{"id":17098,"date":"2022-04-01T08:00:06","date_gmt":"2022-04-01T06:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/?p=17098"},"modified":"2022-04-01T14:09:21","modified_gmt":"2022-04-01T12:09:21","slug":"sovereignty-and-non-intervention","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/sovereignty-and-non-intervention\/","title":{"rendered":"Sovereignty and Non-Intervention"},"content":{"rendered":"

It is abundantly clear by now that China will not criticize the Russian Federation\u2019s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, started on 24 February 2022, despite China\u2019s much-touted strict support for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. That Russia has no legal justification<\/a> for its invasion, nor for the recognition of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People\u2019s Republics as independent, and is thus violating Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty, should be without question. But this has not moved China\u2019s diplomatic position. Neither has Ukraine\u2019s pending case<\/a> before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Kyiv seeks confirmation that Russia\u2019s claims of a genocide in the Donbas are entirely spurious and cannot be used as justification for an invasion. The Court has already granted provisional measures ordering Russia to immediately suspend military operations. In a 13-2 vote, only the Russian and Chinese judges voted against. China has also not been moved by the fact that the International Criminal Court (ICC<\/a>) wants to investigate potential Russian war crimes in Ukraine. In light of the Russo-Ukrainian War, as the following will argue, China\u2019s approach to international law appears not principled, but rather geopolitical and selective, and its much-sought after image as a \u201cresponsible great power\u201d is and should be seriously dented.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s Stance on Sovereignty and Intervention<\/strong><\/p>\n

Even if Russia had mounted a credible attempt at a humanitarian justification for its invasion of Ukraine, it bears reminding that China\u2019s consistent stance has been to reject any military intervention not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)<\/a>. In an effort to end its diplomatic isolation after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, Beijing had shifted away from its previous absolutist view of sovereignty<\/a> to support some (often Western-initiated) United Nations (UN) sanctioned interventions in the 1990s (e.g. Timor-Leste<\/a>) \u2013 but only such \u2013, while continuing to veto sanctions and interventions in other cases (e.g. Zimbabwe<\/a>, Syria<\/a>). It allowed for the intervention in Libya<\/a> through its abstention, but later harshly criticized NATO\u2019s interpretation of the mandate and became much more veto-prone in the UNSC. Even aside from the record of China\u2019s condemnation of the NATO and US interventions in Kosovo<\/a> and Iraq<\/a>, an argumentum a minori ad maius<\/em> would have to lead Beijing to a clear rejection of Russia\u2019s invasion.<\/p>\n

Non-Interference and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence<\/strong><\/p>\n

During its exclusion from the UN until 1971, the People\u2019s Republic of China did not propose something substantively new to international law, but, together with India, sought to accentuate certain aspects of the UN Charter through the since much-cherished<\/a> \u201cFive Principles of Peaceful Co-existence<\/a>\u201d. These include respect for others\u2019 sovereignty, non-aggression, and the often-cited non-interference in other\u2019s internal affairs. The goal of propagating the vague and non-binding principles<\/a>, was to strengthen China\u2019s relations with formerly colonized peoples<\/a>. During its unilateral military intervention in still rather newly-independent Ukraine, Russia has reportedly demanded that, for hostilities to cease, Ukraine has to change its constitution and to accept that Russia appoint a new Ukrainian prime minister<\/a>. Near perfect violations of letter and spirit of the five principles.<\/p>\n

Domestic Sensitivities \u2013 From Taiwan to Xinjiang<\/strong><\/p>\n

Aside from the continued rule of the Communist Party, territorial integrity is the most central goal<\/a> of the Chinese leadership. Beijing is worried about consolidating control where it already has it, such as in Xinjiang, and about gaining control where it only claims sovereignty, mainly in Taiwan. It has been obsessed with the issue of supposed separatism and foreign interference in its internal affairs for decades. Together with its \u201cShanghai Cooperation Organisation\u201d partners, China concluded a convention on combating separatism as one of the \u201cthree evils\u201d<\/a> purportedly plaguing the region \u2013 and later used alleged separatism to justify its extensive network of re-education camps<\/a> in Xinjiang. As for Taiwan, commitment to a \u201cone China policy<\/a>\u201d is Beijing\u2019s most basic expectation of any foreign partner. Meanwhile Russian peace negotiators demand that Ukraine recognize Crimea as part of Russia and the separatist so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People\u2019s Republics as independent<\/a>.<\/p>\n

China and Russia \u2013 a \u201cStrategic Partnership With No Limits\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

Competing with China\u2019s principles and domestic sensitivities, is the geopolitically important strategic partnership with Russia, which the two presidents in early February described as having \u201cno limits<\/a>\u201d. Ever closer ties allow China to rely on a strategically secured hinterland<\/a>, and to focus on offensive action in the Western Pacific. Beijing values the reliable support in its diplomatic standoff with the US, aims for cooperation to weaken the US, and is happy for Russia to distract Washington<\/a>. China and Russia have also aligned more closely on ideology and want to make the world safe for dictatorship<\/a>. They agree broadly on issues of global order, while both perceive threats from the US, and see themselves in a \u201cjoint struggle<\/a>\u201d against US-fomented democratic revolutions. Russia is also increasingly important to China\u2019s energy security<\/a> \u2013 esp. for the case of a military standoff with the US \u2013 even though Beijing would never allow for a dependence like the EU\u2019s.<\/p>\n

A Geopolitical C<\/strong>hoice \u2013 China\u2019s UN Votes and Official Statements on Ukraine<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the time of writing, geopolitics appears to have outweighed principles. Importantly, China does attempt to walk a tightrope between its priorities and has not gone full in with Russia. On balance, though, formerly treasured notions in international law and international relations are being left in the rear-view mirror. Two aspects of China\u2019s approach shall be addressed here, its voting behaviour in the UN and its official statements on Ukraine more broadly.<\/p>\n

China abstained at UN votes, but in diplomatic statements defends the Russian position. A first UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution<\/a>, vetoed by Russia, on February 25, \u201cdemanded that Moscow immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw all troops\u201d. It also required Moscow to reverse its recognition of the two separatist entities in eastern Ukraine as independent. A second UNSC text<\/a> \u2013 procedural, i.e. it could not be vetoed \u2013 called for a rare emergency special session of the UN General Assembly to address Russia\u2019s military operation. Both texts were supported by eleven members, with China among the three abstentions. At the General Assembly<\/a>, 141 countries supported a resolution demanding that Russia immediately withdraw from Ukraine, with China among the 35 abstentions. Reportedly, the UNSC texts had to be watered down<\/a>, though, for China not to use its veto. Mainly, a reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter \u2013 and thus inter alia potential sanctions under Article 41 \u2013 was removed, and language on Russia\u2019s \u201caggression against Ukraine\u201d changed from \u201ccondemn\u201d to \u201cdeplore\u201d. Moreover, by abstaining, China did not show the consistency of members like Kenya<\/a>, who noted that it had previously also opposed Western military interventions.<\/p>\n

While there was some back and forth on whether to emphasize Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty<\/a>, Chinese diplomatic statements consistently showed sympathy and understanding for the Russian position. After a generic commitment to all countries\u2019 sovereignty, Foreign Minister Wang Yi muddied the waters<\/a> right on February 24 by noting the supposedly \u201cunique historical context\u201d and his understanding for \u201cRussia\u2019s legitimate concerns on security issues\u201d. Referencing \u201cCold War mentality\u201d implied Western culpability, and the call for a new \u201cEuropean security mechanism\u201d appeared to entirely discount the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Later, Wang explicitly criticized past NATO expansion<\/a>, as well as the current use of sanctions. Paying lip-service to sovereignty towards Ukraine, he did not waver in justifying Russia\u2019s action<\/a>. Throughout, Wang made no reference at all to the non-interference principle \u2013 nor did his superior, Politburo member Yang Jiechi<\/a> in a fresh statement on March 15. Both failed to call on Russia to respect the ICJ\u2019s order of March 16. Beijing gives the clear-cut impression that its principles do not hold where its strategic partner in Moscow is concerned.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

It is abundantly clear by now that China will not criticize the Russian Federation\u2019s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, started on 24 February 2022, despite China\u2019s much-touted strict support for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. That Russia has no legal justification for its invasion, nor for the recognition of the so-called Donetsk and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[],"authors":[6986],"article-categories":[6000],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-17098","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","authors-thomas-eder","article-categories-article"],"acf":{"subline":"China Deserts its Principles on Ukraine"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20220401-130933-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17098","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17098"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17098\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17104,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17098\/revisions\/17104"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17098"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17098"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17098"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=17098"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=17098"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=17098"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}