{"id":26912,"date":"2025-12-08T08:00:19","date_gmt":"2025-12-08T07:00:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/?p=26912"},"modified":"2025-12-09T18:18:46","modified_gmt":"2025-12-09T17:18:46","slug":"how-itlos-won-the-battle-for-advisory-jurisdiction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/how-itlos-won-the-battle-for-advisory-jurisdiction\/","title":{"rendered":"How ITLOS Won the Battle for Advisory Jurisdiction"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A decade ago, in 2015, ITLOS delivered its first-ever advisory opinion as a <em>full<\/em> tribunal in the Request for an Advisory Opinion <a href=\"https:\/\/www.itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/case_no.21\/advisory_opinion_published\/2015_21-advop-E.pdf\">submitted<\/a> by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC). By asserting advisory jurisdiction under Article 21 of its Statute, the Tribunal sparked controversy, with many <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/leiden-journal-of-international-law\/article\/abs\/advisory-jurisdiction-of-the-international-tribunal-for-the-law-of-the-sea-comments-on-the-request-for-an-advisory-opinion-submitted-by-the-subregional-fisheries-commission\/8BCEAA8EEFECA4EC96499EF15A31F621\">scholars<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/case_no.21\/written_statements_round1\/C21_Response_Round_1_Portugal.pdf\">states<\/a> arguing that UNCLOS never intended to confer such jurisdiction. Since then, ITLOS has issued another advisory opinion, in 2024, in the Request for an Advisory Opinion <a href=\"https:\/\/www.itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/Advisory_Opinion\/C31_Adv_Op_21.05.2024_corr.pdf\">submitted<\/a> by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law. This time, criticism was muted: only <a href=\"https:\/\/www.itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/written_statements\/1\/C31-WS-1-8-China__transmission_ltr._.pdf\">China<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/written_statements\/1\/C31-WS-1-18-Brazil_01.pdf\">Brazil<\/a> objected, while countries that had previously opposed it, such as the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/written_statements\/1\/C31-WS-1-27-UK.pdf\">UK<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/written_statements\/1\/C31-WS-1-19-France_translation_ITLOS.pdf\">France<\/a>, acknowledged the Tribunal\u2019s jurisdiction, with France noting in its submissions that \u201c&#8230;the Tribunal\u2019s advisory jurisdiction now seems to be accepted\u201d (para. 9).<\/p>\n<p>A decade later, in light of recent developments, including Brazil and China\u2019s June pledges at the Third UN Ocean Conference to ratify the BBNJ Agreement, which explicitly grants ITLOS full advisory jurisdiction and is set to <a href=\"https:\/\/press.un.org\/en\/2025\/l3306.doc.htm\">enter into force<\/a> in January 2026, it is timely to revisit the Tribunal\u2019s advisory competence. France\u2019s statement signals a pivotal moment, suggesting that ITLOS\u2019s advisory jurisdiction has been consolidated through subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(b) of VCLT. This post is structured as follows: First, an overview of UNCLOS provisions on advisory jurisdiction; second, a discussion of the debate surrounding ITLOS\u2019s 2015 advisory opinion; third, an assessment of the Tribunal\u2019s advisory jurisdiction a decade later in light of objections by China and Brazil; and fourth, an examination of how the silence of many States bears on that jurisdiction.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Silence of UNCLOS on Advisory Jurisdiction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>As ITLOS itself acknowledged in 2015, \u201c[n]either the Convention nor the Statute makes explicit reference to the advisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/case_no.21\/advisory_opinion_published\/2015_21-advop-E.pdf\">Advisory Opinion of 2 April 2015<\/a>, para. 53). Here, advisory jurisdiction refers to that of the <em>full<\/em> Tribunal, not the Seabed Disputes Chamber\u2019s limited Article 191 jurisdiction, which is confined to matters of the Area. The main jurisdictional provision of UNCLOS, Article 288(1)-(2), refers only to \u201cdisputes,\u201d which suggests that the courts and tribunals established under Article 287 were intended to exercise jurisdiction solely in contentious proceedings:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u201cA court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over any <em>dispute<\/em> concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes of this Convention, which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement.\u201d (emphasis added)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute (Annex VI to UNCLOS) goes a step further. It provides jurisdiction over: a) \u201cdisputes,\u201d which clearly covers contentious cases; b) \u201capplications,\u201d which concern requests for prompt release of vessels and crews or for provisional measures (<a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/case_no.21\/advisory_opinion_published\/2015_21-advop-E.pdf\">Advisory Opinion of 2 April 2015<\/a>, para. 55); and c) \u201cmatters,\u201d the term that lies at the heart of the debate on ITLOS\u2019s advisory jurisdiction:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u201cThe jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all <em>disputes<\/em> and all <em>applications<\/em> submitted to it in accordance with this Convention and all <em>matters<\/em> specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.\u201d (emphasis added)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Unlike these provisions, Article 138 of Rules of the Tribunal, adopted in 1997 under Article 16 of UNCLOS and amended twice since, expressly provides for advisory jurisdiction:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u201cThe Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Yet, because procedural rules cannot expand the Tribunal\u2019s jurisdiction beyond what UNCLOS and its Annexes permit, the legal basis for ITLOS\u2019s advisory jurisdiction could ultimately rest only on Article 288 of the Convention and Article 21 of the Statute.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Controversy over ITLOS\u2019s Advisory Jurisdiction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Tribunal held that although Article 288 of UNCLOS refers only to \u201cdisputes,\u201d ITLOS nonetheless possesses advisory jurisdiction on the basis of Article 21 of its Statute, since \u201c\u2026the Statute enjoys the same status as the Convention\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/case_no.21\/advisory_opinion_published\/2015_21-advop-E.pdf\">Advisory Opinion of 2 April 2015<\/a>, para. 52). The Tribunal held that \u201cmatters\u201d in Article 21 must extend beyond \u201cdisputes,\u201d otherwise the text would have used the same term (para. 56). It therefore interpreted \u201cmatters\u201d to include advisory jurisdiction when expressly conferred by \u201cany other agreement\u201d under Article 21 (paras. 56\u201358). Regarding Article 138 of the Rules, the Tribunal clarified that it does not itself create advisory jurisdiction but merely \u201cfurnishes the prerequisites\u201d for its exercise (para. 59).<\/p>\n<p>Scholars and states raised two principal objections to the Tribunal\u2019s reasoning. First, Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute merely mirrors Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, which was never intended as a legal basis for advisory jurisdiction but only for contentious jurisdiction (cf. <a href=\"https:\/\/referenceworks.brill.com\/display\/entries\/LOSO\/LAOS_9789024737192_329-418.xml\">Virginia Commentary, vol. V<\/a>, p. 378; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/leiden-journal-of-international-law\/article\/abs\/advisory-jurisdiction-of-the-international-tribunal-for-the-law-of-the-sea-comments-on-the-request-for-an-advisory-opinion-submitted-by-the-subregional-fisheries-commission\/8BCEAA8EEFECA4EC96499EF15A31F621\">Lando<\/a>, p. 451; <a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/case_no.21\/written_statements_round1\/C21_Response_Round_1_Portugal.pdf\">Written Statement of Portugal<\/a>, para. 10). Second, Articles 21 of the ITLOS Statute and 288 of UNCLOS must be read consistently (<a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/case_no.21\/written_statements_round1\/C21_Response_Round_1_UK.pdf\">Written Statement of the UK<\/a>, para. 22; <a href=\"https:\/\/brill.com\/view\/journals\/lape\/14\/2\/article-p318_5.xml\">Tanaka<\/a>, 327). Since Article 288 cannot reasonably be construed as conferring advisory jurisdiction, it is implausible that Article 21 was intended to establish a broader jurisdictional basis than that provided by Article 288. Perhaps a \u201csubsequent practice\u201d argument interpreting Article 21 was unavailable to the Tribunal in 2015. Of 22 written statements, only 10 supported (implicitly or explicitly) its advisory jurisdiction, 7 opposed and 3 were unclear. With only half in favor, there was plainly no agreement, making it impossible to invoke \u201csubsequent practice\u201d to assert jurisdiction.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-26913\" src=\"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/Saba-bild.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"312\" height=\"235\" srcset=\"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/Saba-bild.png 400w, https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/Saba-bild-375x283.png 375w, https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/Saba-bild-150x113.png 150w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 312px) 100vw, 312px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Current Standing of ITLOS\u2019s Advisory Jurisdiction: Making Sense of Objections<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT provides that treaty interpretation must consider, alongside the ordinary meaning and the object and purpose, \u201cany subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.\u201d Subsequent practice is an authentic means of treaty interpretation and carries equal weight to the other means under Article 31 (<a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/commentaries\/1_11_2018.pdf\">Commentary to Draft Conclusion 3<\/a>, pp. 23-27). The number of states actively engaging in the practice may vary and silence by one or more parties can amount to acceptance, where \u201cthe circumstances would reasonably call for some action\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/draft_articles\/1_11_2018.pdf\">Draft Conclusions 5, 10<\/a>). Scholars generally agreed after 2015 that the interpretative tools available left the meaning of Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute ambiguous (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/leiden-journal-of-international-law\/article\/abs\/advisory-jurisdiction-of-the-international-tribunal-for-the-law-of-the-sea-comments-on-the-request-for-an-advisory-opinion-submitted-by-the-subregional-fisheries-commission\/8BCEAA8EEFECA4EC96499EF15A31F621\">Lando<\/a>, p. 450; <a href=\"https:\/\/brill.com\/view\/journals\/lape\/14\/2\/article-p318_5.xml\">Tanaka<\/a>, p. 326). The question, then, is whether subsequent practice can now help clarify that meaning in light of more recent developments.<\/p>\n<p>In 2024, during the climate change advisory opinion, 26 out of the 31 states that submitted written observations either explicitly or implicitly accepted the Tribunal\u2019s jurisdiction, including states that had previously opposed it, such as <a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/written_statements\/1\/C31-WS-1-19-France_translation_ITLOS.pdf\">France<\/a> and the <a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/written_statements\/1\/C31-WS-1-27-UK.pdf\">UK<\/a>. Only two states, China and Brazil, maintained their objections, while two others, Japan and Australia, adopted a more cautious approach, framing their remarks on the Tribunal\u2019s advisory jurisdiction as questions for the Tribunal to clarify (<a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/written_statements\/1\/C31-WS-1-4-Japan_01.PDF\">Written Statement of Japan<\/a>, pp. 1-2; <a href=\"https:\/\/itlos.org\/fileadmin\/itlos\/documents\/cases\/31\/written_statements\/1\/C31-WS-1-11-Australia.PDF\">Written Statement of Australia<\/a>, paras. 4, 16). In short, roughly 87% of participating states endorsed ITLOS\u2019s advisory jurisdiction, with only China and Brazil in opposition. The evolution of state practice over the span of nine years is striking: by 2024, the Tribunal\u2019s jurisdiction was being increasingly accepted as \u201csubsequent practice.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-26914\" src=\"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/Saba-Bild-2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"287\" height=\"242\" srcset=\"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/Saba-Bild-2.png 326w, https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/Saba-Bild-2-150x127.png 150w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 287px) 100vw, 287px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>However, \u201cagreement\u201d on the interpretation under Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT must be established among <em>all<\/em> parties, unlike Article 32, which applies to subsequent practice reflecting only some parties\u2019 views (<a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/commentaries\/1_11_2018.pdf\">Commentary to Draft Conclusion 2<\/a>, p. 20). Thus, unless China and Brazil have also accepted the practice, no \u201cagreement\u201d under Article 31(3)(b) exists. That said, after China and Brazil submitted their written statements in June 2023, a notable development occurred: in September 2023, both states signed the BBNJ Agreement, whose Article 46(7) provides:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\u201cThe <em>Conference of the Parties<\/em> may decide to request the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to give an <em>advisory opinion<\/em> on <em>a legal question<\/em> on the conformity with <em>this Agreement<\/em> of a proposal before the Conference of the Parties on any matter within its competence.\u201d (emphasis added)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The provision essentially mirrors the three requirements in Article 138 of the Rules: a duly authorized \u201cbody\u201d may request an advisory opinion on a \u201clegal question,\u201d depending on the \u201cother agreement.\u201d By signing the BBNJ Agreement, China and Brazil have, in principle, accepted the Tribunal\u2019s approach to \u201cmatters\u201d under Article 21. At the Third UN Ocean Conference in Nice (June 2025), both states further pledged to ratify the Agreement, reinforcing their practical endorsement of ITLOS\u2019s advisory jurisdiction (see <a href=\"https:\/\/agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br\/en\/meio-ambiente\/noticia\/2025-06\/brazil-ratify-high-seas-treaty-years-end-lula-says\">here<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/press\/68082\/greenpeace-east-asia-reaction-to-chinas-un-ocean-conference-statement-on-actively-pursuing-national-ratification-process\">here<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Current Standing of ITLOS\u2019s Advisory Jurisdiction: Silence as Acceptance<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The next question concerns how to interpret the silence of states that neither objected to nor endorsed the Tribunal\u2019s advisory jurisdiction. The ILC notes that the phrase \u201call parties\u201d was deliberately omitted from Article 31(3)(b) VCLT to avoid requiring every party to participate in subsequent practice. (<a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/publications\/yearbooks\/english\/ilc_1966_v2.pdf\">Yearbook of the ILC<\/a>, p. 222; <a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/draft_articles\/1_11_2018.pdf\">Draft Conclusions 5, 10<\/a>). Still, treating silence as agreement sets a high bar and depends on context: the state must be aware of the practice, have every opportunity to react, and fail to do so (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/sites\/default\/files\/case-related\/70\/070-19841126-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf\">Military and Paramilitary Activities<\/a>, para. 38; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wto.org\/english\/tratop_e\/dispu_e\/269_286abr_e.pdf\">EC-Computer Equipment<\/a>, para. 272; <a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/commentaries\/1_11_2018.pdf\">Draft conclusions with commentary<\/a>, p. 79). The ICJ likewise applies a context-specific approach. In boundary disputes, it sets a stringent threshold, presuming legal title and requiring any claim of acquiescence to start from that presumption (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/sites\/default\/files\/case-related\/94\/094-20021010-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf\">Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria<\/a>, paras. 64, 67; <a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/commentaries\/1_11_2018.pdf\">Draft conclusions with commentary<\/a>, p. 80). By contrast, when dealing with the practice of international organizations, the Court has shown a greater willingness to infer member-state consent. Several authors have identified this pattern (<a href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684818\">Arato<\/a>, 2010, p. 460; <a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/book\/4230\/chapter-abstract\/146065067?redirectedFrom=fulltext\">Buga<\/a>, 2018, p. 67), which I refer to here as \u201ccollective acquiescence.\u201d In this context, states may be taken to accept an organization\u2019s consistent practice unless they object, given the public and official nature of that practice, which affords them \u201cevery opportunity of accepting or rejecting\u201d it (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/sites\/default\/files\/case-related\/70\/070-19841126-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf\">Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua<\/a>, para. 38).<\/p>\n<p>In <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/sites\/default\/files\/case-related\/70\/070-19841126-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf\"><em>Nicaragua<\/em><\/a>, the Court treated official publications, such as the <em>ICJ Yearbook<\/em>, as evidence of subsequent State practice, thereby concluding that Nicaragua\u2019s acceptance of PCIJ jurisdiction remained valid under Article 36(5) and could be invoked against any State with a declaration under Article 36(2), including the US. In the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/sites\/default\/files\/case-related\/53\/053-19710621-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf\"><em>Namibia Advisory Opinion<\/em><\/a>, the Court relied on Security Council practice to interpret Article 27(3), holding that the resolution on Namibia was valid despite two permanent members\u2019 abstentions, which did not negate the required \u201cconcurring votes.\u201d In the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/sites\/default\/files\/case-related\/49\/049-19620720-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf\"><em>Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion<\/em><\/a>, the General Assembly\u2019s practice, particularly its adoption of resolutions, was central to interpreting \u201cexpenses of the Organization\u201d under Article 17(2) of the UN Charter. Throughout, the Court looked to <em>collective<\/em> practice, often foregrounding the voting outcome of the organ rather than the views of individual members.<\/p>\n<p>The subsequent practice relating to ITLOS\u2019s advisory jurisdiction exhibits similar characteristics. The advisory jurisdiction of the full Tribunal has been consistently referenced, particularly with regard to Article 138 of the Rules, in <a href=\"https:\/\/brill.com\/display\/serial\/ITLO\"><em>ITLOS Yearbooks<\/em><\/a> since 1997 under the headings \u201cJurisdiction\u201d or \u201cCompetence.\u201d The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.itlos.org\/en\/main\/publications\/\"><em>Basic Texts<\/em><\/a> volumes published in 1998, 2005, and 2015 likewise include the Rules. Furthermore, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.itlos.org\/en\/main\/jurisdiction\/guide-to-proceedings\/\"><em>Guide<\/em><\/a><em> to Proceedings before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea<\/em>, published and periodically updated by the Tribunal, provides guidance on the advisory jurisdiction of the <em>full<\/em> Tribunal as provided for in any international agreement.<\/p>\n<p>Reports of the Meetings of States Parties indicate that the issue is seldom addressed: While some States note that the Statute lacks an express grant of advisory jurisdiction beyond the Seabed Disputes Chamber, they also accept that other agreements may confer it, effectively endorsing ITLOS\u2019s approach. (<a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/SPLOS\/184\">Twenty-third Meeting<\/a>, para. 21; <a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/SPLOS\/287\">Twenty-fifth Meeting<\/a>, para. 23; <a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/SPLOS\/303\">Twenty-sixth Meeting<\/a>, para. 25). Delegations have responded positively to the Tribunal\u2019s advisory proceedings on climate change, and the reports record no negative views regarding its advisory jurisdiction (<a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/SPLOS\/34\/12\">Thirty-fourth Meeting<\/a>, para. 15; <a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/SPLOS\/35\/11\">Thirty-fifth Meeting<\/a>, para. 12). Likewise, the President\u2019s consistent welcome of the conferral of advisory jurisdiction in the then-pending BBNJ Agreement met with no objections (<a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/SPLOS\/32\/15\">Thirty-second Meeting<\/a>, para. 17; <a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/SPLOS\/33\/15\">Thirty-third Meeting<\/a>, para. 19).<\/p>\n<p>Additionally, ITLOS\u2019s practice over the past decade, reflected in two advisory proceedings (2013\u20132015 and 2022\u20132024), marks a significant development under UNCLOS. Silence in response, given the institutional practice noted above, can only reasonably be read as acceptance. This is reinforced by the fact that roughly 75% of UNCLOS parties have signed the BBNJ Agreement, which presupposes ITLOS\u2019s advisory jurisdiction and will <a href=\"https:\/\/press.un.org\/en\/2025\/l3306.doc.htm\">enter into force<\/a> in January 2026. Taken together, these developments make continued silence increasingly difficult to interpret as anything other than acceptance.<\/p>\n<p>To translate France\u2019s remark that the Tribunal\u2019s advisory jurisdiction now seems accepted into legal terms: ITLOS\u2019s advisory jurisdiction now appears firmly established as subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of VCLT. What began as a bold step, the Tribunal asserting advisory jurisdiction in its Rules despite the absence of any explicit reference in UNCLOS, and then exercising it in 2015 amid fierce criticism, now seems to have culminated in success. A decade on, ITLOS appears to have won a hard-fought battle for its advisory jurisdiction.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A decade ago, in 2015, ITLOS delivered its first-ever advisory opinion as a full tribunal in the Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC). By asserting advisory jurisdiction under Article 21 of its Statute, the Tribunal sparked controversy, with many scholars and states arguing that UNCLOS never intended to confer [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":37,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[7867,7459,3888],"authors":[7868],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-26912","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-advisory-jurisdiction","tag-itlos","tag-law-of-the-sea","authors-saba-ishkhnelidze","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":""},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20251208-171649-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26912","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/37"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=26912"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26912\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":26927,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26912\/revisions\/26927"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=26912"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=26912"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=26912"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=26912"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=26912"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=26912"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}