{"id":24266,"date":"2025-03-05T14:00:16","date_gmt":"2025-03-05T13:00:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=24266"},"modified":"2025-03-06T19:11:46","modified_gmt":"2025-03-06T18:11:46","slug":"gender-climate-and-the-illusion-of-neutrality","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/gender-climate-and-the-illusion-of-neutrality\/","title":{"rendered":"Gender, Climate, and the Illusion of Neutrality"},"content":{"rendered":"

This blog post examines the stance of the European Court of Human Rights (\u2018ECtHR\u2019, \u2018the Court\u2019) in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland<\/em><\/a> through a gender lens, questioning whether its reasoning fully addresses women\u2019s systemic representational disadvantages both across generations (intergenerational<\/a>) and within the present generation (intragenerational<\/a>, para. 149). In so doing, it further explores how the Court\u2019s reliance on supposedly \u2018neutral\u2019 standards reinforces existing structural biases, effectively compelling women to conform to male-centred frameworks rather than ensuring substantive equality.<\/p>\n

The ECtHR\u2019s Approach to Inter- and Intragenerational Inequities in Climate Jurisprudence <\/strong><\/p>\n

In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland<\/em>, the complaint was brought by four elderly women and a non-profit association governed by Swiss law. The applicants anchored their arguments on, inter alia<\/em>, intergenerational equity while relying on Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights<\/a> (\u2018ECHR\u2019) (paras. 22\u201326)<\/a>. This marked the first time the ECtHR found a state responsible for the violation of Article 8 related to climate change on the merits (para. 573)<\/a>. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that anthropogenic climate change poses a current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights protected under the ECHR (para. 436)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Court highlighted that the legal obligations under the ECHR primarily protect individuals currently alive within the jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties, implying its focus on intragenerational equity<\/a> (para. 484<\/a>). Yet, emphasizing future threats, the Court briefly underscored the obligation to protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations under Article 3 of the UNFCCC<\/a> (for a definition of future generations, see Humphreys\u2019 \u2018Against Future Generations<\/a>\u2019 and scholars\u2019 reply<\/a>), hinting at intergenerational equity. The Court\u2019s phrasing of \u2018burden-sharing\u2019<\/a> while examining intergenerational equity poses an interesting approach, as it points at the \u2018vulnerability\u2019 of future generations. As the Court\u2019s reasoning suggests, this vulnerability arises because future generations lack representation in current decision-making. Yet, they will bear the escalating consequences of current failures to address climate change effectively (paras. 419, 420)<\/a>. This \u2018burden-sharing\u2019 also entails a practical aspect for the benefit of future generations, hinting at the obligation to develop<\/a> effective national procedures and frameworks. The content and scope<\/a> of these obligations came down to procedural safeguards<\/a>, i.e. access to information concerning climate policies and risk assessments and the right to public participation in decision-making (see here<\/a> and here<\/a>, paras. 420, 554).<\/p>\n

While finding a violation and emphasizing the absence of full participation in the decision-making of the groups most affected by climate change, the Court does not integrate its recognition of women\u2019s specific vulnerabilities into its reasoning on the positive obligations arising under Article 8. This leads us to the gender perspective of intragenerational and intergenerational equity.<\/p>\n

The Illusion of Neutrality: Structural Bias in Legal Standards<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Court acknowledged that both current and future impacts of climate change most heavily affect vulnerable groups in society \u2018who need special care and protection from the authorities\u2019, and who are at a representational disadvantage (paras. 410, 485).<\/a> Here, it seems, the ECtHR implied that participation in decision-making is unequal even for the present generation. It stated that \u2018the members of society who stand to be most affected by the impact of climate change can be considered to be at a distinct representational disadvantage\u2019, including women, especially elderly women, who were deemed particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of climate change (see, paras. 529\u2013531<\/a>, IPCC repor<\/a>t<\/u>).<\/p>\n

This interrelation between the adverse effects of climate change, gender, and inequality has also been recognised within the UNFCCC<\/a> framework, in documents such as the Gender Action Plan<\/a> and the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender<\/a>. For instance, in the aftermath of climate-related crises, women and girls<\/a> are more exposed to gender-based violence, and girls are less likely than boys to continue their education. Moreover, despite attempts to include women<\/a> \u2013 especially from rural and indigenous communities \u2013 in decision-making and introducing gender-disaggregated data for analysis and solutions, the foundational structural and institutional barriers seem to remain largely and conceptually unaddressed. Issues such as unpaid household labour, unequal power relations<\/a>, or unequal land rights still prevent women<\/a> from full participation or representation.<\/p>\n

It remains unclear whether the broad procedural safeguards, i.e. access to information concerning climate policies and risk assessments and the right to participation (para. 554<\/a>), will fulfil the Court\u2019s \u2018practical and effective\u2019 standard that ensures full participation or representation of women in the decision-making (cf. para. 545<\/a>). As governance and (political) decision-making remain anchored<\/a> in male-centred norms, barriers will remain despite the procedural safeguards as they stem from a broader systemic issue. Achieving gender equality within this model requires women to accommodate to institutions built on male-centred norms rather than critically assessing whether these institutions are adequate to ensure the substantial representation of women\u2019s interests and needs, both intergenerationally and intragenerationally. Feminist legal scholars, like K.W. Cross<\/a>, have long argued that forcing women to \u2018fit\u2019 into male-centred norms does not secure substantive equality. Instead, it merely perpetuates a norm that privileges male experiences as the default benchmark of reasonableness, assimilating women into the existing structures, including those envisioned by such procedural safeguards.<\/p>\n

In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, <\/em>the Court acknowledged the vulnerability of women, particularly in cases of premature deaths or the specific challenges faced by elderly women. However, it does not sufficiently address their disadvantages of participation or representation stemming from such systemic inequalities both from the inter- and intragenerational perspective. This is particularly evident in the context of climate change and the adverse effects of heatwaves, where the Court\u2019s recognition of gendered experiences remains unclear (see para. 517<\/a>, compare with Synthesis Report by the FCC Secretariat<\/a> and World Bank Group report<\/a>). Hence, the Court reasoned that it is \u2018often impossible to quantify the effects of the environmental nuisance at issue in each individual case and to distinguish them from the influence of other relevant factors such as age, profession or personal lifestyle\u2019 (para. 517<\/a>). We argue that this reasoning obscures the gendered experiences of harm (gender-differentiated impacts of climate degradation, including health and daily well-being, gender-based violence, access to education and training, income level and access to employment, or participation in decision-making are explained by, e.g. UNFCC Subsidiary Body<\/a>, the World Bank<\/a>, UNDP<\/a>), instead reverting to an abstract notion of neutrality that fails to capture the intersectional vulnerabilities faced by elderly women.<\/p>\n

Redefining Parameters for Equity<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Court acknowledged the complex chain of effects of climate change and the confluence of vague factors contributing to the increased vulnerability of elderly women. The unique harms faced by elderly women as a group or individual applicants due to heatwaves were presented to the Court, including the higher mortality rates and greater health risks (para. 66<\/a>). Yet the Court\u2019s assessment concerning this vulnerability ultimately corresponded to the \u2018high intensity of exposure\u2019 and \u2018pressing need\u2019 thresholds concerning harm. The application of these \u2018especially high\u2019 thresholds (para. 527<\/a>), combined with the requirement of demonstrating \u2018exceptional circumstances\u2019 (para. 533<\/a>), reflects a rigid approach that inadequately addresses the structural dimensions of gendered vulnerability. Moreover, the criteria for these thresholds lack clear parameters, raising the question of the standard against which they are measured.<\/p>\n

As K.W. Cross<\/a> observes, men or male experience are often regarded as \u2018neutral\u2019 and \u2018universal\u2019, serving as the standard against which the interests, experiences, and characteristics of the subordinated are measured. This raises the question of whether, despite establishing that \u2018in each applicant\u2019s individual case, [\u2026] the requirement of a particular level and severity of the adverse consequences affecting the applicant concerned is satisfied\u2019 (para. 531), the Court\u2019s reinforcement of high thresholds in an ambiguous manner risks perpetuating a framework that fails to adequately account for gendered disparities in harm. This outcome is symptomatic of a deeper problem in the conceptual architecture of gender equality and equity.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the substantial assessment concerning elderly women\u2019s vulnerability encounters the \u2018neutral\u2019 (procedural) barrier of Article 34<\/a>, through these high and exceptional thresholds. In other words, it is questionable whether merely recognizing the vulnerability of elderly women at the individual level, while subjecting them to high and exceptional thresholds or failing to sufficiently emphasize the structural dimensions of their gendered experiences of harm, suffices to provide effective protection. As highlighted by President Judge O\u2019Leary\u2019s question during the hearing<\/a>, a different outcome could have emerged had the Court considered, as in Gorraiz Lizarraga <\/em>(para. 38<\/a>), an evolutive interpretation of victim status<\/a> \u2013 one that responds to contemporary needs and fully accounts for the intersectional and gendered nature of harm in climate-related cases.<\/p>\n

The Court\u2019s interpretation through this \u2018especially high thresholds\u2019 fails to adequately account for the structural biases inherent in these frameworks, effectively compelling women to conform to a so-called \u2018neutral\u2019 standard that is, in reality, shaped by the average male experience. This \u2018neutral\u2019 standard, however, is far from neutral. It reflects a male-centric perspective that historically dominated legal systems. This assessment resembles another similar concept, the \u2018reasonable person\u2019 standard. Despite being presented as an objective measure, the reasonable person is frequently anchored in male norms, as argued by feminist scholars such as W. Parker<\/a> and Ann C. McGinley<\/a>. Valentin Jeutner<\/a> describes it as a bias that \u2018channels the prejudices of those who invoke the standard\u2019, rather than mitigating it. In this case, the ECtHR\u2019s reliance on a supposedly neutral standard, whilst reinforcing high thresholds, reduces the particular vulnerabilities of elderly women, forcing their lived experiences to conform to an ill-suited framework (see here<\/a> and here<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Under this framework, women\u2019s subjective characteristics \u2013 especially those of older women \u2013 seem to be implicitly assessed through a high threshold from the parameter of a \u2018reasonable person\u2019, meaning that of men, who supposedly inhabit a neutral standpoint, unaffected by factors such as bodily vulnerability, socio-economic constraints, or gender-based caregiving responsibilities (paras. 533-534<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Concluding Remarks<\/strong><\/p>\n

To conclude, by overlooking women\u2019s embodied, gendered experiences, the Court\u2019s approach reveals the deep-rooted flaws in existing gender equality mechanisms for addressing intragenerational equity. Its reliance on so-called \u2018neutral\u2019 standards reinforces male norms, limiting recognition of the compounded vulnerabilities faced by (especially elder) women during climate-induced crises. Yet intragenerational and intergenerational equity are inseparable: failing to address present inequalities weakens efforts to protect future generations. Only an intersectional approach that accounts for the interplay of age, gender, and social factors can ensure \u2018practical and effective\u2019 participation and representation for all.<\/p>\n

This requires moving beyond frameworks that assimilate women into male-centred norms. Instead, legal and policy structures shall reconnect both women and men with their distinct gendered experiences and the broader natural environment, fostering a more holistic understanding of human-environment relationships. Such a shift not only addresses gendered harms but also strengthens our responsibility to future generations and the planet. By replacing instrumental, male-centric \u2018neutrality\u2019 with genuinely inclusive and ecologically attuned structures, we create a foundation for true intra- and intergenerational equity, tackling a systemic issue that spans across time.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This blog post examines the stance of the European Court of Human Rights (\u2018ECtHR\u2019, \u2018the Court\u2019) in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland through a gender lens, questioning whether its reasoning fully addresses women\u2019s systemic representational disadvantages both across generations (intergenerational) and within the present generation (intragenerational, para. 149). In so doing, it further […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[3792,3782,3857,5418],"authors":[7567,7566],"article-categories":[3572],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-24266","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-climate-change","tag-ecthr","tag-gender","tag-vulnerability","authors-dilruba-begum-kartepe","authors-mariia-zheltukha","article-categories-symposium"],"acf":{"subline":"Rethinking Intra- and Intergenerational Equity in the ECtHR\u2019s Climate Jurisprudence"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20250306-000807-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24266","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=24266"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24266\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":24315,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24266\/revisions\/24315"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24266"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=24266"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=24266"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=24266"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=24266"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=24266"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}