{"id":14250,"date":"2021-06-07T08:00:52","date_gmt":"2021-06-07T06:00:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/?p=14250"},"modified":"2021-06-11T12:06:54","modified_gmt":"2021-06-11T10:06:54","slug":"from-sticks-to-carrots","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/from-sticks-to-carrots\/","title":{"rendered":"From Sticks to Carrots?"},"content":{"rendered":"

A new article on how States could be encouraged to comply with international law promises to revolutionize how we think about incentives in international relations. In \u2018Rewarding in International Law<\/a>\u2019, Anne van Aaken and Bet\u00fcl Simsek\u00a0propose a new approach to how we make use of \u2018sticks\u2019 and \u2018carrots\u2019 in international law.\u00a0In addition to sanctions, they argue that rewards also be part of the tools used to boost compliance. This Symposium\u00a0aims to explore the potentials and pitfalls of the proposed approach and asks how rewarding can be applied in different contexts \u2013 from general international law to human rights and rule of law situations in the EU.<\/p>\n

In this introductory note, we will first present the main ideas of van Aaken and Simsek\u2019s\u00a0article<\/a> and then briefly outline the claims of each contribution within the Symposium<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Rewarding in International Law<\/strong><\/p>\n

Many studies have asked and sought to answer the question of why States comply with international law. The paper<\/a> by van Aaken and Simsek proposes a different, innovative approach to the question: it investigates \u2018rewarding\u2019 as a potential mechanism to boost compliance. If traditional international legal and international relationship scholarship has most often focused on negative incentives to induce States to comply, the paper underlines the costs and ineffectiveness of such sanctions. In introducing a new approach to this area of international legal scholarship, the paper makes a systematic and persuasive argument of how compliance could be improved through the introduction of rewards, i.e. “transfers of valued material or immaterial goods, such as opportunities for and benefit of cooperation, money, technology, or social approval\/good reputation.” (p. 196<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The paper presents a typology of how rewards can be applied in international law. It distinguishes between rewards, which are provided for in a treaty (internal rewards) and those that are obtained outside of a treaty (external rewards). It also distinguishes between rewards that States obtain at the time of entering a treaty or when they comply with an obligation. These distinctions allow the authors to systemically analyse how rewards compare to sanctions and capture all positive inducements for cooperation. The authors “provide a \u2018tool-box\u2019 for enhanced cooperation, discussing the conditions under which different tools may work” (p. 198<\/a>). In this regard, the paper brings nuance to the universe of compliance mechanisms, highlighting both the potential benefits and limitations of rewarding.<\/p>\n

The paper\u2019s main argument is that compared to sanctions rewards ultimately represent a potentially superior mechanism to motivate State compliance and that therefore international law ought to give them full consideration. In the main part, the paper adopts a rationalist approach: it underscores the usefulness of rewarding, showing that “compliance can be achieved if a reward outweighs the benefits from breaching international law.” (p. 197<\/a>). But both authors also consider how the behavioural, psychological impact of \u2018rewards\u2019 may be perceived differently by States and how rewards could provoke a different response than sanctions. Whilst “[t]hreats trigger negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, or anger, and cause a subject to feel stress” (p. 231<\/a>) and could be perceived as hostile, rewards can show better results and “produce a more neutral setting” (p. 232<\/a>), bringing to front the reciprocity and cooperation between different actors. These are \u2013 as the article emphasises \u2013 the building blocks of international law.\u00a0By altering the frames within which we think about international cooperation, the paper helps shift the narrative \u2018from a penalty-oriented system to governance mechanisms between states\u2019 (p. 198<\/a>). In this regard, it not only fills a gap in the existing literature, but also encourages us to think about compliance through a positive lens.<\/p>\n

The Contributions of the Symposium<\/strong><\/p>\n

Reflecting on the normative dimension,\u00a0<\/strong>Daniel Peat<\/strong><\/a> (University of Leiden) raises a set of important and fundamental questions when it comes to rewarding in international law. While van Aaken and Simsek’s article offers an insightful way to reinvigorate the debate on compliance, Peat raises questions about the power imbalances in this context and their influence on the power of rewarding. More broadly, he questions what impact a debate on sanctions or rewards can have on the legal character of international law in the long term.<\/p>\n

In her contribution, Silvia Steininger<\/strong><\/a> (Max Planck Institute For Comparative Public Law and International Law Heidelberg) reflects on potentials and limits of rewarding in an institutional setting like the Council of Europe. Pointing to the difficulties the proposed tool raises in the context of States not complying with their human rights obligations, including how it affects the authority of international institutions, she argues that rewards should be understood as an extension of the existing institutional options and not as a substitute for \u2018shaming\u2019.<\/p>\n

Luis F. Viveros-Montoya<\/strong><\/a> (University College London)\u00a0examines whether rewards can be used as remedies by human rights courts and engages with the idea of punitive damages. He considers that neither rewards nor penalties fit\u00a0the general law of State responsibility\u00a0and the remedial powers of human rights courts.\u00a0While he potentially sees room for courts to award incentives to States through rewarding, he rejects the proposition if that entails that courts have the authority of applying a lex specialis\u00a0<\/em>standard that displaces the general rule of \u2018full reparation\u2019.<\/p>\n

Approaching the question from an international relations perspective,\u00a0Cristiane Lucena Carneiro<\/strong><\/a> (University of S\u00e3o Paulo) highlights the role of institutional architecture and proposes a fresh look at how a problem is structured. She argues in favour of considering carefully how punishment and reward fit within institutional design and then analysing what role they play within rationalist and behavioural science frames.<\/p>\n

In light of recent attacks on the rule of law principles in Hungary and Poland, Matej Avbelj<\/a><\/strong> (Graduate School of Government and European Studies at Kranj) explores whether van Aaken and Simsek\u2019s findings can be applied in the context of an autonomous legal order such as the EU. While seeing a case for their application, he argues that within a close union of States, fundamental shared values should act as the ultimate limit to rewarding.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Acknowledgement:<\/u><\/em> This Symposium<\/a> is co-organised by Veronika Fikfak, whose contribution to this Symposium forms part of the Human Rights Nudge project<\/a> that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union\u2019s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement No. 803891).<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A new article on how States could be encouraged to comply with international law promises to revolutionize how we think about incentives in international relations. In \u2018Rewarding in International Law\u2019, Anne van Aaken and Bet\u00fcl Simsek\u00a0propose a new approach to how we make use of \u2018sticks\u2019 and \u2018carrots\u2019 in international law.\u00a0In addition to sanctions, they […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6639],"tags":[],"authors":[5329,6030,6812],"article-categories":[3572],"doi":[],"class_list":["post-14250","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","authors-christian-pogies","authors-justine-batura","authors-veronika-fikfak","article-categories-symposium"],"acf":{"subline":"An Introduction to the Symposium on Rewarding in International Law"},"meta_box":{"doi":"10.17176\/20210609-142107-0"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14250","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14250"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14250\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14274,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14250\/revisions\/14274"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14250"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14250"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14250"},{"taxonomy":"authors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/authors?post=14250"},{"taxonomy":"article-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-categories?post=14250"},{"taxonomy":"doi","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/doi?post=14250"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}