 15 compounds this dynamic by establishing a framework in which FIFA exercises oversight over members\u2019 political conduct while facing no equivalent external check on its own. The result is a regulatory architecture that protects football from politics without meaningfully constraining<\/u><\/a>\u00a0FIFA\u2019s own political engagements, creating the \u2018structural asymmetry.\u2019<\/p>\n

The political nature of the collaboration\u00a0becomes clearer when the Board\u2019s institutional structure is taken into account. The Board\u2019s governance structure departs<\/u><\/a> from the normative conception of sovereign equality embedded in the UN Charter. This violation<\/u><\/a>\u00a0manifests<\/u><\/a> in the Board\u2019s reported governance arrangements under Article 2.2(c) of the Board<\/u>\u2019<\/u>s Charter<\/u><\/a>, which conditions permanent participation on substantial financial contributions<\/u><\/a>\u00a0while remaining subject to the continuing discretion of its chairman, Donald J. Trump<\/u><\/a>, according to Article 3.2(a) of the Board\u2019s Charter (\u2018Charter\u2019).\u00a0Therefore, the Board transforms the agency within the global security order into a capacity-based ladder in which political alignment matters. Consistent with this structure, rather than operating as a narrowly defined mechanism authorised to address the Gaza conflict, the Charter establishes a broader institutional arrangement designed to operate alongside, and potentially in competition<\/u><\/a> with, established multilateral frameworks<\/u><\/a> for international peace and security.\u00a0This, in effect, positions the Board less as a focused peacebuilding mechanism and more as a platform embedded within the geopolitical intent of the United States.<\/p>\n

In addition to this manifestation of the inherent statutory asymmetry,\u00a0FIFA\u2019s collaboration with the Board cannot be assessed independently of the Board’s institutional character. UN experts have raised concerns regarding the human rights records<\/u><\/a> of several states central to the Board’s governance. As the following section demonstrates, this institutional context is not incidental, it is precisely what renders FIFA’s otherwise \u2018unprohibited\u2019 political engagement consequential.<\/p>\n

The Violation of the International Human Rights Regime & F<\/strong>IFA <\/strong>Statute<\/strong>s<\/strong><\/p>\n

The agreement is in contravention of the FIFA<\/u> Statutes<\/u><\/a> and other applicable international rules to which the institution remains obliged. While primarily registered and recognised under Article 60 Swiss Civil Code<\/u><\/a> as an association with political, religious, scientific, cultural, charitable, social or non-commercial purposes. The declaration of its non-profit associative character also accrues<\/u><\/a> the institution various tax exemptions. Although FIFA derives its legal status from Swiss domestic law, its activities operate at a global level. Through its authority over competitions, recognition of national associations, and regulatory control of the sport, FIFA plays a significant<\/u><\/a> role in governing international football. Thus, it plays a key role in regulating international sporting affairs to some degree.<\/p>\n

In the Reparations for Injuries <\/em><\/u>case<\/u><\/a>, the International Court of Justice recognised that entities other than States may possess international legal personality where required by their functions. While this reasoning does not directly apply to FIFA, it supports the broader point that international law is not confined strictly to States. Given FIFA\u2019s transnational regulatory influence<\/u><\/a>, at times extending beyond and even displacing domestic legal frameworks,\u00a0as noted by Franck Latty<\/u><\/a>, it is appropriate to assess its conduct against the international standards it has undertaken to respect.<\/p>\n

In pursuance of such recognition, this obligation of FIFA and the corpus of international regulatory mechanisms it governs and is governed by is referred to as \u2018lex-<\/em><\/u>fifa<\/em><\/u><\/a>.\u2019 Besides, international instruments, FIFA\u2019s own actions remain bound by its statute, which, under Article 2, expressly provides that humanitarian values must guide its conduct. The 2016 amendment to the FIFA Statute also acknowledges the paramount nature of human rights and provides, under Article 3, that the organisation \u201cis committed to respect all internationally recognised human rights\u2026.\u201d\u00a0The adherence to such principles also stems from the horizontal application of the human rights regime to private entities such as FIFA. In that regard, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights<\/u><\/a>\u00a0(\u2018Guiding Principles\u2019)\u00a0remain a significant instrument regulating corporations.<\/p>\n

In fact, FIFA has previously acknowledged the important place of such provisions before the Swiss National Contact Point and acquiesced<\/u><\/a>\u00a0to accepting responsibility for human rights violations. This position is further reinforced by a\u00a0report<\/u><\/a> prepared by John Ruggie, commissioned by FIFA, which identifies the Guiding Principles as the authoritative standard applicable to FIFA given its global activities. The framework mandates that the requirement of the organisation contributing to such violation is not a prerequisite, and as such, its obligations extend beyond its control, such that it seeks<\/u><\/a>\u00a0to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationships, even if FIFA has not contributed to those impacts.<\/p>\n

Moreover, under Section 4 of FIFA\u2019s Human Rights Policy<\/u><\/a> (\u2018the policy\u2019), enacted in 2017, the organisation has expressed its utmost commitment to go beyond its responsibility to respect human rights as posited under the Guiding Principles and to embrace all internationally recognised human rights. Section 2 also considers such rights with respect to specific groups or populations that require special attention, including ethnic, national, and linguistic minorities, among others. This commitment to human rights extends to all FIFA bodies and officials and must be upheld even when it conflicts with domestic laws, as set out in Sections 13 and 7 of the Policy. In the present case, the Board not only contravenes<\/u><\/a> the international order, but, as opined by UN Experts, also\u00a0contravenes<\/u><\/a> a human rights-based approach. Given this problematisation of its character, legitimacy and the implication of human rights<\/u><\/a> violations, the recent agreement between the Board and FIFA remains violative of key articles under both the FIFA Statute and its Human Rights Policy.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, Article 4 of the FIFA Statute enshrines the principle of non-discrimination which\u00a0is reiterated in Article 5 of the Policy, thereby prohibiting discrimination based on nationality. This principle of non-discrimination has been reiterated to say that the obligation is transformative and extends to actions that must be undertaken in pursuance of decisions of the International Courts. For instance, obligations accrued<\/u><\/a> to FIFA post the Occupied Palestinian Territory<\/em><\/u><\/a> Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. However, the Board retains absolute authority to decide membership as per\u00a0 Article 2.1<\/u><\/a>, which is based on both an exclusion<\/u><\/a> of non-allied states\u00a0and mandates<\/u><\/a>\u00a0an economic capacity-based hierarchy (see Article 2.2(c)), thus violating the neutrality principle and the clause on non-discrimination.<\/p>\n

In the Shadow of Power, Neutrality Fails<\/strong>, <\/strong>A<\/strong>gain<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Board of Peace risks transforming global security into a pay-to-play system, replacing shared legal frameworks, and placing discretion in the hands of the powerful. It is precisely this system that FIFA, the organiser of the tournament that the United States will host<\/u><\/a> in 2026, has chosen to legitimise. FIFA,\u00a0by collaborating with the Board, actualises the statutory asymmetry\u00a0vis-\u00e0-vis the principle of neutrality.\u00a0But in doing so, it also\u00a0lends institutional legitimacy to a structure that undermines the very collective security order that neutrality exists to protect. The question in the future is whether ISOs will be held to the commitments they have made and the principles they deploy, or whether proximity to power will continue to excuse abandoning both.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Political neutrality occupies a central place in the constitutional architecture of international sports governance. Within the Olympic Movement, neutrality is described as a \u201cuniversal fundamental ethical principle\u201d embedded in the International Olympic Committee\u2019s ethics framework and closely linked to the principle of universality. International sporting organisations (ISOs) frequently portray themselves as institutions capable of transcending […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[3581,8009,7892,7131],"authors":[7954,7953],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-28753","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-human-rights","tag-neutrality","tag-sports-law","tag-usa","authors-arjun-singh","authors-meraj-ahmad","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"FIFA\u2019s Collaboration with the Board of Peace"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20260529-172926-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28753","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28753"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28753\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":28756,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28753\/revisions\/28756"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28753"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28753"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28753"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=28753"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=28753"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=28753"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}