{"id":28217,"date":"2026-04-02T11:30:59","date_gmt":"2026-04-02T09:30:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=28217"},"modified":"2026-04-01T15:15:04","modified_gmt":"2026-04-01T13:15:04","slug":"a-hungarian-bank-heist","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/a-hungarian-bank-heist\/","title":{"rendered":"A Hungarian Bank Heist"},"content":{"rendered":"

On March 6, 2026, an incident seemingly ripped from a poorly written crime thriller created the premises for new diplomatic friction between Hungary and Ukraine. Hungarian authorities intercepted<\/u><\/a>\u00a0two Ukrainian armored transport vehicles travelling from Austria to Ukraine.\u00a0The transporters\u00a0reportedly<\/u><\/a> carried $75 million in cash as well as nine kilograms of gold belonging to Ukrainian state-owned lender Oschadbank. The Hungarian government linked these funds to an alleged\u00a0money laundering scheme<\/u><\/a> and proceeded to seize them. Ukraine, for its part, was quick to\u00a0condemn<\/u><\/a> Hungary\u2019s actions. Kyiv also asked the European Union to provide a legal assessment of the situation, and Oschadbank itself announced its intention to pursue legal action<\/u><\/a>. Given Ukraine\u2019s prolific use of international adjudicatory bodies in recent years \u2013 particularly since Russia’s full-scale invasion<\/u><\/a> of 2022 \u2013\u00a0a case against Hungary before an international tribunal does not seem far-fetched. This blog post assesses the potential legal grounds for such an action and the legal fora to which Ukraine and Oschadbank could turn.<\/p>\n

The Background<\/strong><\/p>\n

The case falls amidst heightened diplomatic tensions between Hungary and Ukraine regarding the cessation<\/u><\/a> of oil transit through the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, as well as Hungary\u2019s fast approaching parliamentary elections. While this post focuses on the seizure of the funds, it is important to consider that Hungary also detained the Ukrainian transport crew, which consisted of seven Oschadbank employees, for more than twenty-four hours. During that time, Hungarian authorities allegedly den<\/u>ied<\/u><\/a>\u00a0Ukrainian consular staff access to the detainees and subjected them to\u00a0physical abuse<\/u><\/a>. While the employees were eventually\u00a0released<\/u><\/a> and the vehicles returned, Hungary is still withholding both the\u00a0gold and the cash.\u00a0Fidesz \u2013\u00a0Hungary\u2019s governing party \u2013\u00a0also introduced a bill<\/u><\/a> that\u00a0would allow the government to keep these assets frozen for up to 60 days\u00a0while the investigation is ongoing. In response, Ukrainian foreign minister Andrii\u00a0Sybiha\u00a0took to X<\/u><\/a>, accusing\u00a0Hungary of \u201cstate terrorism and racketeering\u201d, \u201cstealing money\u201d, and \u201chostage-taking\u201d. In another post, Sybiha explicitly denounced<\/u><\/a> the actions as illegal, alleging that Hungary was \u201cfalling down a spiral of lawlessness\u201d.<\/p>\n

Are the\u00a0Seized Funds\u00a0Protected by State Immunity?<\/strong><\/p>\n

While plausible at first glance, Sybiha\u2019s\u00a0accusation that Hungary was \u201cstealing money\u201d from state-owned Oschadbank\u00a0is problematic from an international law perspective,\u00a0as there is no customary right to property specifically for states (see Tzeng<\/u><\/a>). In lieu of such a right, states must turn to other legal rules to vindicate their property interests. One of the rules that are usually cited in this context is the principle of state immunity. The\u00a0Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, for example, relied primarily on state immunity when it\u00a0sought legal redress before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)\u00a0against\u00a0the seizure of some\u00a0documents and data carriers<\/u><\/a>\u00a0by Australia (see Memorial of Timor-Leste<\/u><\/a>, para. 5.18). In 2022, when Russia\u2019s central bank assets were frozen<\/u><\/a>\u00a0in response to its\u00a0aggression against Ukraine, state immunity was likewise\u00a0discussed<\/u><\/a> as a possible legal bar to this measure.\u00a0In this context, some authors\u00a0claimed<\/u><\/a> that state immunity only prohibits judicial actions targeting foreign state-owned assets, while others\u00a0maintained<\/u><\/a>\u00a0that it extends to legislative and executive actions with the same effect. The Russian central bank\u00a0recently brought<\/u><\/a> an action for annulment against the indefinite prolongation of the asset freeze before the Court of Justice of the European Union, claiming, inter alia, violations of state immunity\u00a0(for an analysis of the Russian action for annulment, see here<\/u><\/a>).<\/p>\n

In addition,\u00a0a legal challenge to Hungary\u2019s actions based on this principle would likely fail for a number of other reasons. For one, state immunity from measures of constraint does not apply to property that is in use for \u201cother than government non-commercial purposes\u201d, as stipulated by Article 19 lit. c of the U.N. Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (UNCJ<\/u>ISP<\/u><\/a>).\u00a0The ICJ seemed to recognize the customary character of this provision in Jurisdictional Immunities (Germany v. Italy)<\/em><\/u><\/a>, paras. 116-118. Russia\u2019s frozen central bank assets most likely\u00a0constitute, at least in part, foreign exchange reserves. Such reserves are generally <\/u>considered<\/u><\/a> to be in use for governmental purposes.\u00a0Oschadbank, conversely, is not Ukraine\u2019s central bank and is not responsible for managing the country\u2019s foreign exchange reserves (a function that,\u00a0under the applicable Ukrainian legislation<\/u><\/a>, falls upon the National Bank of Ukraine). Therefore, the cash and gold seized by Hungary are likely in use for commercial banking operations and,\u00a0as such, are not covered by state immunity from measures of constraint.\u00a0Oschadbank\u00a0itself admitted as much in its statement<\/u><\/a>\u00a0on the matter,\u00a0according to which the funds were meant to be used \u201cin circulation and saturation of the cash market in Ukraine.\u201d\u00a0Even under a broad interpretation of state immunity, Hungary\u2019s seizure of the Oschadbank funds would therefore not necessarily qualify as\u00a0illegal.<\/p>\n

U.N. Criminal Conventions as a Basis for Jurisdiction?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Another obstacle to a claim against Hungary is the lack of a jurisdictional title that could be used to bring a possible violation of state immunity before the ICJ. Equatorial Guinea faced a similar problem a few years ago\u00a0when it sought to challenge\u00a0France\u2019s seizure of certain assets, including a mansion in Paris and some luxury vehicles,\u00a0as part of a money laundering investigation.\u00a0In that case, Equatorial Guinea invoked Article 4 of the U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention<\/u><\/a>), which stipulates that states shall carry out their obligations under the Convention \u201cin a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity.\u201d\u00a0This allowed Equatorial Guinea to bring its claim before the ICJ under the compromissory clause enshrined in Article 35(2) of the Palermo Convention. However, this gambit ultimately failed when the Court rejected<\/u><\/a> the argument that the broad reference to sovereign equality in Article 4 incorporated the principle of state immunity into the Convention.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, Ukraine could still invoke this treaty in another way. Under Article 12(1) and (2) Palermo Convention, state parties are obligated to adopt measures necessary to enable the freezing and confiscation of property derived from offenses covered by the Convention, as well as property used to commit such offenses, including money\u00a0laundering (as per Article 6). If Hungary\u2019s accusations of money\u00a0laundering are a mere pretext to use the funds as political bargaining chips, Ukraine could argue that Hungary committed an abuse of rights<\/u><\/a>\u00a0by seizing the funds and\u00a0adopting legislation to keep them frozen.\u00a0However, a similar strategy already failed in a case filed\u00a0against Russia\u00a0by Ukraine shortly after the beginning of the full-scale invasion. In that case, Ukraine argued that Russia had abusively invoked and thereby breached Articles I and IV of the 1948 U.N. Genocide Convention<\/u><\/a>\u00a0by falsely claiming the existence of\u00a0a genocide against Russian\u00a0speakers in the Donbas region in order to justify its aggression against Ukraine. The ICJ, however, was not convinced by this argument. In this regard, the Court\u00a0stated<\/u><\/a> that \u201cwhile such\u00a0an abusive invocation [of a treaty] will result in the dismissal of the arguments based thereon, it does not follow that, by itself, it constitutes a breach of the treaty.\u201d\u00a0Against this background, it seems unlikely that Ukraine will be able to use the Palermo Convention to its advantage. The same is true for the U.N. Convention against Corruption,<\/u><\/a> which contains similar provisions on money laundering and sovereign equality.<\/p>\n

Oschadbank\u2019s Options<\/strong><\/p>\n

Although Ukraine may struggle to bring a viable claim against Hungary before the ICJ,\u00a0Oschadbank could still pursue legal action independently. At the international level, there seem to be two possible pathways. The first one would be to pursue investment arbitration against Hungary under the\u00a01994 Hungary-Ukraine Bilateral Investment T<\/u>reaty<\/u> (BIT)<\/u><\/a>. Although Oschadbank\u00a0is wholly state-owned, it will most likely qualify as a protected \u201cinvestor\u201d under Article 1(2) of the BIT. Another tribunal previously ruled<\/u><\/a> that state-ownership was not an obstacle in this context\u00a0and\u00a0that Oschadbank\u00a0was eligible for protection under the similarly worded Russia-Ukraine BIT<\/u><\/a>. However, Oschadbank would still face an uphill battle in establishing\u00a0that the transported funds constitute an investment in Hungary, given their tenuous territorial nexus to this country.<\/p>\n

The second pathway would be for\u00a0Oschadbank\u00a0to file an individual application before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). According to the ECtHR\u2019s long-standing jurisprudence, even wholly state-owned enterprises can enjoy the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), including its 1952 Protocol<\/u><\/a>\u00a0establishing a human right to property. The requirements in this regard include that the state-owned enterprise in question\u00a0not participate in the exercise of governmental powers and be sufficiently independent\u00a0from the government (see Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey<\/em><\/u><\/a>,\u00a0paras. 78-82).\u00a0Oschadbank seems to check these boxes.\u00a0Regarding the merits of such an application, the ECtHR\u2019s extensive jurisprudence on the freezing and confiscation of assets under proceeds-of-crime legislation makes clear that legislation enabling the seizure of proceeds of\u00a0serious crimes such as money laundering does not violate the right to property under the ECHR,\u00a0if it is proportionate (see, for example,\u00a0Balsamo v. San Marino<\/em><\/u><\/a>, paras. 81 and 92). However, if Hungary\u2019s accusations of money laundering are unfounded, the principles established by this jurisprudence would not apply,\u00a0and Oschadbank would likely prevail. According to <\/u>the ECtHR<\/u><\/a>, the burden of proving whether the assets in question are the proceeds of crime may legitimately be shifted to the accused party. Therefore, Oschadbank would be well advised to tread carefully.<\/p>\n

Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n

While Ukraine itself does not appear to have a feasible way to bring a claim related to the seized assets before the ICJ, Oschadbank\u00a0may be able to succeed with a human rights-based claim before the ECtHR. Alternatively, Ukraine could take up Oschadbank\u2019s case and file an inter-state case against Hungary under Article 33 ECHR. This case could also include a claim related to the detention of the transport crew, which Ukraine has already denounced<\/u><\/a> as a violation of the ECHR. The coming weeks will reveal whether a diplomatic solution to the dispute is still possible, or\u00a0whether\u00a0litigation is necessary.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The author <\/em>thanks Prof. Tom Ruys for helpful comments during the drafting process.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On March 6, 2026, an incident seemingly ripped from a poorly written crime thriller created the premises for new diplomatic friction between Hungary and Ukraine. Hungarian authorities intercepted\u00a0two Ukrainian armored transport vehicles travelling from Austria to Ukraine.\u00a0The transporters\u00a0reportedly carried $75 million in cash as well as nine kilograms of gold belonging to Ukrainian state-owned lender […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[7964,3745,3598],"authors":[7963],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-28217","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-hungary","tag-state-immunity","tag-ukraine","authors-philipp-kehl","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"On the Legal Ramifications of Hungary\u2019s Seizure of a Ukrainian Cash and Gold Transport"},"meta_box":{"doi":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28217","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28217"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28217\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":28224,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28217\/revisions\/28224"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28217"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28217"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28217"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=28217"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=28217"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=28217"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}