{"id":27363,"date":"2026-02-06T14:00:15","date_gmt":"2026-02-06T13:00:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=27363"},"modified":"2026-02-09T18:51:34","modified_gmt":"2026-02-09T17:51:34","slug":"trump-and-the-international-legal-order","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/trump-and-the-international-legal-order\/","title":{"rendered":"Trump and the International Legal Order"},"content":{"rendered":"

In the early hours of 3 January 2026, the United States launched \u201cOperation Absolute Resolve<\/a>\u201d. The military attack, which reportedly<\/a> cost the lives of at least 80 people, consisted of a series of airstrikes on Venezuela and the abduction of Venezuela\u2019s (at least de-facto) head of state, President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.
\nInternational legal scholars have called it a \u201csevere breach<\/a> of foundational principles of international law\u201d and \u201ca flagrant and grave violation<\/a> of the fundamental prohibition on the use of force\u201d.<\/p>\n

I do not wish to contribute yet another legal analysis of the operation. Its illegality is, as Marko Milanovic<\/a> put it, \u201cso obvious, so manifest, and so egregious, that the issue is simply not open to reasonable disagreement\u201d. Instead, I want to look at the bigger picture: Considering the current surge<\/a> in military operations with (at least) questionable legality that have sparked geopolitical debates concerning the future of the international legal order in the wake of great-power politics, I intend to focus on the broader implications of the Trump administration\u2019s stance towards international law for the international legal order.
\nIn particular, I want to counter the argument that the era of international law, if there has ever been one, is over. Such bitter and at times cynical feelings of despair are misplaced. Instead, especially when faced with aspirations of imperial domination, international law should not be abandoned but upheld.<\/p>\n

The United States Under Trump: A Rogue State
\n<\/strong>The US has broken international law before. What sets past instances apart from \u201cOperation Absolute Resolve\u201d, however, is the approach the Trump administration exhibits towards international law. As noted by Janina Dill<\/a>, whereas past US governments have at least tried to justify their actions with (albeit contorted) references to international law, the Trump administration has yet to release any statement that even comes close to resemble an international legal argument. The Trump Administration has, so far, simply framed the operation as a mere \u201claw enforcement operation<\/a>\u201d, thereby trying to deny its international dimension entirely.<\/p>\n

However, when looking at recent statements made by President Trump<\/a>, who suggested that only his own morality can constrain his global power, and the White House\u2019s Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, Stephen Miller<\/a>, who has asserted that strength, force and power are the \u201ciron laws of the world\u201d, it becomes clear that this is not merely an avoidance strategy, but rather an expression of a profound disdain for the very concept of law itself.<\/p>\n

Thus, while past US administration have (mis-)used international law to enforce their interests, the current White House is not only violating (international) law but is hostile towards the idea of law as an impartial institution of justice in general. In the Trump administration\u2019s vision of the international order, there appear to be no common goods, no community interests and no principles higher than \u201cAmerica First<\/a>\u201d (i.e. whatever Trump defines as such). Thus, the United States\u2019 announcement<\/a> to withdraw from 66 international organisations like the International Law Commission and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is only consequential<\/a>. Multilateralism with its underlying ideas<\/a> of shared interests and pooled resources have no place in such a worldview. There are only transactional arrangements in which America\u2019s interest must always come out on top: A deals-based international order.<\/p>\n

The Triumph of Realism?
\n<\/strong>Some might consider this stance to be simply honest: International politics has always been about the protection and assertion of one\u2019s interests and not about the achievement of higher ideals like justice, peace or fairness. These have only been ideological fa\u00e7ades for interest-driven policies.<\/p>\n

This so-called \u201crealist<\/a>\u201d view holds that international law is mostly epiphenomenal: The idea<\/a> that there is a \u201cmagical force known as \u2018international law\u2019 [which] will bend the arc of history toward justice\u201d is nothing but a \u201cdream\u201d. It would be absurd to think that the world\u2019s most powerful men like Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping would abide by an unenforceable \u201claw\u201d if it contravenes their core interests. In the rough arena of great-power politics, international law must bow to the sheer force of military and economic power.<\/p>\n

On the basis of this fundamental claim about the (ir-)relevance of international law, more concrete arguments against the utility of law in international politics are put forward: On one side of the political spectrum, it is sometimes argued that (the West\u2019s) double standards in the application of international legal concepts make international law a tool of domination. Whereas on the other side, it is often stated that international law protects the \u201cglobal rogues<\/a>\u201d. The US should not<\/a> wrap itself \u201cin a straitjacket of international institutions and laws\u201d as it must be able to serve its own interests.<\/p>\n

If you are not coincidentally a citizen of the most powerful nations agreeing with the latter stance, the realist vision of global politics is often paired with a feeling of resignation: The world is simply what it is. \u201cThe strong<\/a> do what they can and the weak suffer what they must\u201d.<\/p>\n

The Case for International Law
\n<\/strong>The realist challenge to international law is of course by no means novel and scholars have developed a multitude answers over the years (see for example Shirley V. Scott<\/a>\u2019s, Jan Wiegandt<\/a>\u2019s and in particular Onuma Yasuaki<\/a>\u2019s responses).
\nHowever, in light of recent global conflicts, the emergence of a \u201cmultipolar order<\/a>\u201d and the unvarnished pronouncement of imperial claims<\/a>, escaping into the embittered and sometimes cynical indifference to international law that realism offers, might be particularly tempting. Yet, it is this exact sentiment that I seek to refute. The engagement with international law is not futile. International law is practically indispensable for the functioning of international politics and can serve as catalyst for political action on the national level. Thus, even when faced with reckless displays of brute force and power, we should not resign in despair, but continue to engage with international law.<\/p>\n

While the realist position may appear persuasive at first, its underlying assertions concerning international law and its relationship with politics and power are rather superficial. Realism is underpinned by an unrealistic image of how law fulfils its societal functions as it conflates the concepts of law and state. Its assumption that the law\u2019s particular societal power stems primarily from (potentially) violent law enforcement does not even apply<\/a> to various areas of national law. Realism\u2019s fundamental fallacy is its inability to recognise that international law constitutes a legal order in which the subjects creating the law are also tasked with its \u201cenforcement\u201d. Accordingly, the interpretation, application and enforcement of international law is not primarily hierarchically organised, but mostly interactional<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Yet, realism with its focus on raw power-politics is mostly blind to the value of these interactions. But to properly understand the many roles that international law plays in politics, it is crucial to have a more accurate understanding of (international) politics.<\/p>\n

The Role of International Law for International Politics<\/strong><\/p>\n

When states act in the realm of international politics, they have to navigate a complex web of relationships, conflicting interests and interconnected issues. In this intricate political environment, states constantly legitimise<\/a> their behaviour, try to condemn the actions of others as illegitimate or justify themselves in response to such criticisms.<\/p>\n

For this dimension of international politics, international law is practically indispensable. For one, it provides global politics with a common framework and vocabulary to structure these interactions (see here<\/a> for an overview of such constructivist international relations theories). More important than this rather technical claim for international politics is, however, international law\u2019s distinct authority.<\/p>\n

This normative authority is based on the general ideas associated with the law. Law is often idealistically perceived as a practical realisation of justice and fairness, as the common rules of society that are binding upon everyone and impartially applied to all (see Onuma<\/a> and Johnstone\/Sukumar<\/a>). Importantly, it is furthermore considered to be the authoritative mode of conflict resolution due to the law\u2019s (assumed) \u201cobjectivity<\/a>\u201d. It is this impression of law as an \u201cobjective\u201d and authoritative standard of practical justice, that grants it its unique normative authority: If a state\u2019s act is convincingly portrayed as illegal, it is characterised as not only subjectively condemnable, but also \u201cobjectively\u201d illegitimate.<\/p>\n

Neither moral considerations nor political interests possess the capacity to adequately fulfil this (de-)legitimising function of law, as both are not perceived as possessing the law\u2019s specific \u201cobjective\u201d normative authority. The individual interests of one state cannot be regarded as a legitimate justification towards other states with conflicting interests. Community interests may represent a higher normative ideal that could (de-)legitimise political actions. However, the questions of which interests are to be considered common, and the manner in which they are to be achieved, are subject to political debate. Accordingly, community interests are perceived as far less \u201cobjective\u201d than the law. The same applies to moral arguments.<\/p>\n

Thus, as long as international political actors feel the need to justify their actions to their peers or criticise their actions, the language of international law will be spoken in international politics.<\/p>\n

The Importance of International Law Beyond International Politics<\/strong><\/p>\n

Moreover, international law can shape which interests states pursue. Realism often views states as monolithic entities with set, rational interests that are shaped by the constant struggle for survival in an anarchic world. But of course, what states do is decided by their governments and foreign policy is evidently influenced by domestic politics which is in turn shaped by a multitude of different actors, interests and processes.
\nThis insight reveals another dimension of how international law functions and influences politics beyond inter-state politics: International law shapes the national political landscape.<\/p>\n

Especially after being \u201cinternalised<\/a>\u201d into the national legal order, international law becomes enforceable in courts and binding upon the administration. Accordingly, strategic litigation<\/a> can bring into focus specific issues and promote international legal norms.
\nFurthermore, international law can also serve as a \u201cfocal point<\/a>\u201d for political action. One prominent example in this regard is \u201cFridays For Future\u201d, which relied heavily on the Paris Agreement to advocate for limiting global warming to 1.5\u00b0C. Similarly, another international legal argument that has provided a focal point for political mobilisation and shaped political debates is the claim that Israel commits a genocide in Gaza.<\/p>\n

The power of international law to provide a catalyst for political mobilisation is, once again, linked to the normative authority ascribed to (international) law and the associated promises of justice and fairness. International law provides a powerful vocabulary for political movements to formulate their demands in.
\nHowever, the more utopian and far-fetched these promises appear to be, the weaker international law\u2019s mobilisation potential becomes. Every uncondemned and unanswered disregard for international law undermines the political power of the violated norm. \u00a0Furthermore, realism with its claim of international law\u2019s epiphenomenal character and the underlying cynical indifference towards the law can be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy.<\/p>\n

This is exactly why it is crucial to not become numb when faced with displays of imperial power and to not succumb to a vision of the world in which normative ideals are no longer relevant because no one is moved by injustices anymore. Yet, this is the world Trump, Miller and the other architects of this administration believe in. Therefore, it is essential that states, lawyers and civil society refuse to abandon international law but continue to engage with it.<\/p>\n

Concluding Thoughts<\/strong><\/p>\n

Defending international law is sometimes belittled as naively idealistic. However, no one thinks that just believing in international law or invoking international legal arguments will magically make the world a better place. Similarly, international law is not a perfect vision for a just world but has flaws, biases and only a limited vocabulary for some issues.<\/p>\n

Nonetheless, despite these and other criticisms, international law still provides a common language to articulate criticism, demand accountability and share ideas of justice. To abandon this vocabulary, however imperfect, would mean to silently submit to a world which only knows the grammar of force, strength and power.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In the early hours of 3 January 2026, the United States launched \u201cOperation Absolute Resolve\u201d. The military attack, which reportedly cost the lives of at least 80 people, consisted of a series of airstrikes on Venezuela and the abduction of Venezuela\u2019s (at least de-facto) head of state, President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":37,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[5721,7150,7131],"authors":[6641],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-27363","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-application-of-international-law","tag-international-relations","tag-usa","authors-christopher-janz","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"Against International Law Fatalism"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20260206-152647-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27363","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/37"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27363"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27363\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27366,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27363\/revisions\/27366"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27363"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27363"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27363"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=27363"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=27363"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=27363"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}