{"id":27675,"date":"2026-02-28T15:00:06","date_gmt":"2026-02-28T14:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=27675"},"modified":"2026-03-02T20:04:41","modified_gmt":"2026-03-02T19:04:41","slug":"the-trump-corollary-to-the-monroe-doctrine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/the-trump-corollary-to-the-monroe-doctrine\/","title":{"rendered":"The \u2018Trump Corollary\u2019 to the Monroe Doctrine"},"content":{"rendered":"

On 2 December 2025, the White House published the National Security Strategy 2025<\/u><\/a>. It contains the explicit invocation of a \u2018Trump Corollary\u2019 to the Monroe Doctrine.\u00a0The US attack on Venezuela<\/u><\/a> on 3 January 2026 indicates that this was neither a declaration of minor importance\u00a0nor an idle threat.<\/p>\n

Since 1823, the USA has declared several doctrines in which principles for the use of force were outlined. However, since Richard Nixon announced the Nixon<\/u>\u00a0<\/u>Doctrine on<\/u> the<\/u>\u00a0<\/u>\u2018<\/u>Vietnamization<\/u>\u2019<\/u> of the Vietnam War<\/u><\/a> in 1969, no US president has consciously declared a doctrine or a corollary to an existing doctrine. The labelling of policies as doctrines has otherwise occurred due to press reports or subsequent rationalizations (e.g. the Bush\u00a0Doctrine in the\u00a0NSS<\/u> 2002<\/u><\/a>). Some presidents even explicitly\u00a0shied away from labelling a policy as a doctrine (e.g. Bill Clinton<\/u><\/a>, Barack Obama<\/u><\/a>).<\/p>\n

Initially, the declaration of a doctrine is merely a unilateral act of a state, which may be relevant on different levels under public international law. In cases where the use of force is foreseen in a doctrine, the question of its legal and law-creating effects is of particular interest. Doctrines have the appeal of quasi-legal <\/u>concepts<\/u><\/a>, or at least imply the use of an international legal idiom, in order to justify the exercise of power.<\/p>\n

What Monroe<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Doctrine?<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>\u2013<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Doctrine<\/strong> and<\/strong> Corollaries<\/strong><\/p>\n

The NSS 2025 explicitly states that the USA will \u2018assert and enforce a \u2018Trump Corollary\u2019 to\u00a0the Monroe Doctrine\u2019 in order\u00a0to \u2018ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed\u2019 (NSS<\/u> 2025,<\/u> p.5<\/u><\/a>). This inevitably raises the question of what the Monroe Doctrine exactly entails.<\/p>\n

On 2 December 1823, President James Monroe delineated the principles of US foreign policy in his annual address to Congress<\/u><\/a>:\u00a0The \u2018decolonization principle\u2019\u00a0states that European powers are prohibited from establishing new colonies in the Western Hemisphere and must not interfere in its political affairs or internal conflicts. The \u2018non-intervention principle\u2019\u00a0(also called the principle of disinterest) declares that the United States would not interfere in the wars or internal conflicts of European states.\u00a0The term \u2018Monroe Doctrine\u2019 was\u00a0then first used in\u00a0US Congress debates in 1853 (see D. Perkins, <\/u>A History of the Monroe Doctrine<\/em><\/u>, p. 99<\/u><\/a>).\u00a0Subsequently, different principles concerning the use of force and assertions of legal rights regarding the use of force have been put forward within the framework of the Monroe\u00a0Doctrine.\u00a0Some authors count no fewer than a dozen corollaries and content-altering interpretations<\/u><\/a> of the Monroe Doctrine.<\/p>\n

The Roosevelt Corollary <\/u>of 1904<\/u><\/a>, for example,\u00a0asserted a US right to intervene in Latin American states in cases of \u2018flagrant and chronic wrongdoing\u2019 or \u2018impotence\u2019 to ensure order and protect American interests. It was actually prompted by European gunboat blockades of Venezuela in 1902\/03 to collect debts, raising fears of European colonization in the Western Hemisphere, which also resulted in the Drago-Porter Convention of 1907<\/u><\/a>.\u00a0This convention, which is still technically in force, prohibits the collection of financial debts by force. The Roosevelt Corollary was, however, abandoned in an internal memorandum by Undersecretary of State Joshua Reuben Clark in 1928, later published as the so-called Clark<\/u>\u00a0<\/u>Memorandum<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n

In the lead-up to the Second World War, the question arose whether\u00a0Canada and Greenland<\/u><\/a> were covered by the Monroe Doctrine. A statement by President Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1938 is considered an extension of the defensive aspect of the Monroe Doctrine to Canada<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n

The US interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and its compatibility with the UN Charter was already a matter of concern for the US<\/u> delegation<\/u>\u00a0<\/u>at the San Francisco Conference<\/u><\/a> in 1945. An interpretation by John Foster Dulles reduced the doctrine to its core principle of defending the US, hence allowing the use of force only in cases of self-defence. This brought the use of force foreseen under the Monroe Doctrine\u00a0in <\/u>line<\/u><\/a>\u00a0with the right of self-defence under\u00a0Article 51 UN Charter.<\/p>\n

The 2025 <\/strong>\u2018Trump Corollary<\/strong>\u2019: Substance and Legal Assessment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Over the 200 years of its existence, the understanding of the Monroe Doctrine has gone through various stages<\/u><\/a>. As\u00a0the vagueness of the Monroe Doctrine leaves room for various interpretations regarding its scope and meaning,\u00a0it has also resulted in different legal assessments. Particularly between the\u00a01890s and the 1930s, these debates produced contradictory legal interpretations. Some Latin American scholars, namely\u00a0Alejandro Alvarez<\/u><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 later in his\u00a0life a judge at the ICJ \u2013\u00a0argued in 1924 that it had become\u00a0a rule of regional, \u2018American\u2019 international law. This was part of several a<\/u>ttempts to <\/u>reframe or<\/u> \u2018<\/u>Pan-Americanize<\/u>\u2019<\/u> the doctrine<\/u><\/a> as a multilateral legal principle, particularly by stressing anti-colonial and anti-interventionist dimensions of Monroe\u2019s formulation.<\/p>\n

However, another meaning,\u00a0pointing in a completely different direction,\u00a0can also be attached to it: it has been employed as a pattern of argumentation to\u00a0justify imperial claims of supremacy. In 1939, Carl Schmitt developed his idea of a \u2018<\/u>Gro\u00dfraumordnung<\/u><\/a>\u2019 (\u2018greater area order\u2019) based on the Monroe Doctrine. He assumed that\u00a0\u2018empires\u2019\u00a0(\u2018Reiche\u2019)\u00a0served as special subjects of international law, which he considered entitled to regional dominance based on a \u2018prohibition of intervention by foreign powers<\/u><\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n

The Trump Corollary,\u00a0as stipulated in the 2025 NSS, asserts a US right to deny non-hemispheric competitors access to strategically relevant assets and to employ coercive measures, potentially including force, to prevent such access. This is a new level of hostility towards existing legal regulations, even for the current US<\/u> a<\/u>dministration<\/u><\/a>. From a legal perspective, the Trump Corollary confronts several obvious obstacles. First, it foresees the use of force not only in response to an armed attack according to Art. 51 UN\u00a0Charter, but also to prevent the presence or influence of external competitors. Second, the doctrine operates unilaterally and does not rely\u00a0on any Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII UN Charter. Third, the Trump Corollary\u00a0follows a pattern of conflating political narrative with legal arguments.\u00a0In sum, the Corollary articulates a doctrine of hemispheric hegemony and does so\u00a0in a far more comprehensive way than even the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 did.\u00a0The former was declared to prevent forceful territorial interference, whereas the Trump Corollary strives\u00a0to deny other states control over\u00a0\u2018strategically vital assets\u2019.<\/p>\n

The Drafting Process<\/strong> of an <\/strong>Untypical <\/strong>National Security Strategy<\/strong><\/p>\n

Under international law, the NSS 2025 is a document of the US executive branch and a statement of its legal position.\u00a0A closer look at its drafting process<\/u><\/a>\u00a0can be useful to highlight how this abandonment\u00a0of previous political and legal positions came about.\u00a0The writing of a national security strategy is usually the result of a comprehensive interdepartmental process. According to several media reports<\/u><\/a>, the lead drafter of the 2025 NSS is Michael Anton, who served as Director of Policy Planning in the second Trump Administration from January to September 2025.\u00a0He is best known as the author of the\u00a0essay \u2018The Flight 93 Election<\/u><\/a>\u2019, published under the pseudonym\u00a0Publius Decius Mus<\/em>. In it, he compared the 2016 US presidential election to United Airlines Flight 93 on 11 September 2001,\u00a0arguing that voters had to \u2018charge the cockpit or die.\u2019\u00a0Given this background, the dramatic and exaggerated tone of the 2025 NSS should not be surprising.<\/p>\n

This must also be seen in the context of an internal conflict<\/u><\/a>\u00a0within\u00a0the MAGA (Make America Great Again) think tank network.\u00a0This network, comprising the America First Policy Institute (AFPI<\/u><\/a>), the Heritage Foundation<\/u><\/a>, the Center<\/u> for Renewing America (CRA<\/u><\/a>)\u00a0and the Conservative Partnership Institute (CPI)<\/u><\/a>, is central to the agenda of the second Trump administration, it forms an autonomous intellectual infrastructure. It is\u00a0indispensable to engage with\u00a0its\u00a0work to ensure that academic discourse does not degenerate into parallel and self-confirming discussions.<\/p>\n

Within and amongst these institutions, there is also a debate about the degree of aggressiveness with which the liberal\u00a0international order can be unravelled. This oscillation\u00a0between the declaration of extreme positions (e.g. Vice President Vance’s speech at the 2025 Munich Conference<\/u><\/a>) and reassurances<\/u><\/a> demonstrates that extreme positions do not represent permanent US\u00a0policy. Within this context, the Trump Corollary constitutes a success of a so-called \u2018sovereigntist\u00a0agenda\u2019: a rejection of international organizations paired with a wish to dominate the Western Hemisphere (including claims to regain control over the Panama Canal<\/u><\/a>). At the same time, it\u00a0marks a noted geographical change of focus<\/u><\/a> by deprioritizing\u00a0the containment of\u00a0China and Russia. Unlike in the case of the rather conventional NSS 201<\/u>7<\/u><\/a>, there is no contradiction between actions and statements here.<\/p>\n

Venezuela 2026 as the <\/strong>F<\/strong>irst <\/strong>A<\/strong>pplication <\/strong>of the Trump Corollary<\/strong><\/p>\n

The US statement<\/u><\/a> at the Security Council meeting on 5 January 2026 regarding the ab<\/u>du<\/u>ction of <\/u>Nicol\u00e1s Maduro<\/u><\/a>\u00a0from\u00a0the presidential residence in Caracas contains no real attempt at justification under international law. It was indeed marked by an \u2018absence of an articulated legal justification\u2019, as\u00a0Marko Milanovic aptly stated<\/u><\/a>.\u00a0There is only a weak reference to Charter language, in which the statement refers to\u00a0\u2018attacks on the people of the United States\u2019 by a \u2018narco-terrorist\u2019. If this remains the only reference, then it is potentially system-shattering. Unlike in the NSS 2002 \u2013 including the Bush\u00a0Doctrine \u2013 or the rather artistic combination of Security Council resolutions as justifications for the 2003 <\/u>i<\/u>nvasion <\/u>of Iraq<\/u><\/a> (see resolutions 678<\/u><\/a>, 688<\/u><\/a>, and 1441<\/u><\/a>, respectively), there is not even an attempt to justify the action in compliance with international law.<\/p>\n

However, the justification presented now bears some similarity to one aspect\u00a0of the justification provided by the US<\/u><\/a>\u00a0when apprehending Manuel Noriega and launching an invasion\u00a0into Panama in December 1989 \u2018to combat drug trafficking\u2019. Even though\u00a0Panama had previously announced<\/u><\/a> it considered itself in a state of war with the United States, the legal justification presented by the US for the invasion was significantly more complex<\/u><\/a> as it relied on a combination of action in self-defence and protection of the Panama Canal.\u00a0This stands in sharp contrast to the isolated US claim that the actions taken in Venezuela were merely \u2018law enforcement operation<\/u>s<\/u>\u2019<\/u><\/a>, thereby also ignoring\u00a0j<\/em>us ad bellum<\/em> and matters of state immunity.<\/p>\n

Provided the action in Venezuela in January 2026 remains an isolated incident in the context of the Trump Corollary, this does not necessarily cause a change in the\u00a0law. What is worrying\u00a0is that no attempt was even made to qualify the action under the Trump Corollary as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force.<\/p>\n

The <\/strong>Only C<\/strong>onsolation<\/strong>: <\/strong>A <\/strong>C<\/strong>laim <\/strong>Beyond <\/strong>Fulfilment<\/strong><\/p>\n

A doctrine is the law-like dressing up of a political maxim for action. It illustrates an effort to confer legitimacy upon actions by claiming motives beyond national interest. As a \u2018hegemonic<\/u>\u00a0<\/u>doctrine<\/u><\/a>\u2019, the Trump Corollary constitutes a claim for an exception. It subjects the sovereignty of states in the Western Hemisphere to US\u00a0approval. At the same time, like other doctrines, it marks the limits of the hegemonic exercise of power: it lays down commandments for action and prohibitions, the enforcement of which is beyond the actual options for action of the declaring state. The idea of a doctrine is engaged when political means of power do not suffice to enforce its principles. To place military or economic access to the Western Hemisphere entirely under US reservation would exceed even US capabilities. A discrepancy between aspirations and the actual ability to implement the concept also characterized the context in which Schmitt`s Gro\u00dfraum<\/em>ordnung<\/em> was articulated.<\/p>\n

With only two exceptions,\u00a0previous US doctrines could be interpreted as merely representing a declaratory repetition of the law in force<\/u><\/a> and were mostly aptly considered by the USA as such. The Trump\u00a0Corollary is the third openly illegal doctrine under international law:\u00a0the Roosevelt\u00a0Corollary (1904) to the Monroe Doctrine and the Bush Doctrine (2002) alone could not be understood as a purely declaratory repetition of existing law and contained strategic and legal concepts that exceeded it. The same applies to the Trump Corollary.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On 2 December 2025, the White House published the National Security Strategy 2025. It contains the explicit invocation of a \u2018Trump Corollary\u2019 to the Monroe Doctrine.\u00a0The US attack on Venezuela on 3 January 2026 indicates that this was neither a declaration of minor importance\u00a0nor an idle threat. Since 1823, the USA has declared several doctrines […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[4358,7150,3932,7131,7880],"authors":[7539],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-27675","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-armed-conflict","tag-international-relations","tag-intervention","tag-usa","tag-venezuela","authors-heiko-meiertons","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"The Return of \u2018Gro\u00dfraumordnung\u2019 \r\n"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20260301-144925-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27675","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27675"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27675\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27807,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27675\/revisions\/27807"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27675"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27675"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27675"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=27675"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=27675"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=27675"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}