{"id":26527,"date":"2025-11-04T08:00:38","date_gmt":"2025-11-04T07:00:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=26527"},"modified":"2025-11-04T15:43:48","modified_gmt":"2025-11-04T14:43:48","slug":"a-new-occupation-of-palestine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/a-new-occupation-of-palestine\/","title":{"rendered":"A New Occupation of Palestine"},"content":{"rendered":"

With President Trump declaring the end of the war in Gaza, and Hamas and Israel agreeing on the \u2018first phase\u2019<\/a> of a US-brokered peace deal, what comes next for Palestine is still uncertain. Nonetheless, it can be safely presumed that subsequent phases would involve the realisation of Trump\u2019s plans<\/a> for transitional governance (TG) under the \u201cBoard of Peace\u201d headed by himself and Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Point 9 of Trump\u2019s 20-point plan<\/a> for Gaza, which sets out his vision for TG, is extracted below:<\/p>\n

\n

\u201cGaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the “Board of Peace,” which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of state to be announced, including Former Prime Minister Tony Blair. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform programme, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump\u2019s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Celebration of a halt in hostilities brokered by Trump must not distract from the dangerous imperialism and disregard for international law that this transitional plan demonstrates. Seidl<\/a> recently wrote that it reflects a \u201cregressive retreat\u201d from post-liberal peacebuilding. Echoing this criticism, we offer a different critical legal theoretical assessment of Trump\u2019s plan, focusing specifically on Point 9. We argue that this plan is fundamentally neo-imperialist and at odds with the rules of international law that govern transitional periods. To that end, we first briefly introduce the framework of this body of law and its foundational principles of self-determination and inclusivity. We then undertake a critical theoretical analysis of Point 9 to demonstrate its neo-imperialist logic and affront to these foundational principles. Moving from an abstract to a specific assessment, we then demonstrate how Trump\u2019s transitional plan violates two specific rules of international law governing transitional periods: those prescribing limitations ratione materiae <\/em>on the scope of transitional governance, and those prohibiting the role of external actors.<\/p>\n

The International Law on Transitional Arrangements and Self-Determination<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Some commentators have argued that transitional periods exist in a regulatory void since they reflect a period of interruption in the normal operation of international law (see here<\/a> at pp. 38 and 65). This claim, however, reflects a mischaracterisation of the functioning of international law. International law often encounters situations where its normal operation is interrupted. This does not, however, mean that such situations exist in regulatory voids; it only means that the general set of rules is replaced by a set of rules specific to that situation. For example, during armed conflict, many general rules of international law (such as rules prohibiting lethal targeting) are modified or replaced by international humanitarian law (see here<\/a> and here<\/a>). In transitional periods, therefore, though the normal operation of international law may be suspended, some <\/em>special body of rules would nonetheless govern transitional arrangements.<\/p>\n

Through an extensive analysis of state practice on transitional arrangements, Emmanuel De Groof<\/a> has characterised this special body of rules as the \u2018jus in interregno<\/em>\u2019. This body of rules thus refers to the lex specialis <\/em>of transitional governance. The internal ideological throughline running across all rules of the jus in interregno<\/em> is the primacy of inclusion and self-determination such that these rules essentially add \u201cspecificity to the principle of self-determination\u201d (De Groof, p. 193). Therefore, any transitional arrangement must take these principles as the starting point. To the contrary, Point 9 of Trump\u2019s plan fundamentally affronts these foundations of the jus in interregno<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The Neo-Imperialist Logic of the Transitional Arrangement<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

The imperialist logic of Point 9 is evident at once by reference to its text. Words such as \u2018technocratic\u2019 and \u2018apolitical\u2019 project an image of neutral, rational governance to the obscuration of the profoundly political act of displacing Palestinian sovereignty. For example, the language of \u2018technocracy\u2019\u2014governance by \u201cqualified Palestinians and international experts\u201d\u2014transforms political questions of legitimacy and justice into managerial problems of efficiency to the exclusion of the political aspirations and self-determination of real Palestinians affected by the war and historical conflict. This reflects a translation of contested histories and political conflicts into technocratic projects of institutional design and capacity-building. \u2018Technocracy\u2019 thus works to effectively deny much of the colonial and apartheidist history of Palestine<\/a>. This is a recurring motif and hallmark of imperialist TG. As Vasuki Nesiah<\/a> notes, in TG there is a \u201crelationship between the denial of colonialism, and its replication\u201d (p. 140). Therefore, by recasting occupation, dispossession, and genocide as technical issues solvable by expert oversight, Point 9 naturalizes external control and entrenches a new form of imperialism in Palestine.<\/p>\n

The juxtaposition of \u201cqualified Palestinians\u201d and \u201cinternational experts\u201d is also one that encodes an imperialist hierarchy. Palestinian participation is permitted only through the filter of \u201cqualification\u201d as defined by foreign interests. This, along with reference to \u2018supervision\u2019 of Palestinian people by a foreign board, echoes the colonial paternalism<\/a> that often finds itself in conversations about the Global South, where non-Western states are portrayed as needing Western mentoring before they can exercise full sovereignty.<\/p>\n

The syntax of Point 9 also enacts the kind of subordination that is reminiscent of imperial control. Point 9 posits that Gaza \u201cwill be governed under\u201d a committee \u201cwith oversight and supervision by\u201d a foreign board. Such language explicitly serves to subordinate the Palestinians to an entirely foreign authority \u2013 an idea entirely at odds with and in denial of the principle of self-determination.<\/p>\n

Nesiah\u2019s observation that TG regimes may revive colonial forms of international authority under the language of global management and humanitarianism is particularly prescient here (Nesiah, 145). By formalizing subordination through institutional architecture and managerial \u2018oversight\u2019, the \u201cBoard of Peace\u201d does exactly this. As the entity that will \u201cset the framework and handle the funding,\u201d it reconfigures Gaza\u2019s future as an international project managed by representatives of former imperial capitals. This reflects a linguistic and political logic of an international body of economically and financially \u2018sophisticated\u2019 States overseeing a supposedly unready people until it meets Western benchmarks of development. The Board\u2019s authority to determine funding and redevelopment ensures that the political economy is directed solely by external actors. Thus, Point 9 embeds a permanent political economy of dependency<\/a> beneath an illusion of temporary assistance and guidance.<\/p>\n

The promise to \u201ccreate modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment\u201d further reveals how neoliberal logics are sewn directly into this neo-imperial vision. The invocation of \u201cmodern\u201d and \u201cefficient\u201d governance frames market rationality as the universal metric of progress, which converts sovereignty into an investment opportunity. Palestine\u2019s political autonomy thus risks subordination to international investor confidence.<\/p>\n

Thus, Point 9 of the peace deal\u2019s text, structure, and logic is a technology and construction of imperialist domination. The Palestinians appear only as beneficiaries of governance, never as the authors of it. As such, Point 9 not only ignores principles of self-determination and inclusivity but also actively works to defeat them. The cumulative result is a neo-imperial legal order that reproduces, through the expressions of expertise and supervision, the same imperial relations that have always been in place.<\/p>\n

The neo-imperial logic of Point 9 thus violates the foundations of the jus in interregno<\/em>. Testing Point 9 against specific rules of the jus in interregno<\/em> further reveals that Trump\u2019s plans are also unlawful under international law.<\/p>\n

The Transitional Arrangement\u2019s Violations of Restrictions Ratione Materiae <\/em>and Prohibitions on External Influence<\/strong><\/p>\n

De Groof identifies two sets of rules under the jus in interregno<\/em>. The first set of rules consists of limits ratione temporis <\/em>and ratione materiae <\/em>to the TG (p. 199). This means that the existence of the TG must be temporary, and that the scope of its work must be strictly transitional in nature. Though Point 9 notes the \u2018temporary\u2019 nature of the TG, the scope of its powers is undoubtedly overbroad.<\/p>\n

De Groof finds that, in relation to limitations ratione materiae<\/em>, the scope of work of a transitional authority is restricted to \u201c[preparing] for the future without entrenching it\u201d (p. 218). In concrete legal terms, this means that the TG must not make decisions effectuating permanent change. Trump\u2019s Point 9, however, does exactly that. As we have already argued, Point 9 entrenches economic dependency and commits Gaza to an economic future to be determined by a Board of Peace contemplated to be dominated by foreign heads of State to the exclusion of meaningful Palestinian representation. Such entrenchment consequently violates TG\u2019s ratione materiae <\/em>limitations, especially considering that \u201cfundamental state transformation choices\u201d which involve \u201csubstantive decision-making\u201d such as long-term investment decisions are beyond the scope of transitional work (De Groof, p. 270). The mandate of controlling economic development and making investment decisions also means that the transitional authority is empowered to enter into politico-economic alliances and treaties. This would also breach rationae materiae <\/em>restrictions since \u201cthe power to conclude political or alliance treaties is arguably limited during the interregnum\u201d (De Groof, p. 270).<\/p>\n

These violations of the ratione materiae <\/em>restrictions are compounded and exacerbated when considering Point 9\u2019s constitution of the \u201cBoard of Peace\u201d as the transitional authority. It is unclear whether Point 9 contemplates any Palestinian representation on this board. The explicit mention of Palestinian representation on the \u2018apolitical Palestinian committee,\u2019 contrasted against the absence of any such contemplation and explicit reference to foreign heads in relation to the board is, however, indicative of the lack of any meaningful Palestinian representation on this board, if at all. We have already demonstrated how this neo-imperialist setup deeply affronts the principles of inclusivity and self-determination in the transitional process in the abstract. A transitional authority constituted as such also specifically violates the second set of rules of the jus in interregno<\/em>.<\/p>\n

As a starting point, all external actors must respect ratione materiae <\/em>restrictions discussed above. Therefore, external actors are also bound by the first set of rules restricting the scope of TG. This means that \u201c[e]xternal actors are barred from influencing TG with a view to leaving a definitive imprint on the post-transition stage\u201d (De Groof, p. 296). As we already explained, the transitional authority\u2019s economic mandate would inevitably lead to a definitive imprint on Gaza\u2019s economic future. But even if the proposal is amended to limit or decentralise economic and development-related decisions, the \u201cBoard of Peace\u201d is nonetheless stillborn. The second set of rules identified by De Groof \u2013 limiting the role of external actors \u2013 includes the \u201cprohibition on externally imposing transitional governance\u201d (p. 286) even if such imposition is consensual. This means that external actors are limited to only providing \u2018assistance\u2019 to TG and cannot create or be the transitional authority itself, even with consent, since this would be incompatible with the principle of self-determination. The \u201cBoard of Peace\u201d then undeniably breaches this prohibition, for it is a transitional authority chaired and dominated by external actors and foreign heads of states. As such, the entire form and locus of external intervention envisaged under Point 9 violates the jus in interregno<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s 20 Points, and particularly Point 9, must thus not be accepted as the framework for peace in Palestine, as they represent an opportunistic neo-imperialist conquest laundered as institutional peacebuilding. Any meaningful conception of \u2018peace\u2019 anywhere must commit itself to the rules of international law and its promise of self-determination; and Palestine is no exception. Therefore, though Trump\u2019s deal may have ended a devastating humanitarian crisis, it must be acknowledged and rejected for what it is: a neo-imperialist fantasy unlawful under international law.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

With President Trump declaring the end of the war in Gaza, and Hamas and Israel agreeing on the \u2018first phase\u2019 of a US-brokered peace deal, what comes next for Palestine is still uncertain. Nonetheless, it can be safely presumed that subsequent phases would involve the realisation of Trump\u2019s plans for transitional governance (TG) under the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":37,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[3811,4771,7768],"authors":[7766,7767],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-26527","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-palestine","tag-self-determination","tag-transitional-governance","authors-samiksha-mukherjee","authors-sanmay-moitra","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"The Legal Argument Against Trump\u2019s Neo-Imperialist Transitional Plan"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20251104-141510-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26527","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/37"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=26527"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26527\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":26530,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26527\/revisions\/26530"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=26527"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=26527"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=26527"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=26527"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=26527"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=26527"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}