{"id":26984,"date":"2025-12-15T08:00:21","date_gmt":"2025-12-15T07:00:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=26984"},"modified":"2026-01-12T12:37:29","modified_gmt":"2026-01-12T11:37:29","slug":"the-russian-climate-case","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/the-russian-climate-case\/","title":{"rendered":"The Russian Climate Case"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u2018The Russian climate case\u2019 (application no. 9296\/24) was filed on 31 August 2023 at the European Court of Human Rights [\u2018ECtHR\u2019 or \u2018Court\u2019] and brought before the Court by a courageous group of applicants<\/a> comprising 18 Russian citizens and 2 NGOs \u2013 among the few remaining human and environmental rights defenders prepared to challenge the current regime.<\/p>\n

Having exhausted all remedies in Russian domestic courts, the case argues climate-based violations of the European Convention on Human Rights [\u2018ECHR\u2019] under Articles 2 and 8; Article 14 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 8 impacting on Indigenous People and young people as well as a violation of Article 13 (based on the application of Russian law in domestic courts which, it is argued, deprived the applicants of an effective remedy). It also presents a powerful argument under Article 34 establishing interference by the state with the applicants\u2019 right to bring this particular case to the Court. Evidentially, it tackles a wide range of issues including Arctic permafrost melt; climate impacts upon Russia\u2019s Indigenous Peoples and high-level methane events emanating from Russian territory.<\/p>\n

Why This Case Must Be Heard<\/strong><\/p>\n

There are multiple reasons why the Russian climate case should be heard urgently by the Court:<\/p>\n

First, is the extent of Russia\u2019s contribution to the climate crisis. By way of comparison, Switzerland, the respondent state in in KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v Switzerland<\/a> [\u2018KlimaSeniorinnen\u2019] (and currently the only state against which the ECtHR has ruled in a climate case) is ranked 86th<\/sup><\/a> in the world league table of total GHG emissions per capita compared with Russia\u2019s 4th<\/sup><\/a> place. Given the criticism levelled at the Court from some quarters for \u2018targeting\u2019 Switzerland alone, scrutiny of the (then) Council of Europe\u2019s biggest GHG emitter might go some way to redressing the balance.<\/p>\n

In addition to its high ranking GHG emissions, Russia is the second biggest source of global energy-related methane<\/a> emissions. It is the world\u2019s largest exporter of fossil gas;<\/a> consistently ranked among the top three global exporters of oil<\/a>; the third largest coal<\/a> exporter and the largest gas flaring<\/a> nation. It has the world\u2019s largest gas<\/a> reserves, second largest coal<\/a> reserves and plans an increase of domestic coal production<\/a> up to at least 2035.<\/p>\n

Having signed the Paris Agreement in 2016 and accepted it into domestic law in September 2019, Russia nonetheless proceeded to increase rather than decrease its GHG emissions in the period that followed. By 2023, this amounted to an estimated 28% increase<\/a> in Russia\u2019s net GHG emissions compared with 2020.<\/p>\n

Current Russian law<\/a> and policy<\/a> continue to provide for an ongoing increase in GHG emissions right up to 2030. This stands in direct contravention to scientific consensus that GHG emissions must peak<\/a> before 2025, at the latest, and be reduced by 43% by 2030, as well as ICJ determinations of states\u2019 legally binding obligations to protect the climate system and the human rights of present and future generations. Most recently, on 6 August 2025 (less than a month after the ICJ<\/a> advisory opinion on climate change), Russia issued a new emissions decree<\/a> which provided for a further increase in Russia\u2019s emissions target until 2035 to a level of 21%<\/a> greater than its reported 2021 emissions.<\/p>\n

Second, consideration of the Russian climate case before the ECtHR would require the Court to grapple with the breadth and depth of states\u2019 legal obligations in relation to climate change as set out by landmark advisory opinions handed down by the ITLOS<\/a>; the IACtHR<\/a> and the ICJ<\/a> (all post-dating the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment). The guidance set out in those advisory opinions, must now be applied to the individual facts of those climate and human rights cases still pending before the ECtHR as a matter of urgency.<\/p>\n

Third, this case provides an important and potentially unique opportunity to consider climate harms related to the cryosphere. Approximately two-thirds of Russian territory is covered by permafrost which, if thawed, has the potential to release billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere, the consequences of which may be irreversible<\/a> within human timescales.<\/p>\n

Fourth, the applicants in this case include members of Russia\u2019s Indigenous Peoples whose voices have been marginalised. The IPCC<\/a> has been clear that many Indigenous Peoples are at greater risk of harm to health caused by climate change and predicts that future climate impacts for Indigenous communities will include increased malnutrition and a high risk of basic needs not being met due to cascading and long-term impacts of loss of ecosystems. Few other countries could provide the ECtHR with the geographical and factual matrix to address this important issue.<\/p>\n

Fifth, this case evidences the particular importance and dangers presented by methane emissions in the context of high-level methane events emanating from Russian territory as detected by the TROPOMI<\/a> satellite. It further evidences the role of methane in aggravating climate change and the urgent need for reduction<\/a> of the same \u2013 a topic which is becoming increasingly pressing in its relevance.<\/p>\n

Lastly, the case raises fundamental issues under Article 34 of the Convention in relation to the safety and well-being of applicants. Many have suffered repercussions since joining this case. Others were deterred from joining due to the personal risk involved. Since litigation commenced, both applicant NGO\u2019s [Ecodefense and Moscow Helsinki Group] have been liquidated<\/a> by the Russian courts.<\/em> One applicant has had his citizenship<\/a> and that of family members revoked since the case was brought to the domestic courts. Individual applicants (including the co-director of the NGO applicant Ecodefense) and the applicants\u2019 lawyer have been designated \u2018Foreign Agents\u2019 under Russia\u2019s Foreign Agent<\/a> Law. The totality of these acts strike at the heart of the Convention system and require urgent attention from the Court.<\/p>\n

Yet, more than two years after filing, the case appears to have stalled while the ECtHR\u2019s climate caseload<\/a> as a whole has dwindled to such an extent that only one<\/a> of the twelve cases listed on its climate change factsheet<\/a> (last updated April 2024 and which does not include the Russian climate case) remains pending before the Court.<\/p>\n

This delay appears to be at odds both with the Court\u2019s stated approach to Russian cases and its wider Priority Policy<\/a>. In October 2024, the Court\u2019s then President Marko Bo\u0161njak declared<\/a> \u201cholding the Russian Federation accountable for its human rights obligations\u201d to remain a priority concern for the ECtHR despite the country\u2019s departure from the Council of Europe in 2022. Such accountability can, of course, only relate to those cases (of which this is one) over which the Court still has temporal jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

The President stated that processing of such cases should follow two \u201ctracks\u201d. The first track was established to deal with \u201cmessage\u201d cases of \u201cmarked importance for Russia\u2019s international law responsibility under the Convention\u201d, \u201cfor example cases related to civil society activists and democratic governance\u201d. \u00a0The second deals with repetitive cases which fall under well-established case law and therefore processed in a \u201csimpler manner\u201d such as poor conditions in prisons or violations of the right to freedom of assembly.<\/p>\n

As this post argues, there can be few cases with greater importance for Russia\u2019s international law responsibility under the Convention than the Russian climate case and yet, puzzlingly, instead of becoming a \u201cmessage case\u201d, the Russian climate case has languished without communication<\/a> for more than two years.<\/p>\n

Temporal Jurisdiction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Although Russia ceased to be a party<\/a> to the ECHR on 16 September 2022, this case remains within the Court\u2019s temporal jurisdiction. This is because the climate acts and omissions upon which it is based not only precede the state\u2019s departure from the Convention, they also have continuous effect after that date.<\/em><\/p>\n

Long-standing policies culminating in the Presidential Decree<\/a> of 4 November 2020 \u201cOn Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions<\/em>\u201d; and the \u2018Low Greenhouse Gas Emissions <\/em>Strategy<\/em><\/a>\u2019 <\/em>of 29 October 2020, committed the Russian Federation to an emissions trajectory which has continuous effect to 2050 (and beyond in terms of its long-term impact on the planet). It is on this basis that Russia\u2019s climate actions and omissions in advance of its departure from the Convention put in place a course of continuous effect which keeps it within the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.<\/p>\n

Note by way of comparison, the example of \u2018continuous\u2019 effect provided by the Court in Pivkina and Others v Russia<\/a> where the Court held that \u201ca period of detention approved before the termination date but extending beyond it will fall within the Court\u2019s temporal jurisdiction in its entirety on account of the \u201ccontinuous\u201d effect of the detention order\u201d (\u00a761).<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the Court\u2019s wider rationale as expressed in Pivkina<\/em> is particularly relevant to consideration of this case, noting that:<\/p>\n

\u201cin cases where the interference occurs before the termination date but the failure to remedy it occurs after the termination date, it is the date of the interference that must be retained for determining the Court\u2019s temporal jurisdiction. This avoids a situation where a State might evade its responsibility for the wrongs or damage caused while the Convention was in effect, prior to its termination\u201d<\/em> (\u00a753).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

What is the Point in Obtaining a Judgment Against Russia?<\/strong><\/p>\n

It is regularly contended (particularly since 2022) that there is little point in litigating against Russia when it is known that the state will not observe Court judgments. This attitude fundamentally misunderstands the importance of both the Convention and the rule of law, particularly in states where both are devalued.<\/p>\n

A ruling from the ECtHR in this case would provide the first independent and legally binding judgment on Russia\u2019s violations in relation to the climate crisis. Given Russia\u2019s exit from the Council of Europe and the increasingly repressive environment for civil society, it would also most likely present the last opportunity \u2013 at least for the foreseeable future \u2013 for an objective and independent court to scrutinise Russia\u2019s grave climate system violations against international standards and set out clear remedies.<\/p>\n

Russia, remains bound by its obligations<\/a> under the Convention, including the obligation to implement judgments of the Court. The Committee of Ministers (which continues to supervise Russia\u2019s execution of judgments) has already recognised that creative measures are necessary to ensure that Russia\u2019s legal obligations emanating from ECtHR judgments remain visible and usable by other international institutions. For example, by referring to cooperation<\/a> with United Nations bodies as a potential means of achieving compliance with ECtHR obligations. An ECtHR judgment could be a powerful tool on the international stage not just legally but for use in diplomatic talks or advocacy work. In the words<\/a> of one of the applicants: \u201cWe can point to it and use it in our advocacy work – either in a future, better Russia, or on the international stage: at the UN and in trade talks \u2013 wherever Russia is still present. We want to make the truth harder to ignore.\u201d<\/p>\n

Russia is not alone in disregarding judgements of the ECtHR, whether in the short or long-term. In June 2024, the Swiss parliament voted to reject<\/a> the Court\u2019s landmark ruling in KlimaSeniorinnen. Similar examples can be found across a range of countries and issues. Yet even a fundamental understanding of the rule of law makes clear that such defiance cannot justify judicial restraint. On the contrary, states\u2019 refusal to comply with ECtHR rulings must never serve as an argument to shield them from further legal scrutiny. To do so would reward non-compliance and undermine the very foundation of human rights accountability.<\/p>\n

If the ECtHR continues to ignore the Russian climate case, it would not be the first time that the Court has failed<\/a> Russian civil society by delaying meaningful action until it was too late to prevent irreversible harm. The first \u2018Foreign Agent\u2019 law judgmen<\/a>t against Russia came an astonishing 10 years after it had been filed with the Court. Although the applicants were ultimately successful, the decimation of Russian civil society had already been set in stone by the time of judgment. The same mistake must not be made again. As noted by Greenpeace<\/a>: Russia\u2019s impact on the global climate change response is so great that \u201cwithout Russia\u2019s participation, meaningful progress towards solving global environmental problems and the climate and biodiversity crises will be impossible\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n

In accordance with the Court\u2019s own policies, for the sake of the planet, and to advance protection of the rights, lives and livelihoods of present and future generations, the Russian climate case should be heard as a matter of urgency.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u2018The Russian climate case\u2019 (application no. 9296\/24) was filed on 31 August 2023 at the European Court of Human Rights [\u2018ECtHR\u2019 or \u2018Court\u2019] and brought before the Court by a courageous group of applicants comprising 18 Russian citizens and 2 NGOs \u2013 among the few remaining human and environmental rights defenders prepared to challenge the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":37,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[7829,4758,3597],"authors":[7872],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-26984","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-climate-justice","tag-indigenous-peoples","tag-russia","authors-joanna-evans","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"A Crucial Test for the European Court of Human Rights"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20251215-171644-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26984","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/37"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=26984"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26984\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27155,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26984\/revisions\/27155"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=26984"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=26984"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=26984"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=26984"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=26984"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=26984"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}